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Abstract 
This dissertation addresses the gendered implications of science and technology in 
the era of reforms. It argues that in this era, which began in 1978 and continues today, 
science and technology are highly romanticized as nearly omnipotent. This results in its 
being embedded not only into ordinary Chinese people’s lives, hoping to bring them 
positive changes, but also into the Chinese government’s political practices, hoping to 
achieve its political purposes through science and technology. It also points out that in the 
era of reforms, Chinese women’s lived experiences are full of tensions, struggles, and 
conflicts, as evidenced by the expectations for them to become virtuous wives, caring 
mothers, and, at the same time, successful professionals. The veneration of science and 
technology in Chinese culture and the Chinese government’s strict control over science 
and technology further complicate Chinese women’s experiences. 
To illustrate these points, I mainly use the analytical methods “articulation” and 
“mapping” from cultural studies to explore the impacts of Chinese myth, Confucianism 
and Daoism, Chinese language, Chinese political practices, and media and popular 
discourses to explain the status of science and technology and the living situation of 
Chinese women in the era of reforms. I analyze the cases of the development and use of 
science and technology: to promote marriage and family, for population control and 
family design, to promote the discourse of the super mother, and to help women gain 
independence and fight against sexual violence. I focus on the gendered implications of 
some specific scientific and technological artifacts, including dating websites, in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), breast pumps, social media, and many others.  
ix 
This dissertation contributes to understanding Chinese women and science and 
technology in contemporary China. It reveals that although Chinese women’s living 
situations have improved significantly, many of them are still trapped and subordinated. 
Science and technology, which are always articulated with other elements, especially the 
Chinese government’s politics, the traditional patriarchal culture, and many Chinese 
women’s demands for gender equality, aggravate many women’s suffering while also 
offering some of them extra job opportunities and access to virtual spaces to engage in 
social activism.   
1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
China is undergoing enormous changes in the twenty-first century. Its economic 
performance is impressive: products made in China circulate around the world, and 
China’s GDP per capita is skyrocketing. In 2017 China’s merchandise export reached 
2,263,371 million USD and the GDP per capita reached 8,525 USD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2019). However, despite China’s remarkable 
economic performance in recent years, the economic gap between the poor and the rich 
has become increasingly pronounced as claimed by Benjamin, Brandt, Giles, and Wang 
(2008). The Gini coefficient in China was 0.465 in 2016 (Statista, 2019).1 In contrast, in 
1990, the Gini coefficient was 0.357 and in 2005 it was 0.449 (Wu, 2010, p.93).  
Moreover, because China’s economy has relied heavily on industrialization, its 
environment is under threat. Roumasset, Burnett, and Wang (2008) write that “One-third 
of China’s total land is prone to desertification, including 262 million hectares of pastoral 
and oasis land in the Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Gansu, and Qinghai Province”(p. 
251). The industrialization not only results in the desertification of land, but also heavy 
environmental pollution in China. For example, Hu (2016) reports: 
Discharge [into the Yangtze River] has been steadily increasing over the past 
decade: already surpassing 30 billion tonnes in 2006 and growing to 33.9 billion 
tonnes in 2014, according to the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission. 
                                                 
1The Gini income coefficient that is used to measure income distribution across a population can take any value 
between 0-1.The closer the Gini coefficient is to 1, the more unequal a country is. 
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Also worth noting is that in 2014, 80.8% of total waste water was discharged into 
the mainstream of the Yangtze; the major tributaries; and the Tai, Poyang & 
Dongting Lakes—all parts of the Yangtze River’s water system.  
In order to deal with water pollution, the Chinese government has formulated a series of 
regulatory policies. For instance, China’s revised Water Pollution Prevention and Control 
Law has been in effect since January 1, 2018. This law imposes several strict 
requirements, such as: 
Those who build sewage outlets in protected drinking water source areas will face 
a maximum fine of one million yuan. […] The law instructs government to build 
sewage treatment and garbage disposal facilities in rural areas, and that standards 
be set on fertilizer and pesticide use. (as cited in Meng, 2017) 
Facing not only water pollution but also air pollution, which has led the capital city 
Beijing to be known as a smog city, the Chinese government issued the Air Pollution 
Prevention and Control Action Plan in September 2013. In this plan, which regulates 
emissions including those produced by coal burning, industry production, and vehicle 
exhaust, the Chinese government has made several promises such as: 
By 2017, the urban concentration of PM10 must decrease by 10% compared with 
2012, and as a result the annual number of days with fairly good air quality should 
gradually increase.2 
                                                 
2 “PM10 is particulate matter 10 micrometers or less in diameter, PM2.5 is particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in 
diameter. PM2.5 is generally described as fine particles. By way of comparison, a human hair is about 100 micrometers, 
so roughly 40 fine particles could be placed on its width” (Australian Government Department of the Environment and 
Energy, n.d.).  
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Concentrations of PM2.5 in the heavily polluted Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze 
River Delta, and Pearl River Delta regions must fall by around 25%, 20%, and 
15%, respectively (as cited in Library of Congress, 2019). 
On April 22, 2016, China signed the Paris Climate Agreement. In this way, the Chinese 
government demonstrates to the world its determination to tackle environmental issues.  
Socially, China’s literacy rate has improved. Due to China’s free nine-year 
compulsory educational system spanning from primary school to middle school, which 
has been implemented since 1986, an increasing number of Chinese people are literate. 
Thus, in 1982, 65.505% of Chinese adults (a person aged 15 or above) were literate; in 
contrast, in 2010, 95.124% of Chinese adults were literate (The World Bank, n.d.). While 
it is positive that illiteracy, which had challenged the Chinese society for thousands of 
years, is no longer an issue, new issues have emerged—for example, food safety. In 
2008, the Chinese Milk Scandal broke out. It was revealed that several large and famous 
Chinese milk companies (e.g. Sanlu/三鹿 and Yili/伊利) used the toxic chemical 
melamine, which can crystallize easily and result in kidney stones, in their products 
including powdered infant formula. In addition to the issue of food safety, an exploitative 
sex industry flourishes in contemporary Chinese society. From the mid-1950s to the early 
1980s, the sex industry almost vanished because of the Chinese government’s policy that 
shut down brothels and nightclubs, taught sex workers other living skills, and retained 
sex workers to work in other industries. While in China the sex industry currently is still 
illegal on the surface, it has become an important industry, even one of the leading 
industries in some Chinese cities such as Dong Guan (东莞), due in part to the local 
4 
government’s corruption and individuals seizing opportunities to make profit. Osburg 
(2016) points out that nowadays Chinese society “has been marked by the rise of 
hierarchical, patron-client form of sexuality, especially among elite” (p. 108). 
Politically, the Chinese government has an elevated status in the world. Until July 
2018, more than 20 countries allowed Chinese citizens to enter without applying for 
visas. In contrast, before 2010, there were fewer than 10 visa-free countries for Chinese 
passport holders. Moreover, the Chinese government tries to connect with the rest of the 
world through exerting its soft power and in the forms of investment, trade, and 
exchange.3  By December 2017, the Chinese government had set up 525 Confucius 
institutes and 1,113 Confucius classrooms globally (Confucius Institute Headquarters, 
n.d.). These Confucius institutes and classrooms are responsible for teaching foreigners 
Chinese language and culture. Moreover, the Chinese government has carried out the Belt 
and Road Initiative since 2015. The Belt and Road Initiative aims to build a unified 
international market with China at the center. It includes several strategies such as 
making investments and creating infrastructure in Asian, European, and African 
countries. In general, the relations between China and other countries have been 
improved, but regional conflicts remain an issue. For instance, due to the disagreements 
concerning the South China Sea and Taiwan, military and political skirmishes persist 
between China and some countries.  
                                                 
3 Soft Power: This term is contrary to hard power. Exercising hard power means a country uses its military power such 
as gunfire to exert its influence over other countries. In contrast, exercising soft power means a country tries to 
persuade other countries to respect it and follow its leadership without military coercion. Usually, a country works to 
craft a positive image of itself internationally and propagandize the superiority of its culture.  
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These economic, environmental, social, and political changes in China are largely 
attributed to the Reform and Opening-Up Policy (Gai Ge Kai Fang Zheng Ce/改革开放
政策/ROUP), which was initiated by Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1978 to 1989.4 Deng Xiaoping announced this 
policy in the third plenum of the eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China held from the18th of December 1978 to the 22nd.  
In general, ROUP aims to carry out reforms in China and to open China to the rest 
of the world. ROUP replaces the Chinese Communist Party’s previous emphases on 
egalitarianism and class struggle, instead encouraging competition and entrepreneurship. 
Accordingly, money is supposed to be distributed based on the amount and quality of 
work done, individuals can start their own business, and farmers can use their farmland to 
meet their own needs. ROUP also requires the Chinese government to shift its focus from 
class struggle to boosting the economy, developing science and technology, and 
cooperating with other countries. China’s Communist Party summarizes the desired 
effects of implementing ROUP as: liberate and develop productive forces, enhance 
comprehensive national power, emancipate the mind and seek truth for facts, build a 
socialist country with Chinese characteristics, and so forth (“Reform and Opening-Up,” 
n.d.).  
Since 1978, China has entered the era of reforms. From Deng Xiaoping’s 
leadership through successive leaders Jiang Zeming, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, ROUP 
                                                 
4In this dissertation, I use the abbreviation of “ROUP” to refer to China’s Reform and Opening-Up Policy.  
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has remained one of the constitutional policies. The Chinese government consistently 
maintains that China’s project of reforming and opening-up is an ongoing one. For 
example, on October 24, 2018, China’s current chairman Xi Jinping visited Shenzhen, 
which was chosen by China’s central government as a pioneering economic zone in 1980. 
After attending an exhibition that celebrated how Shenzhen changed from a fishing 
village to an international city in the past decades, Xi (2018) said “China will never stop 
the project of reforming and opening-up. This is the promise we make to the world” (para. 
1). Thus, the era of reforms began in the year of 1978 and continues to this day.5 
The year 2018 marked the 40th anniversary of the implementation of ROUP. This 
occasion offered a time to step back and to think about what had been going on so far. 
This work of reflection was crucial because: 
Understanding China’s reforms is important first and foremost for getting the 
historical record right, and this record is still shifting despite the many volumes 
that have already been developed to this topic. Understanding China’s past 
reforms and, with them, the basis for China’s success is also important for 
China’s future reforms; understanding the path travelled, the circumstances under 
which historical decisions were made and what their effects were on the course of 
China’s economy will inform decision makers on where to go next. Third, 
reflections on China’s reforms are increasingly important for the rest of the world. 
                                                 
5Some scholars (e.g. Minzner 2015) argue that China is in the post-reform era, a stance with which I do not agree. I 
believe that although in recent years, China’s process of reform and opening-up has been slowed in some aspects (e.g. 
politics and the opening of the domestic market to foreign investors) compared with the past decades, China still is on 
track with making domestic changes and building connections with the rest of the world. Moreover, in China, the 
predominant discourse that is both forwarded by the government and believed by most Chinese people is that China is 
still in the era of reforms.   
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Because of China’s economic success, more and more countries see China as an 
example to emulate, a model of development that could help them move from 
rags to riches within a generation. (Hofman, 2018, p. 53) 
There are a number of options for researchers if they want to understand what has 
been going on in the era of reforms. For instance, researchers can study the economic or 
environmental situation in China. In fact, these two aspects are the two most researched 
topics by scholars interested in the era of reforms (see the works of Chow 2004; Heston 
& Sicular 2008; Pekins 2018; Roumasset et al., 2008; Pan 2018). However, this 
dissertation aims to study the implications of science and technology in the era of 
reforms.6 In fact, in this period, the Chinese government has initiated a number of 
scientific and technological projects and spent billions of dollars on developing science 
and technology, which have significantly contributed to China’s impressive scientific and 
technological achievements and the perceived high status of science and technology in 
China in the era of reforms. For example, in March 1986, the Chinese government 
announced the National High-Tech Research and Development (R&D) Program that is 
also known as the 863 Program. This program aimed to support research projects in 
various scientific and technological fields (e.g. biology, information and electronic 
                                                 
6Here, I want to clarify my uses of three terms “science,” “technology,” and “science and technology.” In the 
Chinese language, the three corresponding terms are Kexue/科学 (science), Jishu /技术 (technology), and Keji/科技 
(science and technology). Semantically, Kexue refers to knowledge that helps people to understand the 
natural/material/physical world theoretically (for example, the fields of mathematics, physics, and chemistry are 
regarded as fields of Kexue), Jishu refers to skills or expertise that can be applied to solve practical problems (for 
example, the fields of engineering are regarded as fields of Jishu), and Keji refers to both theoretical knowledge and 
practical skills. However, it is a common practice in China that people use the term of Keji even though they actually 
merely refer to Kexue or Jishu. Accordingly, in this dissertation, I follow the Chinese tradition of using the term 
“science and technology” to align with the existing scholarship in China even though in some situations using a single 
term of “science” or “technology” would probably be more appropriate.   
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engineering, and automation). From 1986 to 2005, the 863 Program cost the Chinese 
government 33 billion Yuan (approximately 4.8 billion USD), and more than 150,000 
million scientists and engineers participated in the 863 Program (“863 Program,” n.d.). 
Accordingly, in the era of reforms, Chinese people have made some extraordinary 
scientific and technological achievements. For instance, on August 16, 2016, China 
launched Micius, which is the world's first quantum communication satellite. On July 29, 
2017, China successfully produced gas from flammable ice for the first time. The 
perceived high status of science and technology in contemporary China is indicated in the 
popular saying, “A nation will prosper only when its science and technology thrive; a 
country will be full of hope and have a promising future only when its science and 
technology are advanced (Ke Ji Xing Ze Min Zu Xing, Ke Ji Qiang Ze Guo Jia Qiang/科
技兴则民族兴，科技强则国家强).” 
The magnitude of the scientific and technological changes and their prestige in the 
era of reforms imply an interesting area of inquiry. However, “the implications of science 
and technology in the era of reforms” is still a broad research question. It is impossible 
for me to address the entirety of science and technology in a dissertation. So, I add 
another parameter to bring my topic into focus: to explore the implications of science and 
technology for gender relations, in particular for Chinese women in the era of reforms.7 
                                                 
7Here, I want to clarify my use of the terms of “woman”/“women” and “female”/”females.” When I use the term 
“woman” or “women,” I refer to the word of Funü(妇女) in Chinese language. In China, Funü refers to adult females. 
Accordingly, in this dissertation, “woman”/ “women” refers to adult females, while “female”/”females” is used without 
reference to age.  
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This decision is made based on the following reasons. First, the population of 
Chinese women is substantial. In 2017, there were 678,710,000 females (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2018). This number was greater than the total population of the 
U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand combined. Thus, as a Chinese female 
researcher, it is both my interest and my responsibility to know what this large population 
of people are experiencing, to understand their happiness and sorrow, to share their 
stories with both Chinese and non-Chinese audiences, and to figure out ways to improve 
their living situations. Second, the discussion concerning Chinese women’s lived 
experiences in the era of reforms is heated and includes many contradictory arguments. 
Some people argue that Chinese women have satisfactory livelihoods in the era of 
reforms. For example, on November 12, 2018, China’s Women’s News released an article 
in which a set of statistics and diagrams was used to prove that Chinese women’s living 
situations have been bettered.8 This article pointed out that in 2017, 52.5% of Chinese 
students who had received higher education were women; 48.6% of professionals in 
China were women; and 91.7% of Chinese women had access to free pre-pregnancy 
physical examinations (“Report of The Outcome,” 2018). However, some scholars argue 
that Chinese women’s living situations are not satisfactory in the era of reforms. For 
example, Lin (2001) writes: 
Reforms are failing women (along with workers and farmers), as evidenced by 
high unemployment, poor labour conditions, lack of protection for rural migrants, 
                                                 
8China’s Women’s News/中国妇女报, a newspaper sponsored by the All-China Women’s Federation, is the only 
governmental national newspaper in China that focuses on Chinese women.  
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the commercialisation (and traditionalisation according to artificial ‘Oriental 
taste’) of femininity, and ultimately the erasure of the problem of gender equality. 
(p. 1284) 
I want to engage in this discussion, to unpack contradictions, and to contribute my point 
of view through focusing on the gendered influences of science and technology. In fact, 
as I argue in Chapter Two, in the era of reforms, new practices of science and technology 
have become indispensable in Chinese people’s lives. Thus, if we want to understand 
Chinese women’s living situations in the era of reforms, we need to take the elements of 
science and technology into consideration. 
I want to make one further specification: in this dissertation I explore the 
implications of science and technology for Chinese women as wives, mothers, and 
professionals in the era of reforms. This research question is built based on my argument 
in Chapter Three, in which I argue that in the era of reforms, being wives and mothers 
remains crucial for Chinese women, meanwhile an increasing number of them are 
encouraged to join the workplace. Further, Chapter Four points out that the literature that 
maps the implications of science and technology for Chinese women’s marriages, 
families, and careers in the era of reforms is scant and lacks complexity. Thus, my 
dissertation addresses this gap in the research. To sum up, in this dissertation, I answer 
the question of how science and technology influence Chinese women, especially their 
marriages, families, and careers in the era of reforms. 
In order to answer my research question, I draw from the field of cultural studies. 
Cultural studies builds on and out of what is sometimes referred to as British cultural 
11 
studies. In addition to the impact of Stuart Hall, the field of cultural studies has been 
developed by scholars from various disciplines, such as Marxist scholars (e.g. Antonio 
Gramsci), scholars in communication and media (e.g. Lawrence Grossberg), and scholars 
in gender studies and critical race theory (e.g. Angela McRobbie). Due to these various 
influences, cultural studies is “an interdisplinary, transdisciplinary, and sometimes 
counter-disciplinary field” (Nelson &Treichler & Grossberg, 1992, p. 4). 
To risk the danger of over-simplification, the intellectual heritage of cultural 
studies can be characterized as having the following four aspects. First, cultural studies 
entails a particular view of what constitutes a culture and how to study it. Hoggart (1969) 
defines culture as “the whole way of life of a society, its beliefs, attitudes and temper as 
expressed in all kinds of structures, rituals and gestures, as well as in the traditionally-
defined form of art” (p. 3). Williams (1958) points out that “culture is ordinary” (p. 91). 
These statements make the abstract concept of “culture” accessible: culture is something 
everyone lives. It is politics, rituals, religious faiths, ideologies, people’s routine 
practices, affect, and so forth. Furthermore, because culture is ordinary, it can be 
perceived not only from elite artifacts (e.g. literature and highbrow art) but also from 
more “ordinary” artifacts (e.g. magazine articles and popular music). Thus, it is important 
for researchers to pay attention to the everyday “ordinary” artifacts. Accordingly, in this 
dissertation, concerning materials of analysis, I study different kinds of artifacts, which 
include but are not limited to government documents, popular sayings, news reports, 
folklore, magazine articles, TV series, songs, films, commercials, photos, paintings, 
stamps, and anonymous posts in open-access internet forums and discussion boards. 
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Second, cultural studies emphasizes the analysis of struggles of power for the 
purpose of understanding how change happens. When Grossberg (2010) defines the 
project of cultural studies, he writes: 
Cultural studies is concerned with describing and intervening in the ways cultural 
practices are produced within, inserted into, and operate in the everyday life of 
human beings and social formations, so as to reproduce, struggle against, and 
perhaps transform the existing structures of power. (p. 8) 
In fact, one of the crucial purposes of conducting research in cultural studies is to 
investigate how culture operates to disempower and empower people. Because cultural 
studies is deeply concerned for marginalized and oppressed people, a primary task of 
researchers in this field is to discuss how power shapes the current landscape of the 
culture that privileges certain people, ideas, and practices at the expense of others. Then, 
researchers are expected to figure out ways to intervene into relations of power to change 
societies for better. In short, cultural studies is “politically driven, that is committed to 
producing knowledge that help people understand that the world is changeable and that 
offer some direction for how to change it” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 264).  
Third, cultural studies is informed by a feminist orientation. For example, Angela 
McRobbie expressed her strong dissatisfaction with the absence of gender in analysis in 
early cultural studies. In 1980, she wrote “[in current works in cultural studies,] women 
and the whole question of sexual division have been marginalized” (p. 111). In 1992, 
Hall wrote that the feminist orientation is important for cultural studies and listed five 
significant contributions it has made: 
13 
First, the opening of the question of the personal as political, and its consequences 
for changing the object of study in cultural studies, was completely revolutionary 
in a theoretical and practical way. Second, the radical expansion of the notion of 
power, which had hitherto been very much developed within the framework of the 
notion of the public, the public domain, with the effect that we could not use the 
term power-so key to the earlier problematic of hegemony-in the same way. 
Third, the centrality of gender and sexuality to the understanding of power itself. 
Fourth, the opening of many of the questions that we thought we had abolished 
around the dangerous area of the subjectivity and the subject, which lodged those 
questions at the centre of cultural studies as a theoretical practice. Fifth, ‘the re-
opening’ of the closed frontier between social theory and the theory of conscious-
psychoanalysis. (p. 269) 
Feminism profoundly informs my criticism. As a feminist researcher, I commit to making 
Chinese women’s living situation visible, which I believe is an important first step to 
fight against sexism. Moreover, I embrace and value my situatedness as a Chinese 
woman. Haraway, a scholar in gender studies and cultural studies, puts forward the 
concept of “situated knowledge,” which argues that although there are some “core” 
qualities, objectivity is mediated and our situatedness matters for understanding the world. 
By drawing from my situatedness, I not only resonate with many other Chinese women’s 
experiences in the era of reforms but also engage in the work of self-reflection, which is 
promoted by cultural studies. Additionally, in this dissertation, I carefully consider ways 
to improve Chinese women’s living situations. As a field whose commitment is to 
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achieve social justice, feminism is not about privileging women at the cost of oppressing 
men; instead it is about changing our current societies into more fair and just places 
where everyone is able to have more access to self-fulfillment. Thus, one of my 
intentions in writing this dissertation is to reveal ways that Chinese women have 
empowered themselves and think about their future directions. 
Fourth, cultural studies provides researchers analytical methods to study a culture. 
Cultural studies requires researchers to ask the question “What’s going on?” (Grossberg, 
2010). Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari, cultural studies promotes the method of 
mapping. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) explain mapping by contrasting it with the method 
of tracing. They write: 
What distinguished the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward 
an experimentation in contact with the real. The map…fosters connection 
between fields…The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is 
detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, 
reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or 
social formation …A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, 
which always comes back “to the same.” (p. 12) 
Thus, in cultural studies, good researchers are good “mappers” who work hard to record 
different elements, to figure out relations among elements, and to detect how relations are 
changing. They draw the connections that constitute the map and do the work of 
articulation.  
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Articulation “is perhaps one of the most generative concepts in contemporary 
cultural studies” (Slack, 1996, p. 112). Although the word “articulation” can refer to the 
act of enunciation, in cultural studies, it is used to describe the process of linking 
(articulating), delinking (disarticulating), and relinking (rearticulating) different elements.  
The concept of “articulation” can be traced back to Stuart Hall’s use of Gramsci’s 
work to resolve the confrontation between the culturalist paradigm and the structuralist 
paradigm of cultural studies. At the risk of over-simplification, the culturalist paradigm 
claims that culture is interwoven in all social practices such as common forms of human 
activity, and there is a “harmonious and well-structured social totality in which 
everything fits together” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 214). In contrast, the structuralist paradigm 
argues that people are bearers of structures, and unity “is constructed through the 
differences between, rather than the homology of, practices” (Hall, 1980, p. 68). Hall 
(1983) draws from both paradigms and provides “Marxism without guarantees”—a 
theory that argues ideological categories not only are generated based on “their own laws 
of development” but also are “generated out of given materials” (p. 45). Due to this 
relative openness, scholars should understand “‘determinacy’ in terms of setting of limits, 
the establishment of parameters, the defining of the space of operations, the concrete 
conditions of existence, [and] the ‘givenness’ of social practices” (Hall, 1983, p. 45). 
I use the concept of “articulation” as an analytical method to explore “the process 
by which otherwise unrelated phenomena—practices, beliefs, texts, social groups, etc.—
come to be linked together in a meaningful and seemingly natural way” (Rodman, 1996, 
p.24). Thus, to understand an issue, I analyze its articulation in relation to a range of 
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different elements. Rodman’s analysis of the posthumous “life” of Elvis Presley is a good 
example of using “articulation” as an analytical method. In order to understand Elvis’s 
posthumous ubiquity, Rodman discusses how race, sexuality, class, and the American 
dream are articulated to constitute the power and significance of a posthumous Elvis.  
Moreover, the concept of “articulation” claims that because connections are 
contingent, “not only does the cause have effects, but the effects themselves affect the 
cause, and both are themselves determined by a host of other relations” (Grossberg, 1992, 
p. 56). This point is important in terms of resisting simple determinist thinking. Since 
there is no determinant cause and effect, cultural theorists need to understand cultural 
phenomena relationally and to notice the dynamics and struggles that are crucial in the 
process of political and cultural changes.  
The concept of “articulation” argues that connections are “not necessary, 
determined, absolute and essential for all time,” but this doesn’t imply that there is no 
“unity or stability” (Hall, 1986, p. 141). In fact, because “some connections are more 
difficult to disarticulate/rearticulate than others,” articulations vary in their tenacity 
(Slack, 1993, p. 27). The phrase “lines of tendential force” refers to articulations that are 
more resistant to change. For example, many women are discriminated against in the 
workplace. The connection between gender and the lack of trust for women’s credibility 
is a line of tendential force. Although this connection is not necessary, it is a common 
practice that women’s salary is less than men’s and it is harder for women to get 
promoted even when the quality of their work is on par with men’s. This means that 
gender-based discrimination in the workplace is relatively “stable.” However, despite its 
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“stable” status at this point, articulation is an ongoing process of change without a 
definite termination. This means maybe one day, women can be treated fairly given that 
political systems, people’s minds, and sexist cultures are open to change.     
Last but not the least, the concept of “articulation” provides a productive way for 
researchers to conceptualize history. The concept implies that in order to understand the 
present moment, we must understand its history. Because, as Williams (2011) puts it:  
In the analysis of contemporary culture, the existing state of [the] selective 
tradition is of vital importance, for it is often true that some changes in this 
tradition—establishing new lines with the past, breaking or redrawing existing 
lines—is a radical kind of contemporary change.  (p. 74) 
Thus, it is through history that we can better understand the present. It is through the 
present that we can better predict the future trajectory of development. When we look at 
history, we look for “what’s old;” when we look at the present, we look for “what’s new” 
and for “what has been rearticulated;” and when we look for trajectories of change, we 
consider the question of what can be disarticulated and what is possible to be articulated 
and re-articulated.  
My analytical materials include various cultural artifacts while the methods of 
“mapping” and “articulation” are my two primary research methods, and feminism is my 
critical perspective. Through focusing on the element “gender” and mapping what 
Chinese women are experiencing in the era of reforms, I answer the question of “What’s 
going on?” Through using the method of “articulation,” I look for “what’s old,” “what’s 
new,” and “what’s rearticulated” in order to understand struggles of power that influence 
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genders asymmetrically. Then I put forward ways of articulating, disarticulating, and 
rearticulating these relationships for the purpose of contributing to the project of 
“end[ing] sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression” (hooks, 2015, p. xii). 
This dissertation includes five chapters. Chapter One, “Introduction,” provides an 
overview of what’s going on in the era of reforms. I argued that the changes in era of 
reforms pose an interesting area to explore with regard to the gendered implications of 
science and technology in contemporary China. To explore this area, I outlined a 
theoretical orientation to cultural studies that guides me to choose analytical materials to 
study a culture, that emphasizes a feminist perspective, and that provides the research 
methods of “articulation” and “mapping.” 
Chapter Two, “Science and Technology in the Era of Reforms” argues that in 
order to understand science and technology in the era of reforms, we must consider the 
articulation of Chinese myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the intellectual heritage of the 
Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, the Chinese tradition of 
numeracy, the discrepancy between the needs of the large Chinese population and the 
country’s inadequate capacity for production with a particular focus on food supply, and 
the policies of China’s Communist Party. This chapter concludes that in the era of 
reforms, science and technology are romanticized as solutions to all social, economic, 
and political problems, which results in many Chinese people’s fascinations with science 
and technology, the inhumane costs of developing them, and their embeddedness into 
Chinese political practices.    
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Chapter Three, “Chinese Women in the Era of Reforms,” focuses on women’s 
roles in contemporary China. It argues that in the era of reforms, Chinese women are still 
expected to become wives and mothers. I explore the articulation of four lines of 
tendential force: Chinese myth, Chinese language, Confucianism and Daoism, and the 
Chinese government’s political practices, which significantly contribute to this 
expectation. However, at the same time, due to the forces of the discourse of the New 
Woman that promotes the image of an independent and knowledgeable woman and the 
Chinese government’s political practices of encouraging and preparing women to join the 
workplace that have begun to exert increasingly important impacts, many Chinese 
women have become professionals. Tensions have formed between women’s traditional 
roles as wives and mothers and their contemporary roles as professionals, resulting in 
significant changes to their lived experiences. For example, women are expected to 
become super mothers: confident and knowledgeable mothers who have highly 
successful careers and at the same time can take good care of their children.  
Chapter Four, “Put It All Together: The Impacts of Science and Technology for 
Women’s Prescribed Roles the Era of Reforms” is developed based on my Chapter One, 
Two, and Three. This chapter begins with my analysis that reveals the insufficiency of 
literature that addresses the implications of science and technology for Chinese women. 
Then, this chapter points out Chinese women’s lived experiences, which are already 
characterized by tensions, are complicated by the perceived nearly omnipotent power of, 
the prevalent applications of, and the embeddedness in the Chinese government’s 
political practices of science and technology. I used four examples to demonstrate this 
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claim: the development and use of science and technology to promote marriage and 
family, the development and use of science and technology for population control and 
family design, the development and use of science and technology to promote the 
discourse of the super mother, and the development and use of science and technology 
for women to gain independence and to resist sexist violence.  
Chapter Five, “Conclusion,” summarizes the implications of science and 
technology for Chinese women in the era of reforms. This chapter narrates cultural stories 
of science and technology and Chinese women in the era of reforms. This chapter also 
lays out the theoretical significances of this dissertation to the fields of cultural studies 
and women’s studies, as well as its practical significances for understanding 
contemporary China and fortifying the fight against sexism. At the end of this chapter, I 
address the limitation of my dissertation and explain my future directions for expanding 





Chapter Two: Science and Technology in the Era of 
Reforms 
 
To understand the implications of science and technology for women, especially 
their marriages and families in the era of reforms, this chapter lays the groundwork for 
understanding the significance of science and technology in China. It considers the 
articulation of the key elements of Chinese myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the 
Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, the Chinese tradition of 
numeracy, the discrepancy between the needs of the large Chinese population and the 
country’s inadequate capacity for production with a particular focus on food supply and 
housing, and China’s Communist Party’s policies. Through discussing these mythical, 
historical, philosophical, religious, cultural, humanitarian, and political forces, this 
chapter reveals that in the era of reforms, many Chinese people believe that science and 
technology are powerful, even nearly omnipotent, and can enable positive societal and 
cultural changes. Thus, science and technology are highly valued and even venerated. 
Due to the perceived high status of science and technology in the era of reforms, they are 
developed even at the cost of sacrificing human interests and have become indispensable 
to the Chinese government’s political practices.  
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Myth 
Myth has exerted profound impacts on Chinese culture. Thus, in order to 
understand science and technology in the era of reforms, it is crucial to explore the role of 
Chinese myth, which has a long tradition of valuing science and technology.  
Most Chinese mythical figures have specialized scientific and technical skills. Nü 
Wa (女娲), Fu Xi (伏羲), Shen Nong (神农), and Sui Ren Shi(燧人氏) are four figures 
who are believed to have significantly contributed to Chinese civilization and people’s 
lives with their skills.9 
The goddess Nü Wa, who has a female upper body and a snake tail, is respected 
as the mother of human beings, as described in the story “Nü Wa Created Man.” After the 
birth of the world, there were no humans. Nü Wa wanted life and beauty in the world, so 
she made people from clay. Another story “Nü Wa Patched the Sky” describes how she 
fixed a big hole in the sky that led to the death of people by extraterrestrial fire and 
meteorites. She accomplished this by melting rocks of five colors into magma to patch 
the hole, and by catching a giant tortoise and using its four legs as pillars to hold up the 
sky. These two stories reflect the three most important technical skills Nü Wa has: to 
produce human beings, to master the technology of melting, and to be a good architect. In 
Chinese myth, Nü Wa is the most significant creator—and engineer— who used her 
scientific and technical power to create, save, and help humans.  
                                                 
9 To know more about Chinese mythical stories, please consider reading these books: 1) Birrell, A.(1993). Chinese 
Mythology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. 2) Christie, A.(1968). Chinese Mythology. Feltham: Hamlyn Publishing. 3) 
Werner, E.T.C. (1922). Myths and Legends of China. New York: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. 4) Yang, L.; An, D.; 
&Turner, J., A. (2005). Handbook of Chinese Mythology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
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The god Fu Xi is the forefather of Chinese civilization in Chinese myth due to his 
several great achievements. Fu Xi invented bagua/八卦—an influential epistemology. 
Below is a photo of a bagua: 
 
 
Figure 2. 1Bagua In A Coin. This photo was taken by the author. 
Bagua includes eight characters. The character “乾” refers to sky, “坤” refers to 
ground, “巽” refers to wind, “震” refers to thunder, “坎” refers to water that cannot 
be controlled such as floods and rainstorms, “离/離” refers to fire, “艮” refers to 
mountain, and “兑” refers to the water that can be used and controlled by human 
beings. Bagua includes two images. “- -” refers to yin/阴, which can be roughly 
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understood as femininity and “一” refers to yang/阳, which can be understood as 
masculinity. Fu Xi argued that these two images and six characters can be combined in 
many ways and the combinations can represent and interpret everything in the world. Fu 
Xi also invented the practices of hunting and fishing, thereby giving people more regular 
access to protein. Moreover, he created the Cangjie system of writing Chinese characters, 
thereby the culture shifted from primarily oral to written communication. In this way, 
people could learn knowledge in a more systematic way and pass down information over 
generations.  
The god Shen Nong is the father of medicine and agriculture. The famous story 
“Shen Nong threshes the hundred grasses” tells how he tasted hundreds of grasses in 
order to explore their different characteristics, such as taste, toxicity, and medicinal 
properties. He shared this knowledge and instructed people in the use of plant-based 
medicine, thereby greatly extending the lives of Chinese people. Shen Nong’s knowledge 
became the basis of Chinese medicine. He is also credited with the invention of 
agricultural tools such as the plow and the hoe and with teaching the practice of 
agriculture.  
The god Sui Ren Shi is the father of fire. In Chinese myth, he was described as a 
man who was different from his peers. While others were afraid of fire, he was willing to 
be around it. He found out that fire brings warmth, which benefits wellbeing and can be 
used to cook food, which makes food more digestible and delicious. Hence, he advocated 
for using fire tactically. Sui Ren Shi also created the practice of sparking fire by friction, 
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which he taught to other people. Because of Sui Ren Shi’s contribution, he is well 
respected and his hometown is recognized as the birthplace of fire culture in China.    
In Chinese myth, many goddesses and gods were originally ordinary people. 
However, due to their scientific and technical contributions, they were deified, such as Da 
Yu (大禹) who had the skills of hydraulic engineering, You Chao Shi (有巢氏) who 
specialized at building houses, and Lu Ban (鲁班) who was elevated as the father of 
carpenters in China. Chinese people built temples to memorialize and mythologize these 
figures. This demonstrates ancient Chinese people’s veneration of science and technology 
and their deep respect for scientists and engineers. Further, in Chinese myth, the 
development of Chinese civilization is aligned with the development of science and 
technology. For example, Fu Xi supports the system of Chinese written language, Shen 
Nong promotes the development of Chinese medicine, and Sui Ren Shi elevates Chinese 
people’s  mastery and use of tools. Chinese myth reflects the close relation between the 
development of civilization and the development of science and technology. As these 
mythical stories reveal, in Chinese culture there is a deeply rooted belief that science and 
technology can bring people power, benefits, conveniences, and happiness.   
Confucianism and Daoism 
Besides myth, to understand science and technology in Chinese culture, it is 
necessary to consider the impacts of Confucianism and Daoism. These two important 
Chinese ideological and religious forces have contributed to the high status of science 
and technology in the era of reforms in significant ways.  
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Confucianism emerged in the Warring States Period between the years of 475 and 
221 BC.10 11Confucius (551-479 BC) and his disciples were the forefathers of this school 
of thought. Before the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), Confucianism as well as other 
schools of thought, such as legalism and Mohism, thrived and developed because 
different emperors had different preferences. For example, Qin Shi Huang (259 BC—
210BC), the first emperor of a unified China, prioritized legalism and applied it to govern 
the country.  
In the early Han Dynasty, because of the scholar Zhongshu Dong’s 
recommendation, Emperor Wu of Han (156 BC-87 BC) rejected the other schools of 
thought in favor of adopting Confucianism exclusively. This historical event is known as 
“Ba Chu Bai Jia Du Zun Ru Shu/罢黜百家独尊儒术.” This policy enabled Emperor Wu 
of Han to constrain people’s beliefs and maintain his governance. After Emperor Wu of 
Han, this policy passed down from emperor to emperor. While a few emperors were not 
of Han ethnicity (e.g. Genghis Khan) resulting in occasional challenges to the superior 
status of Confucianism, for the most part, emperors regarded Confucianism as the 
governing socio-cultural-political theory. In fact, Confucianism was regarded as the 
epitome of the intelligence of Han ethnicity, which is the ethnicity that the majority of 
                                                 
10I want to clarify my use of the English term “Confucianism.” Some scholars (e.g. Chen 1999, and Fen & Chen 2015) 
argue that Confucianism is or is becoming a religion. In fact, from ancient to modern times, Chinese people adhering to 
Confucianism perform some ritual practices such as bowing in Confucius temples to pray for strong academic 
performance. However, the Chinese government doesn’t include Confucianism when they work on the statistics on 
religions in China. Thus, although Confucianism has a strong religious dimension, it is not officially recognized as a 
religion in contemporary China. Accordingly, I view Confucianism as an intellectual and cultural tradition that was 
developed by Confucius scholars such as Confucius, Mencius, and Zhu Xi.  
 
11 To know more about Confucianism, please consider reading the following books: 1) Gardner, D. K. (2014). 
Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. 2) Lee, M. (2017). Confucianism: Its 
Roots and Global Significance. D. Jones (ed.). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 3) Rainey, L., D. (2010). 
Confucius & Confucianism: The Essential. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 3)  
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Chinese people identify with and that has been at the center of power in China throughout 
most of history. In general, from the Emperor Wu of Han through the Qing Dynasty 
(1644-1912), Confucianism was the dominant ideology in Chinese society.  
From the late Qing Dynasty to the early 1980s, the influence of Confucianism 
declined. In the early 1900s, Confucianism was seen “as the cause of all the failures of 
society and government….Confucianism was to blame for almost everything” (Rainey, 
2010, p. 179). During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Confucianism was viewed as 
the “four olds” (old culture, old thinking, old habits, and old customs), which should be 
destroyed. However, Confucianism was never completely obliterated, and since the late 
1980s, it has experienced a resurgence in mainland China. Some scholars have advocated 
for preserving and reviving Confucianism, because they believe that “only by returning to 
a Confucian foundation can Chinese societies maintain a solid culture. ‘Confucian 
values’ are basic to [the] culture, attitude, and behavior of these societies” (Rainey, 2010, 
p.183). 12 Even the Chinese government advocates reviving Confucianism. Yeung and 
Fung (2011) point out that the Chinese government’s intention to develop soft power is 
profoundly shaped by Confucianism, which emphasizes the need for attracting people to 
adopt beliefs that the government promotes and provides persuasive strategies for 
fulfilling that need (pp. 109-134). Accordingly, since 2004, the Chinese government has 
begun to set up Confucius Institutes and classrooms internationally for the purposes of 
improving China’s global image and soliciting foreign followers for the CCP. 
                                                 
12Chinese societies not only refers here to the society in mainland China, but also to the societies in which Chinese 
people constitute the majority group, such as the Singaporean society and the Hong Kong society.  
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Confucianism emphasizes moral development, which primarily promotes the 
ideas of being virtuous, and subordinating oneself to the ruling class, and obeying 
authority. These two ideas can be detrimental to the development of science and 
technology, since in essence they do not cultivate the spirit of being critical and 
innovative. Confucianism also emphasizes education, arguing that “books offer the path 
to be rich and to attract beautiful women/Shu Zhong Zi You Yan Ru Yu, Shu Zhong Zi 
You Huang Jin Wu/书中自有颜如玉，书中自有黄金屋.” However, Confucianism  
focuses on education in the humanities solely, which resulted in the paucity of STEM 
education in ancient China.  
First, Confucianism promotes cultivating morality and constructing moral systems 
in society. Confucian scholars argue that a person should develop the five constant 
virtues: ren /仁 (benevolence), yi/义 (righteousness), li/礼 (propriety), zhi /智 (wisdom), 
and xin/信 (sincerity). Upon careful observation of these five characteristics, it is clear 
that ren, yi, li, and xin are primarily ethical and moral characteristics, which are not 
typically associated with innovation. Only zhi has connotations related to learning and 
exploring science and technology as a way to cultivate one’s intellect. However, 
originally, Confucius only emphasized three characteristics: ren, yi, and li. It was 
Mencius who later added the characteristics of “zhi.” As Confucianism was developed 
further, the five virtues were extended into fifteen: ren/仁 (benevolence), yi/义 
(righteousness), li/礼 (propriety), zhi/智 (wisdom), xin/信 (sincerity), wen/温 
(gentleness) , liang/良 (modesty), gong/恭 (courtesy), jian/俭(temperance), rang/让
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(complaisance), zhong/忠 (loyalty), xiao/孝 (filiality), lian/廉(self-discipline), chi/耻 
(conscientiousness), and yong/勇 (bravery). Thus, according to Confucianism, people 
with high moral standards are respected above those with high intelligence. Consequently, 
a person’s primary task is to nourish his or her soul. In fact, for Mencius,“ human[s] who 
are different from animals in a few [aspects]…The [biggest] difference between [a] 
human and [an] animal is ‘four-mind of human nature’, that is, to sympathize, to feel 
shame and abhor, out of modesty and courtesy, and to tell from right and wrong, with the 
‘kindheartedness view’ as the core concept”(Wang, 2017). Based on Mencius’s 
viewpoint, the way for people to become better is to cultivate virtues; and the more 
virtuous people are in a society, the better society will be. This viewpoint, which 
positions morality as the core distinction between humans and non-human animals, 
differs significantly from a predominant Western viewpoint, which maintains that either 
language or the ability to use tools marks the difference. This Western viewpoint 
emphasizes the importance of scientific knowledge and technological skills 
deemphasized by Confucianism. In fact as has been argued by Gale (2005), 
Confucianism is principally a moral philosophy and places the moral life above 
all other aspects of human activities. For Confucians the ultimate value of human 
activities depends solely on their contribution or lack of a contribution to the good 
moral life of humanity (ren). In other words, apart from its contribution to the 
good moral life, an activity does not possess any value. This moral view has been 
subjected to narrow interpretations and at times has devalued science and 
technology. (section: Applications to Science, Technology, and Ethics )   
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In this configuration of beliefs, there was no intrinsic motivation for people to become 
scientists or engineers in ancient China, since a person’s virtuous reputation rather than 
skills—including scientific and technical skills— enables the person to be accepted and 
respected in the society. In fact, in ancient China, the social status of artisans was low, 
only slightly above that of thieves and prostitutes.   
Confucianism strongly supports the division of classes and highlights the idea of 
people’s subordination to the ruling class and obedience to the authority. Confucianism 
argues that a polite, ethical, and harmonious society is also a hierarchical one. It 
acknowledges and promotes the hierarchical order of heaven (Tian/天), earth (Di/地), 
emperor (Jun/君), parents (Qin/亲), and teachers (Shi/师). This means that a person 
should show his or her ultimate respect first to heaven, second to the earth, third to the 
emperor, fourth to parents, and fifth to teachers. Because of the abstractness of heaven 
and earth, the practices of respecting the other three were applied most prevalently. For 
example, in ancient China, a well-accepted practice was that if the emperor wanted a 
person to die, the person should commit suicide, which is directly captured by the 
Chinese phrase, “Jun Yao Chen Si, Chen Bu De Bu Si/君要臣死，臣不得不死.” In 
general, it was a citizen’s responsibility to cater to his or her emperor, through abiding by 
the emperor’s wishes. Besides being subservient to the emperor, Confucianism also 
promotes the hierarchical relationship between children and parents, which I will explain 
in detail in Chapter Three. Moreover, the emperor is more important than parents. Thus, 
when a conflict arises between serving the emperor and taking care of parents, a virtuous 
person should put the interests of the emperor first, as indicated by the sequence of the 
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fifteen virtues in which loyalty precedes filiality. The relationship between students and 
teachers was rigidly hierarchical such that it was intolerable if a student disrespected his 
teachers in any way, for example, by questioning teachers, defying teachers’ instructions, 
dressing inappropriately, and behaving poorly in front of teachers. Thereby, it was 
unacceptable for students to question their teachers’ ideas and challenge their teachers’ 
authority since they were expected to accept their teachers’ instruction uncritically.  
Consequently, in ancient China, since emperors emphasized cultivating their 
citizens’ morality instead of developing science and technology, most ancient Chinese 
people were educated to follow emperors’ instructions to work hard to satisfy emperors, 
and they did not emphasize STEM learning or crafting scientific and technical skills. 
Moreover, the relationship between students and teachers in ancient China deprived many 
people of opportunities to develop the spirit of critical thinking, bold conjecture, and an 
inclination to challenge existing theory, which are crucial for doing research in science 
and technology. 
Moreover, although Confucianism emphasizes education, it merely emphasizes 
education in humanities. Confucianism argues that people should “pursue…high ideals 
[such as human relations, and human nature] …[and] should not concern oneself with 
mere tools—concrete, practical, technical problems, and knowledge” (Kim, 2010, p. 
210) . In other words, compared with scientific and technological knowledge, people 
should focus on scholarship in the humanities such as philosophy and literature.  
In ancient China, education primarily was based on the nine Confucian books that 
were known as four books and five classics: Great Learning (Da Xue/大学), Doctrine of 
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The Mean (Zhong Yong/中庸), The Analects of Confucianism (Lun Yu/论语), Mencius 
(Meng Zi/孟子), The Classic of Poetry (Shi Jing/诗经), The Book of Document (Shang 
Shu/尚书), The Book of Rites (Li Ji/礼记), The Book of Changes (Yi Jing/易经), and The 
Spring and Autumn Annals (Chun Qiu/春秋). Great Learning instructs people on how to 
improve themselves ethically and thus make society a better place. It is regarded as a self-
help book through which people learn why and how to become a person of high morals. 
Doctrine of The Mean explains and promotes morality, arguing that it is the raw 
substance of the Dao. The Analects of Confucianism records conversations between 
Confucius and his students that best represent Confucius’s thoughts on humanities such 
as social relations, while Mencius is a collection of anecdotes and conversations centered 
on Mencius concerning moral philosophy. Classic of Poetry is a collection of 305 poems 
that were composed between 11BC to 6 BC that offers insight into the birth and 
development of literature in Chinese civilization. The Book of Document is a collection of 
rhetorical prose. It includes many speeches made by major figures in the eras from Yu the 
Great, to the Xia Dynasty, Shang Dynasty, and Zhou Dynasty. Book of Rites is a 
collection of texts concerning the social forms, administration, ceremonies, rites, 
etiquettes, and so forth. Due to the Confucian emphasis on Li, which can be understood 
as good and polite rules of conduct, Book of Rite, whose Chinese name is Li Ji, is a very 
important book. Book of Rites argues that we should believe in the absolute positive 
power of “Li” for people and a society and to this end aims to promote a restoration of 
traditional rites and practices that had been lost throughout history. Book of Changes, also 
known as The I Ching, is a book of philosophy. This book introduces hexagram (gua), 
33 
which can be understood as an essential unit of change. This book argues that through 
studying the 64 different hexagrams, people can understand the process of change and 
predict the future. The Spring and Autumn Annals is a book of history. It focuses on the 
time period from the year from 722 to 481 BC and offers a chronicle of the State of Lu, 
the state in which Confucius and most of his students were born. It records many events 
that occurred in the State of Lu during each year such as marriages, deaths, and wars.  
These nine books were the primary sources from which ancient Chinese people 
obtained their knowledge. However, none of these nine books are particularly related to 
science and technology.13 Furthermore, exams in ancient China were composed primarily 
based on the nine Confucian books. These exams typically included several types of 
questions such as asking students to interpret sentences and paragraphs from the nine 
books, to provide solutions for political problems using Confucian ideas, and to craft 
arguments by quoting and paraphrasing sentences from the nine books. To pass exams 
was significant for ancient Chinese students because it was only through passing exams 
and becoming a Jun Ren that one would be respected, recognized as a scholar, and win 
candidacy to work for the government.14 Thus, for most students in ancient China, 
                                                 
13 Here I want to add a note of clarification. Although these nine books are not specialized books on science and 
technology, some of these books do include minor insights regarding science and technology. For example, in Li Ji 
“commentaries on the ‘Yueling’月令 ( Monthly Ordinances)…contained discussions of specialized knowledge in the 
calendrical astronomy” (Kim, 2010, p.213). Moreover, in ancient China, there were other books that center on scientific 
and technological knowledge such as Astronomical Compilations from the Six Classics and Essential Techniques for 
Common People. However, these books were not as popular as the nine Confucian books and primarily served the 
purposes of personal interest and recreation. 
14Jun Ren (举人): a rank achieved by people who successfully passed the triennial provincial exam in ancient China. It 
was a rank higher than the rank of XiuCai (秀才) achieved by people who successfully passed the entry-level exam, but 
lower than the rank of Jin Shi (进士) achieved by people who successfully passed the triennial court exam. 
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studying science and technology was not necessary and would potentially distract them 
from preparing for exams. Due to the predominance of the nine Confucian books as the 
main source of knowledge and the exam system in ancient China, “the intellectual, and 
social, status of the specialized scientific and technical knowledge [was subordinated]” 
(Kim, 2010, p. 225).  
Due to the embeddedness of Confucianism in Chinese culture in the past 
thousands of years, some of its ideas still matter profoundly in contemporary China. Two 
persistent ideas are people’s subordination and obedience to the government and to 
authority, and the emphasis on education, which in the era of reforms are re-articulated 
with other elements such as the Chinese government’s emphasis on science and 
technology, resulting in the rapid scientific and technological development.  
In line with Confucian traditions, in contemporary China, for many Chinese 
people, the government is sacred. This high esteem for the government is reflected in the 
ferocious competition in China’s national examination for admissions to civil service. For 
example, the Guangdong Meteorological Service planned to recruit 1 employee; however, 
4040 people applied for this job opening when registering for the national exam (National 
Public Servant, 2018). Many Chinese people want to work for the government even 
though they might get higher salaries if they work for industry, because it is believed that 
working for the government means having “a golden bowl,” which means that the job can 
offer a decent salary, but more importantly, social respect. Due to the high status of 
government in Chinese culture, many Chinese people are inclined to follow the 
government’s policies without question. For example, as mentioned in the Chapter One, 
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in the era of reforms, when the government has focused on developing science and 
technology, many Chinese people have devoted themselves to the fields of STEM. 
Moreover, Chinese children are educated to respect authority from a young age. In 
Chinese elementary schools, it is a common practice that a student should raise his or her 
left hand to wait until called on and approved by his or her teachers to answer a question, 
or even to go to the bathroom. If a student fails to conform to this practice, the student 
will be criticized as being impolite and unruly, which are grounds for punishment, even 
corporeal punishment. This education reinforces the Chinese people’s subordination to 
their leaders and the government.  
Moreover, education is still tremendously emphasized in contemporary China. 
For example, even the New York Times Magazine reported on the famous Chinese high 
school “Mao Tan Chang Zhong Xue/毛坦厂中学”, which was nicknamed as  the biggest 
test-prep factory in Asia (Larmer, 2014). This school recruits more than 20,000 students 
annually and specializes at preparing students for the national college entrance 
examination through training students to almost machine-like in their accuracy and 
efficiency at answering exam questions.  This school and other test-prep “factories” are 
popular in China because college education matters tremendously in Chinese society. 
This prioritization is evidenced by the fact that it is legitimate for parents to quit their 
jobs to take care of their children who are preparing for the exam and to compel drivers 
to stop honking on exam days to avoid distracting students from answering questions. 
This strong emphasis on education resulted in the rapid development of humanities in 
ancient China and of science and technology in contemporary China when the focus 
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shifted from humanities education to STEM education, which I will explain in more 
detail later in this chapter.  
Besides Confucianism, Daoism, also known as Taoism, also significantly affects 
the status of science and technology in the era of reforms. To better understand the 
impacts of Daoism, I must first explain the distinction between Daoism as a school of 
intellectual thought and as a religion. In fact, in Chinese, Daoism as a school of 
intellectual thought is written as “道家,” and Daoism as a religion is written as “道教.” 
However, the English conflation of these two phrases into the same word “Daoism” blurs 
significant differences including perspectives on science and technology.  
Similar to Confucianism, Daoism, which was forwarded and developed by several 
thinkers such as Lao Tze and Chuang Tze, initially emerged as a school of intellectual 
thought. As a school of intellectual thought, the essence of its ideas “can be summarized 
into one phrase ‘returning to nature’” (Fung, 1922, p. 241). Daoism argues that people 
should let things work out by themselves and in their own ways and, further, people 
should concentrate on their essentially good nature, should be satisfied with the current 
moment whether it is good or not, and should be able to find happiness through focusing 
on inner peace in their hearts. Accordingly, Daoism contends that “knowledge is of no 
use and can do only harm: ‘Our life is limited, but knowledge is not limited. With what is 
limited to pursue what is not limited is a perilous thing’” (Fung, 1922, p. 243). Moreover, 
Daoism as a school of thought views technology as a corrupting evil power that can lead 
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to moral degradation, as indicated by the phrase “machine heart/ji Xin/机心.”15Although 
this phrase still exists in contemporary China, it is seldom used.   
In contemporary China, Daoism is recognized predominantly as a religion rather 
than a school of intellectual thought. According to the website of China’s National 
Religious Affair Administration, the five most widely practiced religions in China are 
Buddhism, Daoism, Islamism, Catholicism, and Protestantism (“National Religious”). 
Daoism as a religion emerged in the Han Dynasty and was developed based on its origin 
as a school of intellectual thought. For instance, the most preeminent God in the Daoist 
religion is Tai Shang Lao Jun/太上老君, who is the mythified Lao Tze—the founder of 
the Daoist school of intellectual thought.  Tao Te Ching, which is one of the first and the 
                                                 
15This phrase comes from a story in Chuang Tze, which is one of the most important books in Daoism. The story is 
about: 
Zigong traveled south to Chu, and on his way back through Jin, as he passed along the south bank of the Han, he saw 
an old man preparing his fields for planting. He had hollowed out an opening by which he entered the well and from 
which he emerged, lugging a pitcher, which he carried out to water the fields. Grunting and puffing, he used up a great 
deal of energy and produced very little result. 
"There is a machine for this sort of thing," said Zigong. "In one day it can water a hundred fields, demanding very little 
effort and producing excellent results. Wouldn't you like one?” 
The gardener raised his head and looked at Zigong. "How does it work?" 
"It's a contraption made by shaping a piece of wood. The back end is heavy and the front end light and it raises the 
water as though it were pouring it out, so fast that it seems to boil right over! It's called a well sweep." 
The gardener flushed with anger and then said with a laugh, "I've heard my teacher say, where there are machines, there 
are bound to be machine worries; where there are machine worries, there are bound to be machine hearts. With a 
machine heart in your breast, you've spoiled what was pure and simple; and without the pure and simple, the life of the 
spirit knows no rest. Where the life of the spirit knows no rest, the Way will cease to buoy you up. It's not that I don't 
know about your machine - I would be ashamed to use it!" 
Tzu-kung blushed with chagrin, looked down, and made no reply. 
(Zhangzi, 2013, pp.90-91)  
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classic texts of Daoism as the school of intellectual thought, also became the classic book 
of the Daoist religion. 
However, there are some significant differences between Daoism as a school of 
intellectual thought and as a religion. As I discussed previously, the Daoist school of 
intellectual thought emphasizes returning to nature and not intervening with the natural 
developments of things. However, Daoism as a religion focuses on pursuing and 
practicing immortality. This shift of focus in part is caused by the foundation of 
Confucianism as the only orthodox school of intellectual thought in ancient China. Thus, 
Daoism, in order to co-exist with Confucianism and attract followers, had to evolve 
continuously. Finding ways to avoid death and become immortal is a key focus of the 
Daoist religion to serve an essential need of many people, that is to be immortal and 
maintain their youth and health forever. In short, “[D]aoism as a philosophy teaches the 
doctrine of following nature, while [D]aoism as a religion teaches the doctrine of working 
against nature” (Fung, 1948, p. 3). 
This focus of the Daoist religion leads to an emphasis on developing science and 
technology. For example, the Daoist religion is famous for making alchemy, which 
significantly contributed to the emergence of gunpowder, one of the four greatest 
scientific and technological achievements in ancient China. Many Daoist priests who 
devoted themselves to making pills to avoid death were famous doctors, such as Sun 
Simiao/孙思邈 who is the respected as “the God of Doctors” in China. His book 
Thousand Golden Prescriptions/Qian Jin Yao Fang/千金要方 , which records his ideas 
on how to treat many diseases, is still used in contemporary China. Ma Danyang, another 
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Daoist priest, is also recognized as an exceptional doctor because of his contribution to 
the science of acupuncture and moxibustion.16 Moreover, the Daoist religion also 
profoundly influenced astronomy in ancient China. Because the ultimate goal of 
practicing Daoism is to become a god, many Daoist priests, such as He Hong in the Wei 
Jin Southern and Northern Dynasties, studied astronomy in order to understand earth and 
the galaxy. Fung (1948) points out that “the [D]aoist religion has the spirit of science, 
which is the conquering of nature” (p.3). 
Some scholars argue that Confucianism and Daoism had significantly hindered 
the development of science and technology. For example, Gong (2012) claims that 
Confucianism and Daoism together “have discouraged curiosity, commercialization and 
technology. They helped to produce a scientific void in Chinese society that persisted for 
millennia” (p. 411). However, this viewpoint overlooks some notable historical 
developments. In fact, as I analyzed previously, Confucianism and Daoism, especially the 
Daoist religion, contributed to some scientific and technological achievements in ancient 
China. More importantly, some of their commitments, such as the importance of 
receiving education and figuring out ways to be immortal, which are also active in 
contemporary China, have strongly affected impacted the status of science and 
technology in the era of reforms. 
                                                 
16Moxibustion is a traditional Chinese therapy, in which some herbs, the most typical one is dried mugwort, are burnt 
so that their heat and smell can be applied to some specific points of the body. It is believed that moxibustion can 
reduce pain and stimulate people’s immune systems.  
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The Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement 
The Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement were two 
influential social, cultural, and political movements in modern China (1840-1949) that 
aimed to promote science and technology, and have profoundly impacted the status of 
science and technology in the era of reforms. The currents of the Westernization 
Movement emerged in the 1840s. In 1842, the year in which the First Opium War ended 
with China’s complete defeat, the book of Illustrated Annals of Oversea Countries/Hai 
Guo Tu Zhi/ 海国图志 was published. This book was written by Wei Yuan (魏源), the 
prefect of Gaoyou District, who participated in the First Opium War in the frontlines, 
witnessing the power of Western technologies, especially weapons. He argued that 
Chinese people must open their eyes to see what is happening in the world. Illustrated 
Annals of Oversea Countries documents Western countries’ science and technology, 
political systems, cultures, histories, religions, education, trades, geographies, and so 
forth. In the preface, Wei Yuan writes that the purpose of the book is to help Chinese 
people to learn from the West and puts forward the famous argument that Chinese people 
should learn from foreign countries in order to fight against and surpass them (Shi Yi 
Chang Ji Yi Zhi Yi/师夷长技以制夷).  
Wei Yuan’s book enforced the growing argument that China must learn from the 
West. Facing the situation that China was under pressure of further foreign aggression 
and internal social turmoil, some high ranking officials of the Qing government 
supported this argument and urged the government to accept Western ideas and practices, 
especially those related to developing science and technology. Zeng Guofan, Zuo 
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Zongtang, and Li Hongzhang launched the Westernization Movement (Yang Wu Yun 
Dong/洋务运动), also known as the Self-Strengthen Movement, in 1861. The ultimate 
purpose of the movement was to use Western scientific and technological knowledge to 
maintain the rule of the Qing government. The slogan of this movement was “Chinese 
learning should be followed as the essence; Western learning is for use” (Zhong Xue Wei 
Ti, Xi Xue Wei Yong/中学为本西学为用). To face the danger of over-simplification, 
this means that Confucianism should still remain the dominant ideology, but advanced 
science and technology should be imported from the West to solve practical problems. 
This was a process of dis-articulation and articulation: the emphasis on valuing 
humanities exclusively was disarticulated from Confucianism while Western science and 
technology were articulated with Confucianism. The Qin government and many Chinese 
intellectuals believed that this new articulation could make the country prosperous.  
In general, the Westernization Movement emphasized introducing and applying 
science and technology from the West to industrialize China. In practice, the Qing 
government focused on learning advanced scientific theories such as optics, bringing in 
new technological devices such as guns, and promoting education in STEM. The Qing 
government opened several big factories such the Tianjin Machine factory and Jiangnan 
Arsenal. The Qing government also sent Chinese students to learn in the West, primarily 
in the fields of STEM. On August 11, 1872, the first group of Chinese students to study 
abroad left Shanghai for the U.S. From 1872 to 1875, the Qing government sent 120 
Chinese students ranging in age from 10 to 16 to study in the U.S. Many of these students 
who studied in elite U.S. universities such Harvard and Yale became prominent scientists 
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and engineers upon their return to China. For example, the father of China’s railroad, 
Zhan Tianyou, known in the West as Jeme Tien Yow, was among these students. The 
Qing government also established schools specializing in STEM education. For instance, 
for the purpose of building a strong and modern navy, the Qing government set up the 
Foochow Shipbuilding College. McNeill, Li, and Wang (2010) explain the structure and 
the curriculum of the Foochow Shipping College: 
Foochow Shipbuilding College started with two departments, or divisions. The 
first division, or Qian Xue Tang (literally “forward school”, 前学堂) trained 
students in the design and manufacture of battleships, while the second division, 
or Hou Xue Tang (literally “rear school”, 后学堂) trained students in navigation 
and ship maintenance. This second division was developed essentially for the 
training of naval officers.  
Table 1. The course of the Qian Xue Tang 
Foreign language   French (all the textbooks were in French), 
English 
Basic sciences Arithmetic, trigonometry, analytic geometry, 
calculus, physics and mechanics 
Major courses Engineering Cartography; the manufacture and 
structure of steam engines; manufacturing of 
ship hulls 
(pp. 15. 635.8-15.635.9) 
43 
As revealed by its curriculum, there was no other training in humanities besides the two 
language courses that were designed to help students to better understand science and 
technology for Western countries.   
The Westernization Movement did not successfully prevent China from being 
invaded and the Qing government from being overthrown. In 1895, the Qing navy was 
defeated by the Japanese navy in the first Sino-Japanese War, which was viewed as a 
failure of the Westernization Movement. In 1912, the Qing government was overthrown 
and the Republic of China was founded. Despite its failure, the Westernization 
Movement was the first movement in China that introduced a large volume of scientific 
and technological knowledge from the West. Furthermore, I maintain, as an effect of the 
Westernization Movement, the belief that science and technology are powerful and 
capable of bringing positive changes, became widely acknowledged and influential in 
Chinese culture.  
This faith in science and technology continued to grow in the Republic of China 
and contributed to the establishment of the New Culture Movement. On January 15,  
1915, Chen Duxiu, one of the most influential scholars who received education in 
Japan—a country that was further ahead in terms of Westernization— and who in 1917 
became the dean of Peking University—the best Chinese university in the fields of 
humanities, published “My Response to the Criticism” in the journal New Youth /Xin 
Qing Nian/新青年. This journal focused on criticizing traditional Chinese culture, 
especially Confucianism, and promoting Western ideas. Chen (1919) wrote: 
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Westerners fight hard for Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science. However, [their 
efforts are worthwhile] because Mr. Democracy (De) and Mr. Science (Sai) saved 
Westerners from the darkness. In fact, only Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science can 
save Chinese politics, moral system, academics, and ideology from darkness and 
evil. 
Chen’s article was widely read and supported. “For Mr. Democracy/德先生 and Mr. 
Science/赛先生” became the slogan of the New Culture Movement. 
The New Culture Movement (Xin Wen Hua Yun Dong/新文化运动) began 
around 1916, reached its height in 1919, and continued through the 1920s. This 
movement was anti-imperialist, cultural, and political. On May 4, 1919, because of the 
Republic of China’s government’s acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles, college 
students in Peking refused to attend schools and marched in the streets.17 Accordingly, 
the New Culture Movement is also known as the May Fourth Movement. In the 
following days, students from the rest of the China as well as Chinese people in different 
occupations and from different classes participated in the protest. For example, many 
workers refused to go to factories and many businesspersons refused to run their 
businesses.   
In general, the New Culture Movement argued that China’s current backward 
politics, culture, and social practices should be abolished. This movement advocated for 
restoring China’s integrity, replacing the emphasis on learning Confucianism with 
                                                 
17 The Treaty of Versailles was the peace treaty which brought the World War Ito an end. During World War I, China 
helped the U.K. to fight against the Germans. However, this treaty awarded China’s Shandong Province to Japan.  
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learning Western science and technology, using vernacular Chinese (Bai Hua Wen/白话
文) to replace classical Chinese (Wen Yan Wen/文言文) in order to increase literacy, and 
creating a democratic political system. Compared with the Westernization Movement, 
which still viewed Chinese knowledge, such as Confucianism, as the essence of Chinese 
culture and society, the New Culture Movement was determined to completely dis-
articulate Confucianism from Chinese culture and infuse China with Western science and 
technology and its democratic political system.  
As evidenced in the Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, 
three ideas have become articulated to the status of science and technology in Chinese 
culture. The first idea is that Western countries and Western cultures are more advanced 
and civilized than their Chinese counterparts. This idea has resulted in the prevalence of 
beliefs in Chinese society that only Western countries are able to master advanced 
scientific knowledge and develop innovative technological artifacts for decades. The 
second idea is that a key cause of China’s backwardness is the underdevelopment of 
science and technology, which have the potential to bring positive social changes, 
resulting in the veneration of science and technology in Chinese culture. The third idea 
that has taken root is that the development of science and technology must first serve the 
Chinese government’s political purposes, given the continuing articulation of 
Confucianism in promoting the superior status of the government over the people, as 
discussed previously. Recall, the driving force behind the Qing government’s support of 
the Westernization Movement was to avoid being overthrown. Similarly, the Republic of 
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China’s plans for developing science and technology were highly political. Kirby (1989) 
writes: 
Industrialization became a primary concern for the government of Chiang 
Kaishek, which depended on the modern sector of the economy for much of its 
income, and sought security through creation of a world-class armed force 
supported by state-of-the-art metallurgical, chemical, and munitions industries.    
(p. 25) 
In this way, the emphasis of the government of Chiang Kaishek on metallurgical, 
chemical, and munitions industries can be largely attributed to the government’s 
insecurity after witnessing the Japanese government’s determination and ability to invade 
China. Although both the Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement 
ended, their intellectual heritage, especially the value placed on developing science and 
technology, persists in contemporary China. 
The Chinese Cultural Tradition of Numeracy 
Besides myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the Westernization Movement and the 
New Culture Movement, the Chinese cultural tradition of numeracy also has significantly 
contributed to the high status of science and technology in Chinese culture. Numbers are 
important in Chinese culture. The Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Arts/九章算术, 
which was composed by several Chinese mathematicians from the 10th to 12th century, 
is one of the most ancient but influential books in terms of studying numbers. This book, 
which used to serve as a textbook both in China and in some other countries, is 
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recognized as evidence of ancient Chinese people’s talent in quantitative studies. 
Moreover, “the nine-nine song/九九乘法口诀表,” which is a song about multiplication, 
has been passed down for almost two thousand years. Below is my translation of “the 
nine-nine song” based on its Chinese text: 
 一一得一  (one times one gets one) 
 一二得二 (one times two gets two) 二二得四 (two times two gets four) 
 一三得三 (one times three gets three) 二三得六 (two times three gets six)  
三三得九 (three times three gets nine)  
 一四得四 (one times four gets four) 二四得八 (two times four gets eight) 
三四十二 (three times four gets twelve) 四四十六 (four times four gets 
sixteen)    
 一五得五 (one times five gets five) 二五一十 (two times five gets ten)  
三五十五 (three times five gets fifteen) 四五二十 (four times five gets 
twenty) 五五二十五 (five times five gets twenty-five) 
 一六得六 (one times six gets six) 二六十二 (two times six gets twelve) 
三六十八 (three times six gets eighteen) 四六二十四 (four times six gets 
twenty-four) 五六三十 (five times six gets thirty)   
六六三十六 (six times six gets thirty-six) 
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 一七得七 (one times seven gets seven) 二七十四 (two times seven gets 
fourteen) 三七二十一 (three times seven gets twenty-one)  
四七二十八 (four times seven gets twenty-eight)  
五七三十五(five times seven gets thirty-five) 六七四十二 (six times seven 
gets forty-two)  
七七四十九 (seven times seven gets forty-nine) 
 一八得八 (one times eight gets eight) 二八十六 (two times eight gets 
sixteen) 三八二十四 (three times eight gets twenty-four)  
四八三十二 (four times eight gets thirty-two) 五八四十 (five times eight 
gets forty)  
六八四十八 (six times eight gets forty-eight)  
七八五十六 (seven times eight gets fifty-six) 八八六十四 (eight times 
eight gets sixty-four)   
 一九得九 (one times nine gets nine) 二九十八 (two times nine gets 
eighteen) 三九二十七 (three times nine gets twenty-seven)  
四九三十六 (four times nine get thirty-six) 五九四十五 (five times nine 
gets forty-five) 六九五十四 (six times nine gets fifty-four)  
 (seven times nine gets sixty-three) 八九七十二 (eight times nine gets 
seventy-two) 九九八十一 (nine times nine gets eighty-one) 
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This song remains one of the most popular nursery rhymes in contemporary China. 
Generations of Chinese children grow up listening to this song and many of them even 
have memorized it before they enter elementary school. In this way, Chinese people have 
begun to build a mathematical approach to understand numbers since they are young.  
Building on this attachment, there is also a long tradition in China of interpreting 
numbers from a cultural perspective. Since ancient China, Chinese people have assigned 
special connotations to numbers. For example: 
The number 0 refers to the beginning of all things. It is usually regarded as an auspicious 
number because of its round shape. However, since some Chinese people believe that 0 
can refer to nothing, its valence becomes negative when it is the final digit of a number 
(for example 870 and 560). There are mixed and contradictory associations with the 
number 1. It can refer to the winners of the first place in a competition; but at the same 
time, it can refer to singlehood. The number 2 is usually regarded as a good number 
because it refers to companionship. There is a Chinese proverb “good things come in 
pairs/hao shi cheng shuang /好事成双.” For some Chinese people, the number 3, which 
sounds like “sheng/life or to live,” is a good number. However, for some Chinese people 
with a different dialect, this number sounds like “san/ separation,” which makes it an 
inauspicious number. The number 4 is viewed as a bad number because it sounds like “si/ 
death.” The number 5 is associated with “not” or “lacking” because it sounds like “wu/ 
do not have.” The number 6 is an auspicious number because it sounds similar to 
“liu/smooth/success,” and “lu/happiness, and prosperity.” There are mixed and 
contradictory associations with the number 7. This number sounds like “qi/arise/rising 
50 
up,” thus some people believe that it is a good one. However, because July is the ghost 
month in the Chinese lunar calendar, some people think this number is inauspicious.18 
The number 8 is another auspicious number because it sounds like “fa/being rich and 
prosperous.” Thus, it is the number that many Chinese businesspersons favor most. The 
number 9 is often used in weddings because it sounds like “jiu/ lasting forever.” 
Moreover, because in ancient China this number was also associated with the emperors, it 
is also regarded as a royal number.  
From ancient to contemporary China, Chinese people continue to have 
preferences regarding some numbers. For example, almost all Chinese telecoms 
companies and DMVs mark phone and car numbers that include several auspicious 
numbers (such as 666888) as special ones and sell them for large sums of money.  
Due to Chinese people’s fascination with numbers, it is a common practice that 
people use numbers to represent and evaluate lived experiences. In 2015, there was a very 
popular competition in China. The competition was about the numbers of coins people 
could hold with their collarbones. Many Chinese people zealously participated: they put 
coins on their collarbones, took selfies, uploaded the selfies to social media, and 
competed with others concerning the number of coins. Below is a representative photo: 
                                                 
18In Chinese culture, it is believed that during the ghost month, ghosts can leave hell and wander around on earth.  
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Figure 2. 2 A Collarbone Holds Coins. This photo was taken by the author. 
Basically, people perceived having more coins as more valued and closer to the ideal. 
This competition not only reflected Chinese people’s appreciation of a slender body but 
also their obsession with quantifying and evaluating merely based on numbers. It was 
astonishing that millions of Chinese people were willing to use numbers of coins to 
represent their bodies, to believe that more coins better represent the “ideal body,” and to 
reduce the worth of their bodies to this metric.  
In almost every aspect of Chinese people’s lives, numbers are applied for the 
purposes of representation and evaluation. For example, the Chinese government uses 
GDP per capita to evaluate Chinese people’s quality of life; the Chinese government 
believes that the higher the GDP per capita, the happier Chinese people are. In terms of 
evaluating intellectual performance, Chinese people look at grades, the ranking of 
universities, and the numbers of journal articles published. It is common that job 
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openings in Chinese universities require their applicants to graduate from the top 250 or 
300 universities based on QS World University Ranking system and to have published at 
least 3 journal articles that, combined, must exceed certain impact factors. In fact, when 
the 2018 Science and Engineering (S&E) Indicators announced that China had overtaken 
the U.S. with the highest number of publications in S&E, many Chinese people became 
extremely excited (National Science Foundation, 2018). Many media outlets 
subsequently released news reports that celebrated Chinese people’s impressive 
intellectual performance. For example, on February 3, 2018, Sina, which is one of the 
most popular websites in China, published an article titled “The Rise of a Superpower: 
The Number of Chinese Articles in Science and Engineering Surpasses the Number of 
U.S. Articles in S&E and Ranks the Highest Worldwide.” Chinese people were proud of 
the number of journal articles they published even though some Chinese people are clear 
that many Chinese journal articles are of low quality and significance.  
The popularity of a Chinese counselor Ayawawa also reflects many Chinese 
people’s obsession with numbers and quantification. Ayawawa is famous for developing 
a theory, which centers on two terms MV and PU, to help women attract partners. MV 
stands for mating value and PU stands for paternity uncertainty. Ayawawa argues that an 
attractive woman should have a high MV, which means that she should be beautiful and 
young, and have a lower value of PU, which means that she should be submissive to 
avoid generating her partner’s anxieties. In essence, Ayawawa’s theory quantifies women 
and reduces them into some numbers.  
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The tradition of numeracy in China significantly contributes to the flourishing of 
an epistemology that centers on quantification of human beings and their lived 
experiences. This epistemology prioritizes understanding and evaluation based on 
numbers at the expense of accounting for elements that elude numeric representation such 
as people’s feelings. This epistemology potentially inspires the development of science 
and technology in China in accordance with Chinese people’s inclination to understand 
the world “truthfully” based on “accurate” quantifications and representations. For 
example, the Sesame Credit/Zhi Ma Xin Yong/芝麻信用, which was developed by Ant 
Financial Service Group, is very popular in China. The Sesame Credit can score its 
customers from five perspectives: personal credit records, social behaviors, capabilities to 
fulfill contracts, identities (such as jobs), and connections. The higher the scores people 
get, the more benefits they can enjoy, such as renting cars and apartments without paying 
for deposits, because it is believed that high-scored persons are more trustworthy and 
probably are “better” citizens.  
The Discrepancy between the Needs of the Large Chinese 
Population and the Country’s Inadequate Capacity for 
Production 
The previous sections discussed myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the 
Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, and the Chinese tradition of 
numeracy. This section explores another important force that has profoundly impacted 
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the status of science and technology in the era of reforms. This force—the discrepancy 
between the needs of the large population and the country’s inadequate capacity for 
production—not only has captured my attention but also has been of interest to the 
Chinese government. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (1981) published the fundamental document “Resolution on 
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s 
Republic of China.” In this document, the Chinese government both reflected on and 
confessed the mistakes it had made during the Cultural Revolution and pointed out that 
“the principal contradiction our country has had to resolve is that between the growing 
material and cultural needs of the people and the backwardness of social production” 
(The Six Plenary Session, 1981). In fact, since ancient times, Chinese society has always 
struggled with the discrepancy between the needs of the large Chinese population and the 
country’s inadequate capacity for production. To put it simply, a significant issue that 
Chinese society has faced is how to feed, cloth, house, and transport so many people. 
This discrepancy not only has led to widespread social turmoil in China, such as people’s 
rebellions against governments and the overthrown of governances, but also has closely 
related to the development of science and technology. To explain this argument, I pay 
special attention to the issue of food supply and housing.  
For Chinese people, their most basic need is to have a sufficient food supply. 
Although every culture cares about eating, Chinese culture uniquely emphasizes food 
because of the frequency and severity of famine. Li (1982) recorded severe national 
famines in modern and contemporary China: 
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The North China famine of 1876 to 1879, one of the great mortality crises in 
world history, was caused by a drought that extended over five provinces, 
affecting a population of over 100 million people and leaving an estimated 9.5 to 
13 million dead. […] Between 1928 and 1931, northern China was once again 
struck by a major drought that affected a population of 57 million, 12 million of 
them “gravely.” (pp. 687-688) 
Moreover, from 1959-1961, because of drought, floods, and the Great Leap Forward 
Movement, about 30 million Chinese people died from starvation (Smil, 1999, p. 1619). 
Besides the three national famines that Li discussed, other regional famines also 
happened. For example, another severe food crisis happened from 1920 to 1921 in north 
China, resulting in famine-related deaths for an estimated 5 million people (Fuller, n.d.).  
Many Chinese people have suffered during famines. For example, Branigan  
(2013) recorded Chinese people’s experiences in the Great Chinese Famine, which 
happened from 1959 to1961: 
People died in the family and they didn't bury the person because they could still 
collect their food rations; they kept the bodies in bed and covered them up and the 
corpses were eaten by mice. People ate corpses and fought for the bodies. In 
Gansu they killed outsiders; people told me strangers passed through and they 
killed and ate them. And they ate their own children. (para. 8) 
Due to these severe famines, Chinese culture is infused with people’s anxiety about food 
shortages. For example, a typical way for Chinese people to greet each other is to ask the 
question “Have you eaten?” (Ni Chi Le Ma/你吃了吗?). The famous Chinese saying 
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“Food is everything/Min Yi Shi Wei Tian (民以食为天)” reflects Chinese people’s 
prioritization of food.  
To solve the issue of starvation, the Chinese government has put forward many 
policies, which have aimed to promote an equal distribution of the limited resources. For 
example, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the Chinese government implemented a national 
food distribution system. The government collected food and distributed it to individual 
Chinese people based on the size of their families. The government gave Chinese people 




Figure 2. 3 Rice Stamp. This photo was taken by the author. 
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Figure 2. 4 Pork Stamp. This photo was taken by the author. 
Although this national distribution system lessened the discrepancy between the 
sustenance needs of so many people and China’s limited capacity of food production 
through saving some poor Chinese people from dying of starvation, it did not 
fundamentally resolve this discrepancy. In fact, in 2016, the arable land (per hectares per 
person) in China was 0.09; in contrast, in the U.S. the number was 0.47 and for Canada 
the number was 1.21 (The World Bank b, n.d.). Facing the unfavorable natural conditions 
for agriculture and the needs of a large population, it became necessary for Chinese 
society to develop agricultural science and technologies to improve food production by 
making full use of every hectare of arable land.  
Yuan Longping, a Chinese agricultural scientist, has devoted his career to 
promoting super hybrid rice that “emphasize[s] the plant morphological improvement and 
utilize[s] the inter-subspecific heterosis [to increase the yield of rice]” (Ma & Yuan, 
2015 , p. 200). In fact, “by 2003, half of China’s rice production area was planted with 
[Yuan’s super hybrid rice] …. [By] 2007, China’s total rice yield was 500 million tons” 
(The World Food Prize, 2008 ). This means that now China’s capacity of rice production 
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has improved significantly, which results in the reduction of the likelihood of nationwide 
famine and greatly alleviates Chinese people’s fear of starvation. Besides the science and 
technology of super hybrid rice, farming, breeding, aquaculture, and other agricultural 
science and technologies also have been developed and are widely used. Accordingly, 
China has gradually been able to cultivate and harvest more crops, including 38 items 
such as rice, wheat, and vegetables: 







Table 2. 1 China Agricultural and Economic Data. Statistics were retrieved from “China 
Agricultural and Economic Date”, USDA, 
https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17884. 
Consequently, China “met its Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of 
hungry people by 2015 and reduced the global hunger rate by two thirds” (World Food 
Programme, n.d.).  
Besides food supply, the discrepancy between housing the large Chinese 
population and the country’s inadequate productive capacity has also been a serious issue 
in Chinese society for a long time. Chinese people have always emphasized owning a 
living space, as evidenced in the Chinese character“家,” which means home. This 
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character includes two parts: the upper part “宀” refers to shelter, and the lower part “豕” 
refers to pig. In ancient Chinese culture, it was believed that a home should have a shelter 
and a pig. However, with the change of Chinese society from an agrarian to a more 
modern society, many Chinese people no longer believe that a home must include pigs or 
poultry; however, to this day, most Chinese people still believe that without owning a 
housing unit, a home is not complete.19 There is a popular Chinese song “I want to have a 
home”/ Wo Xiang You Ge Jia/我想有个家. The lyrics of this song include, “I want to 
have a home. It doesn’t need to be a fancy place…It doesn’t need to be a big place.” This 
song reflects Chinese people’s strong affection for their homes and their longing for 
owning living spaces.  
However, because of the large population of Chinese people and the limited space 
that is suitable for building houses, many Chinese people lived in overcrowded spaces 
before the 1980s. In 1978, in urban China, the floor area of residential building per capita 
was 6.7 sq m, and in rural China, it was 8.1 sq m ( CEIC, n.d.). In contrast, in the U.S., in 
1973 the sq ft. per person reached 551 (approximately 51 sqm) ( Perry, 2016). These 
statistics clearly revealed the sharp contrast between the average Chinese person’s living 
space and the average American’s living space in the 1970s. 
Facing the situation in which it is impossible for China to expand its geographical 
borders, the feasible solution to increasing Chinese people’s living space is to construct 
                                                 
19I want to clarify the word “home” (Jia) in Chinese culture. “Home” is regarded as more than the combination of a 
man, a woman, and children. More significantly, “home” is regarded as the root of a people, a sense of belonging, and 
the place where people can release all their emotions at ease. Thus, even for people who do not want to get married, 
they might still want to have homes. Thus, for many single people, if they want to have homes, they choose to buy 
apartments or houses as well.  
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tall buildings to make full use of vertical space available, which requires steel. China did 
not have a steelmaking factory until the opening of Han Yang Tie Chang/汉阳铁厂 in 
1890. Given China’s low capacity of steelmaking, from November 1957 to December 
1958, the Chinese government promoted backyard furnacesand encouraged all Chinese 
people to participate in steelmaking, a movement that I will explain more later in this 
chapter. 20  It was not, however, until the era of reforms that China mastered the science 
and technology of mass-producing high-quality steel and that the industry of steelmaking 
began to flourish. According to the World Steel Association (2019), in March 2019, 
“China’s crude steel production… was 80.3 Mt….The US produced 7.8 Mt of crude 
steel….Japan produced 9.1 Mt of crude steel” (para 3). With the increasing amount of 
steel available, China has been able to build more skyscrapers, which has contributed to 
the dramatic increase of China’s residential area per capita. In 2017, in urban China, floor 
area of residential building per capita reached 36 sq m and, in rural China, it reached 45 
sq m, which was almost 6 times the floor area of residential building per capita in 1987 
(CEIC, n.d.). Thus, although compared with some other countries such as the U.S., the 
living spaces for Chinese people are still relatively cramped, their living situations have 
improved significantly in the era of reforms. The improved availability of living space 
demonstrates how scientific and technological development has contributed to alleviating 
the discrepancy between the needs of China’s large population and the country’s 
                                                 
20According to Wikipedia, “backyard furnaces (土法炼钢) were small blast furnaces….People used every type of fuel 
they could to power these furnaces, from coal to the wood of coffins. Where iron ore was unavailable, they melted any 
steel objects they could get their hands on, including utensils, household objects like chairs and doors, bicycles, and 
even their own farming equipment, the intended end product being steel girders” (“Backyard Furnaces,” n.d.). 
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inadequate productive capacity. Moreover, this positive change enabled by science and 
technology reinforces the argument that science and technology are nearly omnipotent 
and that they should continue to play significant roles with regard to addressing the issue 
of housing in China.  
Besides developing agricultural and architectural science and technologies, other 
kinds of science and technology have also developed rapidly, driven by Chinese people’s 
needs to survive and live comfortably. For example, China has worked hard on 
developing and promoting high-speed train and railroad science and technology. This 
kind of science and technology is crucial since it can profoundly improve the country’s 
capacity of production because it offers more mobility for workers and products in 
comparison with traditional trains. With the industrialization of some Chinese cities, 
these cities need more workers. In this context, high-speed train and railroad science and 
technology provide a comparatively affordable way to Chinese people, especially migrant 
workers, to leave their hometown and conveniently travel to work in different cities. 
Moreover, the nationwide high-speed train systems enable products to circulate around 
the country and even around the worldrapidly at a lower cost in comparison with air 
travel. 21 According to The Economist (2017), “[China] ha[d] 20,000 km (12,500 miles) 
of high-speed rail lines, more than the rest of the world combined. It is planning to lay 
another 15,000 km by 2025” (para 2). These high-speed rail lines increased China’s 
capacity for transportation and production, bettering many Chinese people’s travel 
                                                 
21For example, China now has several high-speed railroads to some European countries. These railroads are used 
exclusively for product transportation.  
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experiences and the efficiency of product transportation. Using science and technology, 
China has demonstrated its ability to provide for the material needs of its people and is 
poised to continue doing so.  
To understand the status of science and technology in the era of reforms, we need to 
recognize that the discrepancy between the needs of a large population and China’s 
inadequate capacity of production consistently drives the development of science and 
technology for the purpose of increasing its productive capacity. In fact, as promoted by 
the Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, which are the two 
movements that signified the beginning of modern China, the power of science and 
technology can bring positive changes and solve practical social problems. Because of 
this faith in science and technology, Chinese society has invested in their development, 
which has resulted in progress such as the diminished issue of food shortages and 
Chinese people’s improved living spaces. In return, this progress has reinforced the faith 
in science and technology.  
China’s Communist Party’s Policies 
 
Apart from myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the Westernization Movement and 
the New Culture Movement, the Chinese tradition of numeracy, and the discrepancy 
between the needs of the large Chinese population and the country’s inadequate capacity 
for production, China’s Communist Party’s policies also have significantly impacted the 
status of science and technology in the era of reforms. China’s Communist Party was 
founded in 1921. Many of its forefathers (such as Mao Zedong and Li Dazhao) were 
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students and intellectuals who had actively engaged in the New Culture Movement. 
Moreover, some forefathers of the CCP had the experience of studying abroad, notably, 
Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. Due to the backgrounds of the CCP’s founders and the 
context of their political power, the CCP emphasizes developing science and technology. 
In fact, from the first chairman of the PRC Mao Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, 
Hu Jintao, and the current Chairman Xi Jinping, all of them have initiated important 
policies and projects related to science and technology. These policies and projects have 
driven the development of science and technology, which are viewed by the CCP as 
powerful tools to solve social, economic, and political problems. 
Mao Zedong initiated two significant scientific and technological projects. The 
first was about mastering nuclear science and making nuclear power and satellites; the 
second was the national project of “mass science.” In 1956, Mao pointed out that if China 
wanted to protect itself from Western invasions, it must have its own nuclear weapons. In 
October 1956, Mao approved the development of satellites and nuclear weapons, which 
resulted in the successful launch of China’s first nuclear bomb on June 17, 1967 and its 
first satellite on April 24, 1970.   
Concerning the project of “mass science,” the Chinese government recruited 
common Chinese people to participate in scientific and technological explorations even 
though many of them had little or no STEM education. There were numerous programs 
of mass science. For example, from 1957 to 1958, there was a program of producing steel. 
As discussed previously, Chinese people were asked to collect and use iron products such 
as iron pots and screws to make steel, and while steel workers spent days and nights in 
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the factories, other Chinese people were encouraged to produce steel in their backyards. 
This mass participation reflected how the Confucian emphasis on citizens’ support, 
sacrifice, and subordination to the government without questioning its justification 
became articulated with Mao’s government’s desire to develop steel science and 
technology to influence Chinese people in significant ways. Fan (2017) explains the 
reasoning behind the project of mass science: 
Maoist programs of mass science, such as earthquake prediction, barefoot doctors, 
and various attacks on “elite science,” were based on the tenets of integrating 
experts and the masses and combin[ing] indigenous and Western science. The 
underlying political doctrine asserted the class character of science, exalted 
everyday knowledge, and projected a particular vision of scientific and political 
modernity. (p. 302) 
Fan’s argument reveals that Mao’s national projects of mass science enabled the 
articulation of local Chinese science and technology with Western science and 
technology, and more importantly, reinforced the articulation of science and technology 
with politics.   
These two projects under Mao’s administration exerted significant impacts in the 
following ways. First, they reinforced the importance of science and technology, 
especially military science and technology, in spite of what might be considered other, 
negative measures of success. Thus, although developing nuclear weapons was expensive 
and time-consuming, the Chinese government continued to support the projects during 
the three years of national famine in China (1959-1961) when many Chinese people were 
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starving to death. Scientists and engineers who worked for this project were even under 
protection during the Cultural Revolution, while many university professors were 
tortured. Second, the project of mass science plays an important role with regard to 
disarticulating science and technology from being seen as the purview of the West. As 
argued previously, the belief that science and technology belonged exclusively to the 
West was developed during the Westernization Movement and the New Culture 
Movement. Instead, Mao’s project of mass science aimed to articulate science and 
technology with traditional Chinese culture. Mao believed that in traditional Chinese 
culture, there were useful scientific and technological ideas to exploit. In his view it was 
necessary to combine both indigenous and Western knowledge. For example, in the 
program of barefoot doctors, Mao emphasized that besides learning Western 
pharmacology, doctors should also draw from traditional Chinese lore on medicine.  
Third, Mao insisted that science and technology were “inherently political… neither 
neutral nor value-free” (Fan, 2017, p. 314). Mao’s idea of mass science reflected his 
efforts to eradicate gaps between classes and create an egalitarian society in which 
everyone worked and everyone was served at the same time. However, as Elman (2008) 
points out, “Maoist science and its rhetoric of science’s role in class struggle [served as] a 
smokescreen for power politics” (p. 518). This means that Mao believes that science and 
technology should always serve the government’s political purposes.  
In January1963, Zhou Enlai, the premier of Mao Zedong’s government, 
introduced the plan of four modernizations/Si Ge Xian Dai Hua四个现代化 at the 
Conference on Scientific and Technological Work held in Shanghai. Zhou argued that the 
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government and the people should work diligently to realize the modernizations of 
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. This was an essential 
scientific and technological plan that exerted profound influence on the CCP’s later 
policies even though this plan ended abruptly due to the breakout of the Cultural 
Revolution.   
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) dismantled the institutional scientific 
infrastructure including scientific administration, scientific communities, and the 
educational system in China. Thus, during that decade of social, cultural, and political 
turmoil, the Chinese people and government were not capable of making important 
progress in science and technology. In 1977, with the death of Mao and the return of 
Deng Xiaoping to the power center of the CCP from the political wilderness, the Cultural 
Revolution ended and the CCP shifted its focus to develop the economy as well as 
science and technology. 
Initially, Deng returned to Zhou’s plan of four modernizations. In March 1979, 
Deng (1979) pointed out that “realizing the four modernizations is a many-sided complex 
and difficult undertaking” (p. 188). In December of the same year, Deng announced the 
reform and opening-up policy, which was his expansion of the plan of the four 
modernizations. 
ROUP maintains the core focus of the plan of four modernizations on developing 
science and technology. Deng “identified technological change as the main mechanism 
for improving economic performance and maintaining economic growth” (Saich, 1989, p. 
68). He made a famous statement about science and technology on September 5, 1988 in 
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a meeting with the president of Czechoslovakia that “science and technology are the most 
important and fundamental productive forces (Ke Ji Shi Di Yi Sheng Chan Li/科技是第
一生产力).” Deng’s statement, which implied that science and technology are the forces 
to create history, differed significantly from Mao’s (1945) claim that “people, only 
people, are the force to create history” (“On Coalition Government”). For Deng, the value 
of science and technology exceeded that of human beings. Deng’s arguments indicated 
the beginning of a new era in which science and technology are strongly articulated to the 
government’s main focus on economic development. Science and technology, it is now 
believed, will bring the country a prosperous future.   
From a young age, Deng was committed to promoting science and technology. In 
1920, when Deng’s father asked him what he expected to gain when he was leaving to 
study in France, Deng, a sixteen-year-old at that time, replied “to learn knowledge and 
truth from the West in order to save China.” Deng’s reply reflected his faith in the power 
of science and technology to bring China a promising future. Goldman and Simon (1989) 
summarized Deng’s understanding of science and technology in this way: 
Much of the rhetoric of the Deng Xiaoping regime, which came to power in late 
1978, resonates with the May Fourth Movement’s [which is also known as the 
New Culture Movement’s] celebration of science and technology as the key to 
solving all China’s problems. This disillusionment with the prevailing ideology—
this time, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism—once more created an ideological vacuum 
that the leadership and intellectuals again sought to fill with the idealization of 
advanced science and technology. (p. 9) 
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In short, Goldman and Simon argue that Deng romanticized science and technology and 
assumed that they could fill the gap and solve the issues left by disappointment with and 
inadequacy of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.   
Deng formulated several policies that fundamentally contributed to the 
development of science and technology in the era of reforms and initiated several large 
national scientific and technological projects. First, Deng resumed China’s National 
College Entrance Exam/Gao Kao/高考 in 1977 after it had been stopped for almost 10 
years. Moreover, Deng pointed out that besides considering the class of a student’s 
family, which was the main criterion used previously, universities should take students’ 
academic performances seriously in recruiting. Since then, intelligent and diligent 
students have had the chance to receive higher education, regardless of their class 
background. In fact, many members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 
Chinese Academy of Engineering began their university years in 1977 and 1978, such as 
Zhou Shouwei, Bao Weimin, and Wang Xiaofan. Furthermore, Deng vigorously 
imported Western science and technology and promoted STEM education and research. 
For example, after the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S., 
Deng visited the U.S. for the first time in 1979 and signed “The U.S.-China Agreement 
on Cooperation in Science and Technology.” In February 1984, Deng visited The 
Exhibition of Scientific and Technological Achievements held in Shanghai and pointed 
the significance of developing computer training programs in schools. In 1986, Deng 
initiated the 863 Program, which is one of the biggest scientific and technological 
projects that promoted research in STEM fields in contemporary China. In the same year, 
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Deng also initiated the Spark Program/Xing Huo Ji Hua/星火计划, which aims to utilize 
science and technology to boost the development of rural China. In fact, it has been 
maintained that since 1978, the spring of science and technology has arrived in China.  
After Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao continued to develop science 
and technology, reinforcing the articulation of science and technology with the country’s 
progress. For example, in 1995, Jiang Zemin announced the strategy of invigorating 
China through science and education (Ke Jiao Xing Guo/科教兴国). Jiang argued that 
scientific and technological developments were essential for China’s success; thus the 
Chinese government should emphasize scientific and technological research and STEM 
education. This strategy reflected Jiang’s efforts of articulating science and technology 
with the Confucian emphasis on education in order to cultivate talents in STEM that 
could serve the country. In 1997, Jiang argued that science and technology determined 
the future of China’s economy. This argument brought science and technology “to the 
centre” and expected “them to play a significant role in economic construction of China” 
(Dolla, 2015, p. 43).  
Hu Jintao, the chairman after Jiang Zemin, also emphasized science and 
technology. In 2006, Hu stated his plan for China’s future to become an innovative 
country in 15 years. This meant that besides learning from the West, China was expected 
to create new scientific and technological achievements independently and to craft 
products that are competitive and carry Chinese intellectual property rights. In the same 
year, Hu’s government published “The National Outlines for Medium and Long-Term 
Planning for Scientific and Technological Development (2006-2020).” This outline was a 
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comprehensive plan for scientific and technological developments in China from 2006 to 
2020. It called for launching independent innovative scientific and technological projects 
both in traditional fields such as chemistry and in cutting-edge fields such as mobile 
communication. Since 2003, which was the year that Hu became the chairman, the 
Chinese government had “spent 340.6 billion Yuan on science and technology over the 
past five years” and “China's total investment in research, experimentation and 
development rose from the 128.8 billion Yuan in 2002 to 366.4 billion Yuan in 2007” 
(Wen, 2008). 
Xi Jinping, who succeeded Hu Jintao as Chairman of the PRC, has consistently 
asserted the importance of science and technology for China’s future. Xi’s government 
has inherited and expanded the Thousand Talents Plan (Qian Ren Ji Hua/千人计划), first 
initiated by Hu Jintao’s government in 2008. This plan brings to China outstanding 
international scholars, researchers, and entrepreneurs in STEM by providing them 
competitive salaries, spacious apartments, and other benefits such as offering scholars’ 
spouses decent jobs. This project demonstrates Xi’s as well as Hu’s commitments to 
developing science and technology. Accordingly, while the Chinese government has 
invested a considerable amount of money on experts in STEM, talented scholars in the 
humanities and arts are largely ignored, because it is believed that they cannot create 
social wealth. In this way, the humanities have become disarticulated from educational 
value, which was strongly emphasized in ancient China.  
Facing the pressure of a trade war between China and the U.S., Xi is concerned 
that some scientific and technological fields in China rely too heavily on Western 
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countries. Xinhua Net, a website sponsored by the Chinese government, summarized one 
of Xi Jinping’s most important speeches about developing science and technology, 
especially in the event that China entered a trade war with the U.S., which was delivered 
in May 2018: 
Xi…said as China strives for prosperity and rejuvenation, it needs to devote great 
energy to promoting science and technology, and endeavor to be a major world 
center for science and innovation …Xi called on the country's science and 
technology personnel to grasp the main trends, seize opportunities, face problems 
squarely, and rise to challenges….Xi said they should aim for the frontiers of 
science and technology, lead the direction of its development, shoulder the heavy 
responsibilities bestowed by history, and be vanguards in innovation in the new 
era…Xi said efforts must be made to ensure "high-quality science and 
technology" to underpin the development of a modernized economy…. ‘The 
initiatives of innovation and development must be securely kept in our own 
hands,’ Xi said. (Xinhua , 2018).  
In fact, in 2015, Xi’s government announced the program “Made in China 2025” (Zhong 
Guo Zhi Zao 2025/中国制造 2025). This program aims to change China’s situation from 
being the world’s factory of low-cost and low-quality products to an innovative one that 
designs and crafts valuable high-tech products and provides cutting-edge technical 
services and support. Fang and Walsh (2018) reported that the Chinese government 
would roughly invest $300 billion US dollars (approximately 2024 billion Yuan) in this 
plan. 
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The Status of Science and Technology in the Era of Reforms 
Earlier in this chapter, I explored several forces that have profoundly impacted the 
status of science and technology in contemporary China. Chinese myth, which includes 
numerous gods and goddesses that are scientists and engineers, reveals that there is a 
deep tradition of valuing science and technology. Some aspects of Confucianism and 
Daoism stifled the development of science and technology, especially in ancient China. 
Other Confucian and Daoist aspects have contributed to scientific and technological 
development even in ancient China, such as the emergence of gunpowder. Still, other 
aspects have articulated with new elements in the era of reforms resulting in a transition 
from stifling to encouraging scientific and technological development, such as valuing 
education, which has tenaciously been articulated to what it means to be a good Chinese 
citizen but has now been disarticulated from the humanities in ancient China and 
rearticulated to STEM in contemporary China. The Westernization Movement and the 
New Culture Movement significantly promoted the idea that science and technology, 
which are associated with the West, are powerful and can bring Chinese people and the 
nation a promising future. In addition, the Chinese tradition of numeracy and the 
discrepancy between the needs of the large population and the country’s inadequate 
capacity for production have profoundly driven the development of science and 
technology. Progress enabled by scientific and technological development in terms of 
providing more food and living space for Chinese people has reinforced Chinese people’s 
faith in and need for science and technology. The CCP has formulated many policies to 
73 
promote science and technology, even investing them as the remedies to all social 
problems.  
Due to the articulation of these mythical, ideological, religious, intellectual, 
cultural, humanistic, and political influences, science and technology are romanticized in 
the era of reforms. As a result, many Chinese people are fascinated with science and 
technology, and they privilege scientific and technological developments regardless of 
the costs. Additionally, science and technology have become integral to the Chinese 
government’s political practices.  
On July 22, 2018, the New York Times published the article “Wild About Tech, 
China Even Loves Robot Waiters that Can’t Serve.” In the article, Mozur (2018) 
discusses the phenomenon that increasing numbers of Chinese people embrace science 
and technology without any hesitation. Many Chinese people support new scientific and 
technological devices even when the new devices have no practical use. Moreover, 
Chinese people even fly abroad to purchase “more advanced” scientific and technological 
products, which are sometimes unnecessary. Chang (2015) observed that in “stores [in 
Japan], China’s ravenous consumers cleared out shelves, buying electronic rice cookers, 
air purifiers, digital cameras, and, most notably, electronic toilet seats.” 
In fact, many Chinese children grow up with the saying “If you can study 
mathematics, physics, and chemistry well, you can face the world confidently” (Xue Hao 
Shu Li Hua, Zou Bian Tian Xia Dou Bu Pa/学好数理化走遍天下都不怕). Due to this 
education, many Chinese people view science and technology as the most powerful force 
that can definitely bring them happy lives, as described by a Chinese netizen: 
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The way Chinese people treat science and technology is similar to the way 
American people treat Christianity. American people visit churches during the 
weekend piously. Chinese people view science and technology 
piously…Currently, in China, science and technology replace arts, aesthetics [, 
and humanities]. American people believe God is the creator of the world, and 
Chinese people believe science and technology are the creators of the world.22 
Because of the value placed on science and technology, it has become 
commonplace to promote the development of science and technology regardless of the 
costs. A recent example concerns the births of two genetically edited babies. In 
November 2018, these twin girls were born in China. The Chinese scientist He Jiankui 
collaborated with several Western scientists to alter and modify the genes of these girls 
when they were still embryos. Dr. He claimed that after editing the genes of these babies, 
they were born healthy, proving that they are likely resistant to HIV even though their 
father is an HIV carrier, who in ordinary circumstances would have likely passed down 
the disease of AIDS to his children. Although Dr. He’s research probably contributes to 
biological science and technology in significant ways, it has serious potential inhumane 
costs, including the potential long-term health repercussions for these babies and their 
descendants.  
                                                 
22默默无闻/Mo Mo Wu Wen left this comment in Baidu Tieba on 23 November 2018. Baidu Tieba is one of China’s 
biggest and most active open-access social network with forum-like features. Baidu Tieba claims to be the biggest 
online community that is in Chinese. People can create posts, leave and reply to comments under pseudonyms. This 
comment is retrieved from: http://tieba.baidu.com/p/5958780368. I translated the comment from Chinese to English.  
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A very interesting and increasingly relevant articulation of the elevation of 
science and technology to politics is the Chinese government’s growing effects to  
harness, control, and constrain the power of science and technology since they offer 
potentially subversive opportunities for Chinese citizens to resist the government’s 
control. Thus, the government surveils and constrains Chinese people’s access to and use 
of science and technology, for example by implementing the Great Firewall of China. 
The Chinese government designed and applied the Great Firewall of China (GFW) to 
block and filter information flows. As a result, Chinese people cannot access certain 
websites such as Google, Youtube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram because the 
Chinese government is concerned that these websites include potentially politically 
sensitive information and wants to inhibit the flow of this information in China.23By 
implementing the GFW, which enables the Chinese government to censor the Internet, 
the government controls a main source of knowledge.  
Besides the GFW, the Chinese government has implemented other national 
scientific and technological projects such as Tian Wang (天网), a system of 
surveillance.24 The Tian Wang system is “the world’s biggest camera surveillance 
                                                 
23Legally, Chinese people cannot access these websites because based on the location of their IP addresses, their 
requests to visit these websites would be rejected by GFW. However, many Chinese people pay for VPN services that 
are provided by private companies. The service of VPN can change Chinese Internet users’ IP addresses, thus they can 
visit these blocked websites. However, since January 2015, the Chinese government has worked on blocking VPNs. 
Since 2015, several of the most popular companies that provide VPN services such as Express VPN and Green VPN 
were prohibited by the Chinese government from providing their services in mainland China.     
24The name of the system “Tian Wang” is taken from a Chinese proverb “The net of heaven has large meshes, but it 
lets nothing through” (Tian Wang Hui Hui, Shu Er Bu Lou). Originally, this proverb was used to imply that justice has 
long arms and that people should have faith in God. The Chinese government took the first two characters (“Tian 
Wang”) of this proverb to name a nationwide system of surveillance to signify that the system can catch everything.  
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network. Across the country, 170 million CCTV cameras are already in place and an 
estimated 400 million new ones [would] be installed [between 2017 and 2020]. Many of 
the cameras are fitted with artificial intelligence, including facial recognition technology” 
(Liu, 2017). This system can cover most public places in China since those CCTV 
cameras were installed in railway stations, airports, shopping malls, streets, schools, 
universities, restaurants, cinemas, stadiums, buses, trains, cabs, flights, markets, and so 
forth. Through using the Tian Wang System, the Chinese government can monitor 
Chinese people’s everyday activities in a quick and effective way. Moreover, by 
connecting to a database, which includes the pictures and identifying information of 
people including foreigners in China, the Tian Wang system can not only quickly 
recognize the identity of a person captured by a CCTV camera, but can also review the 
person’s behaviors in the past few weeks and even the information regarding that 
person’s social network. This system is very powerful. In 2017, a BBC News 
correspondent John Sudworth tested the Tian Wang system by trying to stay hidden from 
CCTV cameras in Guiyang City, Guizhou Province China. However, in 7 minutes, he 
was captured by police because the Tian Wang System could even predict his possible 
pathways of escape based on the previous footage captured by CCTV cameras (BBC 
News, 2017).  
This chapter explores myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the Westernization 
Movement and the New Culture Movement, the tradition of numeracy, the discrepancy 
between the needs of Chinese people and the country’s inadequate productive capacity, 
and the CCP’s political practices, which are articulated and have exerted profound 
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impacts on the status of science and technology. As this chapter has demonstrated, these 
forces contribute to the veneration of science and technology in the era of reforms in 
significant ways. The next chapter will address the other central issue of this dissertation, 








Chapter Three: Chinese Women’s Roles in the Era of 
Reforms 
 
Chapter Two considered the influences on science and technology in the era of 
reforms of Chinese myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the Westernization Movement and 
the New Culture Movement, the Chinese tradition of numeracy, the discrepancy between 
the needs of the large population and China’s inadequate capacity of production, and the 
CCP’s policies. These elements contribute to the belief that science and technology are 
powerful and can bring positive changes to Chinese society and people. The previous 
chapter concluded that science and technology are venerated, which results in many 
Chinese people’s preoccupation with them, their development regardless of the costs, and 
their embeddedness into the CCP’s political practices.   
This chapter focuses on Chinese women in the era of reforms through mapping 
their roles. This chapter argues that the articulation of Chinese myth, Chinese language, 
Confucianism and Daoism, and the CCP’s political practices disciplines Chinese women 
to be wives and mothers in the era of reforms.  However, at the same time, the 
articulation of the discourse of The New Woman and the CCP’s political practices to 
encourage and prepare women to join the workplace impacts women’s roles in the era of 
reforms, resulting in an increasing number of Chinese women becoming professionals. 
Thus, in the era of reforms, two predominant roles that many Chinese women have are 
being a mother and a wife, and being a professional. The traditional role of being wives 
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and mothers and the emerging new role of being professionals have created tensions and 
contradictions that have impacted women’s living situations in significant ways.  
As prelude to my discussion, I want to discuss an influential TV series, The First 
Half of My Life/Wo De Qian Ban Sheng/我的前半生 (2017), in which the two leading 
characters—Luo Zijun/罗子君 and Tan Jing /唐晶— are women in contemporary China. 
This TV series is a noteworthy example because it showcases many tensions Chinese 
women have experienced in the era of reforms. It became so popular that a photo of the 
actresses Ma Yili and Yuan Quan, who played the roles of Luo Zijun and Tang Jing, was 
chosen in November 2017 as the cover page of Elle (China), one of the most influential 
high-fashion magazines in China. This TV series has also received many accolades such 
as The Magnolia Award in 2018. 
The first half of Luo Zijun’s life was spent as a rich housewife. However, in her 
30s she was deserted by her husband after he decided to marry his mistress. After 
reflecting on the first half of her life and deciding to support herself independently, Zijun 
returned to the workplace with the help from her friend Tang Jing and Tang Jing’s 
boyfriend He Han, with whom Zijun later felt in love. Tang Jing, unlike Luo Zijun, 
devoted herself to work. However, after being betrayed by her long-term boyfriend He 
Han and Zijun, Jing began to reflect on the first half of her life during which she rejected 
He Han’s proposals and sacrificed her love for her career.  
This TV series, which centers on Zijun and Jing’s struggle to balance their careers 
and family lives, resonated with many Chinese women. In the era of reforms, the 
discourse that good women are independent is popular; however, at the same time, good 
80 
women are still expected to be virtuous wives and caring mothers. What follows is a 
discussion of women’s two predominant and often conflicting roles in the era of 
reforms—being wives and mothers and being professionals.  
Chinese Women’ Roles as Wives and Mothers 
Chinese women have always been expected to become wives and mothers. This 
expectation is deeply rooted in Chinese myth, Chinese language, Confucianism and 
Daoism, and Chinese political practices. The link between women and these socio-
cultural roles is a line of tendential force that resists disarticulation in the era of reforms 
even when many significant changes have happened in Chinese society, as discussed in 
Chapter One and Two.  
Myth 
Chinese women are always expected to get married and to have children. This 
expectation was solidified in the early stages of Chinese civilization, as reflected in 
mythical stories. Among Chinese mythical figures, we should pay special attention to 
four of the most famous goddesses: Nü Wa/女娲, Guan Yin/观音, Chang E/嫦娥, and 
Sao Ba Xing/扫把星. 25  
                                                 
25 To know more about Chinese mythical figures, please consider reading these books: 1) Birrell, A.(1993). Chinese 
Mythology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. 2) Christie, A.(1968). Chinese Mythology. Feltham: Hamlyn Publishing. 3) 
Werner, E.T.C. (1922). Myths and Legends of China. New York: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. 4) Yang, L.; An, D.; 
&Turner, J., A. (2005). Handbook of Chinese Mythology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
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Nü Wa, as discussed in Chapter Two, is a goddess with a human upper body and a 
snake tail and is respected as the mother of human beings in China. She made people by 
creating them from clay and is respected for her love for them. For example, in order to 
patch the big hole in the sky, she used rocks of five colors and four legs of a giant 
tortoise. When she was running out of materials, she sacrificed her body to patch the sky.  
While ancient, Nü Wa remains an influential stereotype of Chinese women. 
Chinese women are expected to follow Nü Wa as an example of shouldering the 
responsibility of reproduction with love, taking good care of their children, and even 
sacrificing their lives for their children unhesitatingly. Nü Wa is one of the most 
significant figures in contemporary Chinese culture. For example, the popular Chinese 
TV drama series Chinese Paladin (仙剑奇侠传), which aired from 2005 to 2016, depicts 
the honorable lives of Nü Wa’s descendants, all of whom were women and who were 
born with the obligation of taking care of people and later sacrificed themselves to fulfill 
this obligation.   
The second figure is Guan Yin. In Chinese myth, Guan Yin is the goddess of 
mercy and compassion. Whereas in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, Avalokitesvara is the 
male god of mercy and compassion, this figure was transformed into a woman in Chinese 
Buddhism, which originates from Indian Buddhism but is more widely practiced than 
Indian and Tibetan Buddhism in contemporary China. This goddess of mercy, Guan Yin, 
is probably the most valued and honored goddess in Chinese culture. In Chinese myth, 
Guan Yin was the third daughter of a king who was determined to join a nunnery. Her 
father was outraged by her decision and tortured her. Later, he had become seriously ill 
82 
and could only be cured by an ointment made from the hands and eyes of his children. In 
another popular version, the ointment could only be made from the hands and eyes of 
people who had no anger. Guan Yin did not hesitate to rip out her eyes and to cut off her 
arms to save her father.  
While an extreme story, Guan Yin represents another stereotype of Chinese 
women: a filial daughter and a selfless beauty. A Chinese woman is expected to be a filial 
daughter who has no hatred or anger towards her parents no matter how her parents treat 
her. Moreover, in the myth, Guan Yin hears the cries of the world and helps people when 
she witnesses miseries, as indicated by a popular image of her with a thousand hands and 
eyes. Compassion has become a highly desired characteristic for Chinese women. 
Moreover, Guan Yin is also deified as the figure who sends babies to families. Thus, it is 
a common practice both in ancient and contemporary China that if a woman wants to get 
pregnant, she will go to a temple of Guan Yin to beg for help. Thus, although Guan Yin 
remains unmarried and doesn’t have a child of her own, she is still highly respected 
because she takes care of all families and her maternal love is for all the people in the 
world. Guan Yin is widely worshipped in contemporary China. In 2005, a 108 meter (354 
feet) statue of Guan Yin was enshrined in Sanya, Hainan Province (“Guanyin of 
Nanshan,” n.d.). The statue is one of the highest Buddhist statues in the world.    
The third figure is Chang E. In Chinese myth, Chang E is the most beautiful 
goddess. She was married to the expert archer Hou-Yi. After ten suns rose in the sky, 
which made the living conditions unbearable, Hou-Yi shot down nine of them and left 
only one in the sky. As a reward, he was given an elixir of immortality, but he was 
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unwilling to take it and asked Chang E to keep it safe. However, Chang E could not resist 
the temptation of being immortal and took the elixir. After, she started to float and fly 
away until she finally landed on the moon. There, she is the only creature, aside from a 
companion jade rabbit, and she leads a lonely, regretful life.  
The myth of Chang E is very popular in contemporary China because it is often 
promoted as proof that Chinese people’s dream of exploring the universe is deeply 
rooted. For example, the Chinese government named its four unmanned lunar-orbit 
spacecraft that have been sent to the moon as Chang E No. 1, Chang E No.2, Chang E 
No.3, and Chang E No.4 and its lunar rover Yutu, which references the jade rabbit. 
Moreover, Chinese culture romanticizes Chang E’s experience. For example, the Mid-
Autumn Festival, which is a national Chinese holiday for families to gather together, 
originates from the story of Chang E. Chinese people make cakes as offerings in 
exchange for Chang E’s protection. However, as a feminist, I question the glorified 
connotation of the story. Living lonely on the moon and being expelled from the 
community of human beings might be difficult for anyone, including Chang E. It could 
be viewed as the punishment for Chang E acting on her desire to be immortal and having 
the courage to betray her husband in taking the elixir without his permission. Thus, 
instead of solely viewing Chang E as the ascendant of Chinese astronauts or a protective 
goddess, I focus as well on Chang E’s lived experience and view her as a Chinese woman 
who is punished because of her quest for independence.  
Similar to Chang E, Sao Ba Xing is another stereotype of Chinese women who 
are not submissive to their husbands. The figure of Sao Ba Xing was crafted in an 
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influential Chinese mythical novel, The Investiture of the Gods (Feng Sheng Yan Yi/封神
演义). Before being deified as a goddess of Sao Ba Xing, she was an ordinary woman 
named Ma Zhaodi/马招娣. She was depicted as a greedy and shrewd woman who often 
quarreled and fought with her husband Jiang Ziya/姜子牙 because she thought he was 
not successful and rich enough, which led her to request a divorce. After the divorce, her 
husband became so successful that he helped to establish the Zhou Dynasty and was 
bestowed the Feng Sheng Bang, which is a list that empowers him to inaugurate new 
gods of heaven. Enraged by his ex-wife Mao Zhaodi, who returned to him and bothered 
him to inaugurate her as a goddess, Jiang Ziya inaugurate her as Sao Ba Xing, the 
goddess responsible for spreading bad luck. Accordingly, no one wants or likes her. 
People use water, brooms, and firecrackers to drive Sao Ba Xing out of their homes. Even 
now, when Chinese people refer to a person, especially a woman, who is believed to 
bring bad luck to others, they refer to that person as Sao Ba Xing.  
These mythical figures reflect how a Chinese woman is expected to behave 
culturally. She should be beautiful, gentle, a filial daughter, a supportive wife, and a 
loving mother. Otherwise, she will be expelled, disgraced, and punished. These myths 
constitute one of the key forces of articulation that emphasizes that Chinese women 
should be virtuous wives and caring mothers.  
Language 
The Chinese language is another force that contributes significantly to the tenacity 
of the link between Chinese women and their roles as wives and mothers. Chinese 
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characters are hieroglyphic, which means they were made based on people’s 
interpretations of images. For example, the number one in Chinese is “一,” the number 
two in Chinese is “二,” the word for wood in Chinese is “木,” the word for many trees in 
Chinese is “林,” and the word for forest in Chinese is “森林.” The Chinese character for 
men is “男.” This character includes two parts: “田” means fields and “力” means 
strength. When we put these two parts together, it is clear that Chinese men are supposed 
to be powerful and conduct agricultural work. In contrast, the Chinese character of 
women is “女.” This character reflects the figure of a woman who has full breasts and 
wide hips, which are believed to be signs of fertility in Chinese culture. The difference 
between the Chinese characters for men and women reveals the belief that men are strong 
and are the breadwinners, while women are seen in terms of their reproductive organs. 
These characterizations can be traced back through thousands of years of Chinese 
civilization and language.  
Moreover, the word “marriage” in Chinese is “婚姻.” Both the character of “婚” 
and the character of “姻” begin with the radical “女/nv,” which refers to a woman. While 
the character of men is absent, the close relation between the character of women and the 
characters of marriage symbolically reinforces that marriage is an indispensable part of a 
woman’s identity. “Wife” in Chinese is “妻.” Based on the classical Chinese book Shuo 
Wen Jie Zi/说文解字, which interprets Chinese characters, “妻” refers to a woman doing 
housework. “Pregnancy” in Chinese is “孕.” This Chinese character includes two parts 
“乃” and “子.” “乃” not only depicts the body shape of a pregnant woman, but also refers 
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to a woman’s “container”—the womb. Meanwhile, “子” means boys, so the figure of 
women contains a male offspring (Xu, 2000). If, as Levi-Strauss states, language works 
as a hidden structure influencing our behavior and thoughts, then it is—at least in part— 
through these Chinese linguistic characters that Chinese women learn their roles and 
negotiate their lived experience.   
Confucianism and Daoism 
The third line of force that contributes to keeping the link between women and the 
expectation for them to become wives and mothers is Confucianism and Daoism. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, some aspects of Confucianism and Daoism remain influential 
in the era of reforms.  
Besides promoting people’s subordination to authority and the government as 
well as emphasizing education, the Confucian ideas concerning marriage and family are 
powerful in contemporary China. Bell (2008) observes that in some provinces, 
“communist Party officials… are assessed on the basis of Confucian values such as filial 
piety and family responsibility” (p. 9). Moreover, it is becoming trendy for parents to 
send their daughters to receive training in Confucianism, a trend that is strongly promoted 
by some Chinese celebrities. In January 2019, Wei Pan/潘蔚, a famous hostess of the 
Travel Channel and the wife of a popular Chinese singer, was interviewed. In the 
interview, Pan explained her reason for quitting her job, leaving her comfortable life in 
Beijing, moving to a small city, and writing a book recording and reflecting on her daily 
life: 
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[Bothered by my children’s education], I said what about moving to Xuzhou 
where there’s a school [named Hua Xia Xue Gong/华夏学宫] focusing on 
traditional Chinese value[s] [especially Confucianism, thus my children can study 
there] …. I cooked for the children. I make wonton, stuffed buns, noodles and 
steamed bread for them. The smell of mom’s cooking [represents the best of a 
home]. …Our children [have changed] a lot in the past three years [since they 
have studied in that school]. Like Aibao [, my youngest daughter,] has learned 
and can recite much [of the] classic literature [in Confucianism]….Now I work as 
a teacher [in that school]….I teach girls handicrafts. [A girl] [will] become a wife 
and a mother in the future. [Thus,] it is important for her to express her love and 
emotion through needle and thread. (Yitiao, 2019).  
Besides Pan Wei’s daughters, Tao Hong/陶虹, a famous Chinese actress, also sent her 
daughter to study in the same school even though this school is not qualified to award 
students with any degree. Since many Chinese people cannot afford the high tuition of 
Hua Xia Xue Gong, they send their children, mostly their daughters, to study in other 
short-term Confucian programs. These programs, which are often titled “nü de ban/女德
班,” claim to enable girls to become virtuous by educating them with Confucianism.26 
“Nü de ban” programs promote the ideas that women should be submissive to their 
parents, remain chaste before marriage, and show deference to their husbands. These 
                                                 
26Nü De Ban (女德班): in Chinese character “nü” refers to women, “de” means virtue, and “ban” means classroom. Nü 
de ban refers to classrooms that center on instructing women to be virtuous.   
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programs often argue that a virtuous woman who abides by these ideas will be granted a 
happy life. Despite the criticism of this program by some Chinese people and local 
governments—for example, in December 13, 2018, Chongqing Wenming Wang, a 
website sponsored by the government of Chongqing City, published the article “The 
Brainwash of Nü De Ban Must Be Stopped”—many parents still send their daughters to 
study there. Furthermore, some sexist ancient Confucian familial practices have been 
revived. For example, on February 10, 2019, an article titled “The Ridicule of People in 
Shan Dong Province During the Spring Festival is a Reflection of the Corruption of 
Chinese Culture” was published on People. com.27 The article focused on the criticism of 
the practice of women preparing food, but not being allowed to eat at the table in Shan 
Dong Province, which is the birthplace of Confucianism. It argued that this practice 
reflects Confucian values that can make families live harmoniously and that the criticism 
against this practice reveals that China’s culture is losing its Confucian roots and being 
degraded. These examples indicate that Confucianism, especially Confucian thoughts on 
marriage and family, are gradually regaining their influence in Chinese culture in the era 
of reforms. 
The Confucian position on marriage and family strongly promotes two ideas. 
First, Confucianism emphasizes that people should get married and should have children. 
Second, Confucianism argues that members in a family should have different roles and 
responsibilities. The position of women in this system is subordinate.  
                                                 
27This article was initially published on People.cn, a website that is sponsored by the Chinese government, and was 
cited by many websites in China. However, in a few hours, it was taken down from People. cn although this article can 
be still be accessed from other websites.  
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First and foremost, Confucianism argues that people should get married when 
they become adults.28 Mencius argues that getting married is expected from the time of a 
baby’s birth. In the book Mencius, Mencius writes, “When a boy is born, all parents hope 
he will someday set up a household, and when a girl is born, they hope she will marry” 
(pp. 64-65). In many places in China, a related practice used to be popular and is still 
performed. On the birth date of a girl, her father plants a camphor tree in the yard. When 
the girl is going to marry, her father cuts the tree down and makes her a suitcase out of 
the tree. The girl carries this suitcase to her husband’s home. This practice demonstrates 
that parents plan for their daughters’ departures from time they are born to join other 
families through marriage.   
Besides emphasizing the expectation for women to marry, Confucianism 
underscores the importance of women having children in their marriages. In Mencius, 
there is a sentence “Bu Xiao You San, Wu Hou Wei Da. (不孝有三，无后为大).” The 
original meaning of this sentence is: every child should shoulder his/her responsibilities 
and respect his/her parents. However, the meaning of this sentence was redefined by later 
Confucian scholars to become “no posterity is the worst of the three unfilial acts.” This 
later version is still widely accepted and has remained the philosophical support for 
procreation-driven marriage in China. In fact, one of the most important beliefs in ancient 
                                                 
28I want to emphasize an important detail. Although same-sex love existed in ancient China as expressed by the 
phrase“Long Yang Zhi Pi/龙阳之癖”that describes homosexual attraction among gay men, only heterosexual 
marriages are recognized in classic Confucian texts.  
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Chinese culture was “more sons, more happiness” (Duo Zi Duo Fu/多子多福). Stockard 
(2002) points out that in ancient China,  
It was a moral duty of the highest order to have a son, to assure that the line of 
your grandfather and father—your line—continued unbroken through the 
generation. This moral duty gave marriage in Chinese society its primary goal: to 
produce sons to continue the descent line of the husband. (p. 44) 
In this way, women were endowed with the responsibility to bear sons.  
Additionally, Confucian scholars set rules for members in a family and required 
them to follow these rules. Men should work outside and women should stay inside. Men 
should be breadwinners and women homemakers. Wang (2011) summarizes Confucian 
thoughts on men’s and women’s separate roles as “for a woman, bearing and raising 
children for her family is more important than [all] other things in the world”; in contrast, 
“for a man, he is supposed to build up [an] establishment outside” (p. 96).  
Confucianism also argues that a husband and a wife should help, support, and 
take care of each other. But this cooperation is contingent on a wife’s submissiveness to 
her husband. An ancient Chinese ritual embodies this emphasis. Mencius describes this 
ritual: 
When a young man is capped, he receives a charge from his father, but when a 
girl is married, it is her mother who gives her the charge.29 As her daughter is 
                                                 
29Cap: In ancient China, when a boy became an adult, a ceremony would be held for him. In the ceremony, a cap would 
be put in his head. This practice signifies that he is recognized as an adult by his community. In the ritual of capping, 
his father would give him advice and outline his expectations for the newly adult man.  
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escorted out the gate she admonishes her: “When you reach your new home, be 
respectful! Be modest! Never disobey your husband!” (Mencius, n.d., p. 64)  
Even Ban Chao/班超, who advocated for women’s education in the Han Dynasty, writes, 
“If a wife does not serve her husband, then the proper relationship (between men and 
women) and the natural order of things are neglected and destroyed” (as cited in Swann 
1960, p. 83). 
Confucianism strongly emphasizes filiality. Parents raise their children; children, 
in return, should take good care of their parents as they age. To be a filial child, the 
person should provide his or her parents with clothing, shelter, food, service, and 
psychological comfort. This means that a boy should respect his parents’ opinions, obey 
his parents’ orders, and satisfy his parents’ expectations, which usually include having a 
successful and respected career. For a girl, this means she should marry someone who is 
chosen by her parents and serve her new family wholeheartedly to win her parents the 
good reputation of raising a virtuous daughter. The girl is also expected to have children, 
preferably sons, after she got married.  
Historically, the only way for women to become successful and achieve self-
fulfillment was to be virtuous wives and caring mothers. As a result, husbands and sons 
could focus on their careers and had more paths open to them to become successful. 
Given their husbands’ and sons’ success, women could get credit for being successful in 
their domestic roles. Accordingly, women were not expected to become knowledgeable 
or read many books. It was believed that “it is a woman’s virtue to be ignorant” (Nü Zi 
Wu Cai Bian Shi De/女子无才便是德). In contrast, women were expected to be good at 
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decorating themselves in order to be aesthetically pleasing and to be skilled at 
needlework in order to make clothing for their husbands and sons. The rule of “three 
obedience” (San Cong/三从) clearly revealed how Confucianism planned an ancient 
Chinese woman’s destiny: to obey her father before marriage, to obey her husband when 
married, and to obey her son in widowhood (Wei Jia Cong Fu, Ji Jia Cong Fu, Fu Si 
Cong Zi/未嫁从父，既嫁从夫，父死从子).30  
Although these Confucian ideas were more widely practiced in the past, they are 
rooted in Chinese culture and remain influential in contemporary China. For example, in 
the era of reforms, many Chinese people are hostile to women who have received higher 
education. There is a popular saying: “there are three kinds of creatures in the world—
men, women, and women with doctoral degrees/Shi Shang You San Zhong Ren—Nan 
Ren, Nv Ren, Nv Bo Shi/世上有三种人—男人，女人，女博士.” This argument 
indicates that women who receive advanced higher education are not even considered 
human beings. Moreover, Chinese women with doctoral degrees are often characterized 
as dinosaurs, which are culturally recognized as ugly and ferocious creatures. These 
interpretations of Chinese women who receive good education reveal that it is still not 
preferred for women to become very knowledgeable in contemporary Chinese culture.  
In 2018, there was a popular Chinese TV series Mother’s Life/娘道, which 
depicted and celebrated a subordinated woman. The main character Ying Gu sold herself 
as a slave to buy a coffin and a gravestone for her father. After marrying her husband and 
                                                 
30 To know more about the rule of three obedience, please read Gao, X. (2003). Women Existing For Men: 
Confucianism and Social Injustice against Women in China. Race, Gender & Class, 10(3), 114-125.  
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giving birth to three daughters, she became so ashamed because she failed to produce her 
husband a baby boy. Her signature phrase, “Chaozong [her husband’s given name], let 
me give you a boy,” reflected her dedication to the task of having a baby boy             
(Guo, 2016). After eight years without conceiving a baby boy, she was expelled by her 
husband’s family. However, she was willing to accept this punishment and believed that 
it was a fair treatment of her. After the sudden death of her husband, she found out that 
she was pregnant with her husband’s child again, a baby boy. In the end of the story, 
when her only son, who later became a traitor in the War Against Japanese Invasion, was 
about to be executed, Ying Gu stood in front of her son and took the bullet in his place.   
Moreover, through studying the parental matchmaking corners, where hundreds 
or even thousands of parents get together in parks or in big squares to exchange their 
children’s information (such as age, salary, educational background, height, and weight) 
in order to find potential satisfactory partners, Zhang and Sun (2013) argue that: 
The existence of parental matchmaking corners indicates…the enduring 
significance of marriage in urban China and the powerful effects of a selective 
rendering [of] traditional gender ideology— “men leading the outer domain and 
women the inner domain.” (p. 138) 
Besides Confucianism, Daoism, especially the Daoist religion, also has exerted 
profound impacts on Chinese women’s role as a wife and a mother. The Daoist religion 
has many gods and goddess that are responsible for managing marriage and reproduction 
among human beings, such as Jiu Tian Xuan Nv/九天玄女, Xi Wang Mu/西王母, , Bi 
Xia Yuan Jun/碧霞元君, and Bao Sheng Da Di/保生大帝. These figures reflect the 
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strong emphases of the Daoist religion on the necessity of people getting married and 
having children. 
Moreover, the Daoist religion promotes the philosophy of Tai Ji/太极, also often 
written as Tai Chi. The Tai Ji Diagram below is recognized as the most thoughtful yet 
simple reflection of the essence of Tai Ji, which was first put forward by the famous 
Daoist priest Chen Tuan (871—989):  
 
Figure 3. 1 The Image of Tai Ji. This image was drawn by the author. 
The Tai Ji diagram includes two main images: a black and a white fish that fuse together 
by connecting heads and tails. In traditional Chinese culture, the image of fish has a 
strong connotation of intimacy. For example, the phrase that is used to this day to 
describe the sexual pleasure between men and women is “the joyful connection between 
fish and water/yu shui zhi huan/鱼水之欢.” In Tai Ji philosophy, the black fish refers to 
yin/阴 that can be simplified as femininity, and the white fish refers to yang/阳 that can 
be simplified as masculinity. The close connection between the two fish signifies the 
intimacy of yin and yang, which is promoted by the Daoist religion.  
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In fact, the Daoist religion pursues an intricate balance between yin and yang, 
emphasizes that this balance is the beginning of everything, and argues that the marital 
and reproductive connection between men and women enables the world to achieve this 
balance. Tai Ping Jing/太平经, one of the earliest but classic books of the Daoist  
religion, points out that “by performing the duties of husbands and wives, both yin and 
yang find what they need, and the world can be peaceful” (Wang, 1997, p. 17), and 
criticizes people who do not get married, stating that “the [so-called] chaste men and 
women who are eager for the reputation of being pure and who refuse to connect with 
each other are against the world. This action inhibits the connection between yin and 
yang, which results in the death of the world” (Wang, 1997, p. 37). In fact, different from 
Confucianism—especially some Confucian thoughts that were developed during the 
Song Dynasty that strongly restricted and vilified people’s, especially women’s, sexual 
desires— the Daoist religion argues that the sexual connection between men and women 
is vital.  
Due to the Daoist religion’s emphases on marriage and reproduction, Chinese 
women are expected to shoulder their responsibilities to marry men and have babies. 
According to the Daoist religion, it is necessary for women to do so in order to ensure the 
peace and the flourishing of everything in the world.  
Chinese Governments’ Policies 
Besides Chinese myth, language, Confucianism and Daoism, Chinese political 
practices also contribute to the expectation that Chinese women should be wives and 
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mothers. Although the policies have varied in different historical periods, Chinese 
women have always been disciplined to be wives and mothers.  
In ancient China, governments were guided by Confucian thought. Confucianism 
believes that governors must first and foremost govern families, regarding the individual 
family as the basis of wider society. Thus, in ancient China, there were many prescriptive 
policies that required women to get married and have children for the purpose of 
increasing the labor force and maintaining social stability. For example, under Emperor 
Taizong of Tang, officials matched single men who were over 20 and single women who 
were over 15 to find them partners to marry. In the Song Dynasty, the legal minimum age 
of marriage for men was 15, and 13 for women. Similarly, for single people over the 
legal minimum age for marriage, the government intervened to introduce them to partners 
(Wang J, 2011). Besides getting married, women were also compelled to have children. It 
was legal for a husband to take concubines or even divorce his wife if she could not 
produce an heir for his family.  
Although the CCP abolished the law that allowed men to divorce their wives 
based on the grounds of infertility, it continues to discipline women to get married and to 
have children. Before the era of reforms, in the 1950s, after sending soldiers—mostly 
men—to Xin Jiang Province to do agricultural work, Mao’s government recruited more 
than 40,000 single women to work in the same province. One of the most important 
purposes of this recruitment was to provide soldiers with wives. There was a famous 
slogan for this historical: without wives, the soldiers cannot keep their minds on the  
work; without sons, the soldiers cannot view Xin Jiang Province as their hometown (Dai 
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& Vingie, n.d.). Additionally, in order to fight against female infanticide, in what might 
on the surface seem like valuing women for their own sake, Mao’s government used 
some slogans such as “if you don’t give birth to baby girls, in the future, your sons cannot 
find women to marry” (“Striking Slogans in China,” 2017).  
Moreover, when the PRC was established in 1949, working labor was in shortage 
because many Chinese people had died in the War Against Japanese Invasion and the 
Civil War in China. Thus, from 1949-1953, Mao Zedong’s government encouraged 
Chinese couples to give birth to children. Two proverbs reflected the family planning 
policies at that time. The first is “many hands make light work (Ren Duo Li Liang Da/人
多力量大).” The second, which often appeared in Mao Zedong’s conversations, is “when 
many help to gather firewood, the flames shoot high (Zhong Ren Shi Chai Huo Yan Gao/ 
众人拾柴火焰高).” Accordingly, the Chinese government also formulated a series of 
policies to regulate abortion and birth control. For instance, in 1952, the Chinese Ministry 
of Health announced that besides special circumstances such as diseases, abortion was 
prohibited; and individuals could have contraception only if their doctors could prove that 
birth control was necessary for saving mothers’ lives.  
In the era of reforms, the CCP’s tradition of emphasizing marriage and families 
continues, as Fincher (2014) argues, “as any Communist Party publication will tell you, 
marriage and family form ‘the basi[c] cell of society’ and ‘a harmonious family is the 
foundation of a harmonious society’” (p. 23). The CCP has formulated policies and 
promoted discourses to discipline women to get married and to have babies.  
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The Chinese government has implemented policies that make the living situations 
of single women difficult. Among many related policies, I want to focus on the CCP’s 
policy regarding buying apartments. As discussed in Chapter Two, Chinese culture 
strongly emphasizes that an adult should own a decent apartment, which is not easy in 
China. In the era of reforms, owning an apartment in urban areas has become increasingly 
difficult. With the growing number of people who move to and work in big cities, and 
who want to buy an apartment there, there is an increasing demand to buy apartments in 
cities, which is exacerbated by the limited capacity to develop these spaces further. 
Furthermore, real estate developers and investors manipulate the housing prices in order 
to maximize profits. Consequently, apartment prices in big Chinese cities are extremely 
high. For example, in February 2019, the average price for apartments in Beijing was 
45,220 Yuan per m² ( approximately 724.30 USD per sq ft; in Chao Yang District, the 
most sought after district in Beijing, the average price reached 102,459 Yuan per m² 
(approximately 1641.12 USD per sq ft); in Shanghai, the average price was 47,920 Yuan 
per m² (approximately 767.55 USD per sq ft ); and in Huang Pu District, one of the most 
sought after districts in Shanghai, the average price was 142,100 Yuan per m² 
(approximately 2276.06 USD per sq ft) [Anjuke.com(a), 2019; Anjuke.com (b) 2019]. In 
contrast, by December 31, 2018, the median sale price in Chicago was 245 USD per sq ft; 
and the median sale price in Manhattan NYC was 1,489 USD per sq ft [Zillow.com (a), 
n.d.; Zillow (b), n.d.]. These statistics indicate that the housing prices in big Chinese cities 
are extremely high even compared with big American cities. 
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Facing the high housing prices, the Chinese government has formulated policies 
to regulate the market. The Chinese government argues that the main reason for the high 
housing prices in big cities is the investors who have bought too many apartments. 
Driven by this logic, the Chinese government regulates property ownership in order to 
eliminate speculators. China’s central government classifies Chinese people’s needs as: 
necessary requirement (Gang Xu/刚需) and soft requirement (Tan Xing Xu Qiu/弹性需
求). The central government argues that the market of real estate should first serve 
people’s necessary requirements, more importantly Chinese couples’ needs for housing. 
Accordingly, the Chinese local governments have set up their own policies based on the 
central government. In 2018, the local government of Shanghai announced that no single 
local residents are allowed to buy apartments. However, married couples that are not 
local to Shanghai and have submitted their social security fees for 5 consecutive years are 
allowed to buy a unit, and in some cases even two. Because of this policy, people who 
want to buy an apartment in Shanghai have to bring their marriage certificates to prove 
their legitimacy. Besides Shanghai, Guanzhou, another big city in China, also has a 
similar policy. According to this policy, single non-local people have to submit their 
social security fees for 5 consecutive years in order to become a candidate to buy a unit. 
However, married people, even if both of them are not local, only need to submit their 
social security fees for 3 consecutive years. Single local people are allowed to buy one 
apartment, but the married locals are allowed to buy two. Similarly, in Beijing, unmarried 
people are also only allowed to buy one apartment while married people are allowed to 
buy two (“New! The policies of buying apartment,” 2018).  
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The Chinese government’s policies relating to buying apartments do not favor 
single people, especially single professional women who work in big cities. This is 
because compared to single women, most single Chinese men are low-skilled workers 
who cannot afford the high price of housing in big cities. Thus, these policies are not 
relevant to them. Men from the middle-class and upper-class can easily find women to 
marry due to the Chinese tradition that expects women to “marry up,” so they are not 
seriously influenced by these regulatory policies.31 However, for many single middle-
class Chinese women who want to have a unit of their own and can afford the down 
payment, the only way for them to buy one is to marry someone and in most cases this 
involves rushing to find partners. In fact, an increasing number of Chinese single women 
who work in the big cities expressed their strong desires of buying an apartment of their 
own in these cities. These women “argue that compared with marriage, an apartment 
offers them a stronger feeling of security…. They argue that an apartment can 
significantly improve their living conditions and is also an investment” (“Why? An 
Increasing Number of Single Women in Big Cities,” 2019). This means that due to the 
Chinese government’s regulations, many single professional women have to compromise 
their singlehood or their dreams of owning apartments. Thus, although on the surface, the 
Chinese government’s policies concerning property acquisition exert negative influence 
on both single men and women equally; professional women who work in big cities are 
                                                 
31The cultural expectation for women to marry up will subsequently be discussed in more detail. 
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the group of people most subject to the discriminatory effects of the government’s 
housing policy.   
Besides the policies related to buying apartments, the Chinese government has 
also formulated other policies that disfavor single people. For example, since June 2017, 
the Chinese government has established the Special Fund for Marriage Consumption 
Subsidies (Jie Hun Xiao Fei Bu Tie Zhuan Xiang Ji Jin/结婚消费补贴专项基金). This 
special fund aims to give subsidies to every newly married Chinese couple. This fund, 
which comes from social security fees that are paid by both single and married workers, 
is used exclusively to support newly married Chinese couples regardless of their 
economic situations. In this way, the Chinese government denies single people’s access 
to funds that they have paid into.  
Furthermore, the Chinese government has begun to intervene into people’s 
divorces, making the process more difficult. According to the Chinese Marriage Law, 
there are two kinds of divorce: negotiated divorce and one-party divorce. Basically, if 
both husband and wife agree to divorce, they can get the divorce certificate quickly from 
the government. As explained in the Article 31 in the Marriage Law of China, “divorce 
shall be granted if husband and wife both desire it. Both parties shall apply to the 
registration office for divorce” (Commission on China, 2006). However, if only one party 
desires the divorce, the process is more difficult and time-consuming. For example, local 
government officials usually intervene by talking with the couple to figure out the 
reasons that drive them to divorce. Moreover, the Chinese culture strongly opposes 
divorce, as indicated by the phrase “one should rather damage ten temples than destroy a 
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marriage/ ning chai shizuomiao, bu chai yi dun hun/宁拆十座庙,不拆一段婚,” which 
can be roughly understood as people should not destroy a marriage for any reason. Given 
this cultural belief, officials usually try to persuade couples to change their minds to 
avoid divorce. In some places, an official’s work performance is even evaluated by the 
number of couples that he or she successfully persuaded from divorce.  
Since August 2018, the Chinese government has experimentally introduced the 
“calm down” period for divorce. The Chinese government claimed that China’s high 
divorce rate was caused by China’s Law of Marriage that made divorce “convenient.” 
Thus, the government needed to intervene to reduce the divorce rate. They set up a 
month-long calm down period for couples who want to divorce. This means that the 
couples need to wait for one month between the time that they submit their mutually 
consensual requests for divorce and the time the government begins to process their 
requests. Moreover, during this calm down period, either of the partners can withdraw his 
or her request. Accordingly, a negotiated divorce can turn into a more time-consuming 
and arduous one-party divorce. In this way, the Chinese government hopes that more 
Chinese couples, especially young couples, maintain stable partnerships.    
Besides implementing policies, the Chinese government has engaged in 
promoting discourses that oppose single people, such as the discourse that single people 
are irresponsible and the discourse of the leftover women. The Chinese government 
openly criticizes single people for being irresponsible, as described in the article “The 
Population of Single Adults in China Reaches 200,000,000: A Population that Equates to 
the Entire Populations of Russia and the U.K. Combined” that was published on August 
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16, 2017 in People.cn, a website sponsored by the Central Committee of the Communist 
Youth League. This article claims that “because single people have fewer responsibilities 
compared with married people, it is much easier for single people to become lazy and 
lack motivation to work… [Accordingly] they are influencing the Chinese economy in 
negative ways” (“The Population of Single Adults,” 2017).  
Additionally, the Chinese government has actively engaged in promoting the 
discourse of the leftover women. “Leftover women (Sheng Nü/剩女),” a phrase that 
refers to single professional urban women who are older than 27 years old, first appeared 
on the internet in 2006. The word “sheng/剩” refers to remains or leftovers, and is often 
used to describe something that is seen as less desirable. The word “nü/女” refers to 
women. Chinese people combine these two words and use this derogatory term to 
describe the group of single Chinese women who are mostly college educated, have 
successful careers, and earn satisfactory salaries. In 2007, China’s Ministry of Education 
even added the term “leftover women” to its official lexicon and since then, this 
discourse has become not only more pervasive but also has gained “legitimate” status in 
Chinese culture.   
Before I explain the discourse of the leftover women in detail, I need to clarify 
one point that it is not the case that China has a surplus of women that results in a large 
number of single women. Instead, in contemporary China, there are fewer women 
compared with men. Due to the Chinese culture’s preference for boys over girls, there has 
been a long tradition of female infanticide, especially in rural areas, as demonstrated by 
Jiang, Li, Feldman, and Sánchez-Barricarte (2012). Driven by some Chinese families’ 
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devotion to provide their baby boys sufficient resources such as money and parental love 
to ensure their survival and success, they kill their baby girls. Moreover, due to China’s 
one-child policy that had been implemented since 1980, the policy that required most 
Chinese households to have only one child, the practice of female infanticide became 
more prevalent.32 Denyer (2016) reported that due to the one-child policy, “there [were] 
30 to 60 million ‘missing girls’” in China who were “apparently killed in the womb or 
just after the birth.”  
A serious consequence of female infanticide is the striking gender imbalance in 
the era of reforms. By 2017, 51.17% of the total population was male. This fairly equal 
distribution was due in part to the surplus of women with longer life spans. However, for 
young generations, there are more males, which make the gender imbalance increasingly 
pronounced. For example, from the ages of 15 to 19, the sex ratio was 100 females to 
117.7 males; from the ages of 20 to 24, the sex ratio was 100 females to 110.98 males; 
and from the ages of 25 to 29, the sex ratio was 100 females to 104.47 males. In part due 
to the gender imbalance, there is a lack of single Chinese women. Among the population 
over 15-years-old who never married, 104,688 were males and 72,470 were females 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). This lack of single women results in a 
surplus of men who are unable to find female partners.  
Additionally, due to the deeply-rooted cultural belief that women should marry  
up, Chinese women are expected to marry men who are superior to them either in their 
                                                 
32I will provide a detailed explanation of China’s one-child policy later in this chapter and in Chapter Five when I 
discuss IVF. 
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educational, economic, or familial backgrounds. Chinese culture argues that through 
marrying up, a woman not only achieves self-fulfillment but also honors her parents. 
Moreover, as discussed earlier in this chapter, since Confucianism promotes marriage 
that subordinates the wife, it is advocated that through marrying up, women will be more 
likely to be submissive and thereby maintain their marriages. From a cultural standpoint, 
this kind of marriage is more stable.  
Because of the expectation for Chinese women to marry up, many Chinese men 
from the lower-middle and working classes have the most difficulty finding partners. In 
Chinese society, these men are referred to as bare branches/ guang gun/光棍. The guang 
guns are already in the base level of society and cannot fulfill Chinese women’s 
expectation of marrying up. Fincher (2014) points out that “most of [guang guns] are 
poor, uneducated and rural” (p. 22). Fong (2016) argues that the population of guang 
guns will continue to increase. She writes, “ten years later [in 2026], one in four men in 
China will be a low-skilled bachelor” (p. 109). Moreover, in Chinese society, guang guns 
are viewed as potential disruptors to social harmony. Fincher (2014) recorded an editorial 
that explains the living situations of guang guns in the People’s Daily, a newspaper 
sponsored by the CCP: 
The continual accumulation of unmarried men of legal marrying age greatly 
increase the risk of social instability and insecurity….[It was reported that] older 
unmarried men in villages surveyed in the past three years have taken part in 
activities destroying social order, including gambling, rioting, stealing and gang 
fighting. (p. 21)   
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Thus, single women, who constitute the smaller population in the era of reforms, are 
expected to “tame” guang guns even though marrying these men is against the cultural 
expectation of marrying up and possibly their personal inclinations to remain single. The 
discourse of the leftover women that has emerged in this context, to a large degree serves 
the purpose of disciplining and compelling single women to marry single men.  
The leftover women include two predominant stereotypes and can be classified 
into several levels. The first stereotype of leftover women can be summarized as ugly, 
unwanted women. This stereotype is of women who lack physical beauty and thus cannot 
attract men to marry. Gradually they become jaded, blame men for being evil, and turn 
into pathetic misandrists. The second stereotype is of women who are unrealistically 
picky beauties. This stereotype of leftover women is often represented as women who are 
beautiful but are extremely picky and have unrealistically high expectations for their 
partners to be perfect people. 
Although these two stereotypes are different, they are similar in terms of 
indicating that single women are problematic and should be educated. The single women 
who fit into the first stereotype are supposed to understand that it is due to their 
unattractiveness that they cannot find partners. Thus, they should stop blaming men for 
their status of being leftover. The single women who fit the second stereotype should be 
educated to be realistic and understand that the perfect person doesn’t exist. In short, 
these stereotypes contribute to the discourse that argues that leftover women are 
troublemakers and should be disciplined to marry.  
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Moreover, in Chinese society, different terms are used to refer to leftover women, 
which I believe constitute a hierarchy of discrimination based on women’s ages. Below, I 
list these terms and explain the hierarchy: 
Level One (the basic level): single women between 25 and 27 are labeled as “Leftover 
Women Warriors” (Sheng Dou Shi/剩斗士), which means that they fight in order to find 
partners. 
Level Two: single women between 28 and 30 are labeled as “Leftover Women Who Must 
Succeed” (Bi Sheng Ke/必剩客), which means that they have no time to waste and must 
find partners as soon as possible. 
Level Three: single women between 31 and 35 are labeled as “Buddhas of Leftover 
Women” (Dou Zhan Sheng fo/斗战剩佛), which means that they have already surpassed 
most single women in terms of the difficulties of getting married. 
Level Four: single women above 35 are labeled as “Great Sages of Leftover Women” (Qi 
Tian Da Sheng/齐天大剩), which derides these single women for being leftover for so 
long.  
Level Five (the Highest Level): single women above 45 are labeled as “Kings of Leftover 
Women” (Sheng Zhe Wei Wang/胜者为王), which ridicules these single women for 
beating all leftover women and becoming their kings by achieving the ultimate “success” 
in terms of failing to finding partners. 
These labels are used to shame single women even though they may have 
successful careers and belong to the middle or even upper classes. In contrast, most 
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middle-class single Chinese men over 30-years-old are labeled as “Uncle” (Da Shu/大叔), 
a name that often used in Korean romantic dramas that depict how handsome, mature, 
successful, rich, middle-aged men fall in love with young and poor girls. Thus the 
connotation of “uncle” is positive and in sharp contrast with the connotations of the labels 
assigned to unmarried women. A popular Chinese saying explicitly reveals the sharp 
difference between the cultural interpretation of aged men and women: A man in his 
forties is a flower in bloom, but a woman is soybean residue (Nan Ren 40 Yi Zhi Hua, Nv 
Ren 40 Dou Fu Zha/男人 40一枝花，女人 40豆腐渣).  
Although the discourse of the leftover women is discriminatory, the Chinese 
government has engaged in promoting this discourse as part of its ongoing practices of 
disciplining and compelling single women to get married through shaming them and 
creating psychological burdens for their parents. For example, on March 10, 2011—a few 
days after International Women’s Day— an article titled “How Many Leftover Women 
Deserve Our Sympathy?” showed up on the website of the All-China Women’s 
Federation.33 The article argued that “as women age, they are worth less and less. So by 
the time they get their Master’s and Ph.D., they become old and ugly like white pearls 
become yellow and lose their shine.” The article concluded that “most leftover women do 
not deserve our sympathy; instead, they need to be educated and be reflective on their 
behaviors.” When I baidued the keywords “剩女/leftover women” and “新华网
                                                 
33The article was original published on the website of All-China Women’s Federation, which is a governmental 
organization that aims to promote gender equality in China. However, this article was revoked later from this website. 
But I managed to retrieve this article from an online forum (http://m.kdnet.net/share-8839395.html) in which a user 
copied the content of the article before it was revoked. I translated this article from Chinese into English. 
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/Xinhua.net,” a website sponsored by the Chinese government on June 11, 2019, at 11:30 
a.m., I found numerous reports on the leftover women on the Xinhua net.34  The 
following shows the top three articles in the first page that I found: 
 
Figure 3. 2 Screen Capture of Online Articles On Xinhua Net. This screen capture was 
taken by the author. 
The first article, “A Blind Date of a 25-Year-old Leftover Woman: All the Dozens of 
Previous Dating Partners Got Married,” describes a 25-year-old single women’s dilemma 
of requesting true love, encountering difficulties finding partners available, and puts 
forward the statement that “women should engage in blind dates as young as possible” 
(Li, 2018). The second article, “The Shift of Maternal Love: A Leftover Monkey 
Becomes a Mother of a Chicken,” describes how in a zoo in Israel, a leftover female 
monkey could not find partners and thus lacked the outlet to release her maternal instinct. 
Finally, she “adopted” a chicken who ran away from the barn and stayed around her, 
treating the chicken as her child (Chen, 2017). Although this article focuses on animals, it 
                                                 
34Baidu/百度: Baidu is the biggest search engine in China. Because Google is blocked, most Chinese people use Baidu 
to search for information.   
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still serves the purpose of shaming single women. The third article, “A 40-Year-Old 
Leftover Woman: I Am Still Expecting Love, But I Am Prepared to Spend the Rest of 
My Life Lonely,” describes the living situation of a 40-year-old single woman, ending 
with her decision to travel to Yunnan Province, which is often advertised as a romantic 
place, where she expects to meet new people (Zhou, 2019). 
In recent years, the participation of the Chinese government in promoting the 
discourse of the leftover women has become less overt. For example, on February17, 
2017, China Women’s News, sponsored by the All-China Women’s Federation, published 
the article “The word ‘Shengnv/Leftover Woman’ Should Disappear.” The article argues 
that aged single women are not leftover women; instead, remaining single is merely a 
woman’s choice of lifestyle. Aged single women are strong, independent, brave, and 
typically lead productive lives (Mo, 2017). However, this doesn’t mean that the Chinese 
government respects single women’s decisions of following their hearts to remain single. 
Three months later, on May 17, 2017, Junke He, one of the primary officials of Central 
Committee of Chinese Communist Youth League, announced that the Chinese 
Communist Youth League would begin to educate young Chinese people to have a 
correct attitude to love and marriage and help aged single Chinese people to find partners. 
On that day, the hashtag “The Communist Youth Leagues Helps Aged Single People to 
Find Partners” was trending in Weibo, Chinese Twitter. Some Chinese netizens ridiculed 
this policy and left comments like, “Thanks for taking care of me. I am waiting for the 
Communist Youth League to assign me a girlfriend/boyfriend.” Since then, local Chinese 
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governments have worked to help single people find partners by holding parties and 
organizing speed dating events.  
Besides disciplining Chinese women to get married, the Chinese government also 
emphasizes that married Chinese women should have children, although the number of 
children has changed from one child to two children with the implementations of the one-
child policy and the two-child policy in the era of reforms. On September 25, 1980, the 
Chinese government published the document, “A Letter to All the Members of the 
Communist Party and the Communist Youth League Concerning Controlling Chinese 
Population Growth.” This document advocated for communist members to voluntarily 
limit their family size to one child. In December 1982, the one-child policy obtained a 
nearly constitutional status. This policy was primarily put forward and supported by a 
group of scientists in STEM. Deng Xiaoping, the head of the Chinese government at that 
time, believed that one of the most critical tasks of the Chinese government was to 
develop the economy and to transform China into a global superpower. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, Deng believed in science and technology and had strong faith in scientists 
and engineers to help him to solve the country’s problems. However, the Cultural 
Revolution had disrupted the Chinese educational system, which resulted in a scarcity of 
social and natural scientists available to work with Deng. Thus, he had to turn to 
“rocketmen”—scholars in military science who were under protection from political 
violence during the Cultural Revolution—for help. He appointed Song Jian, a Russian-
trained missile specialist, to be the head of a research group, composed mostly of 
rocketmen and mathematicians, which worked to formulate population policies.  
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Song’s group argued China’s huge population seriously hindered the development 
of the country. These scientists’ solution to China’s demographic problem was 
significantly impacted by Western scientists such as Olsder, Kwakernaak, and Goldsmith 
(Greenhalgh 2007, Fong 2016). This group laid out: 
[A] radical new vision of population control as a giant social-systems-engineering 
project. In this vision, the problem of population was one of an imminent 
population-economy-environment crisis. Cybernetics (or control-theoretic) 
equations showed that the ‘scientific’ and ‘only effective’ way to avert it was a 
drastic one-child-for-all policy to be implemented immediately.  (Greenhalgh, 
2010, p. 32)                    
After the implementation of the one-child policy, there were some minor changes. 
For example, due to the more conservative environment in the rural areas in China, most 
families wanted to have a boy no matter the cost. Thus, the one-and-half-child policy was 
implemented in these rural areas. This policy allowed for households to have a second 
child if their first child was a girl. In this way, the girls signified the half. Furthermore, in 
order to better connect with Chinese people of minority ethnicities to show that the CCP 
emphasized their interests, any families that included one parent of minority ethnicity 
were allowed to have two children. Despite these minor allowances, millions of Chinese 
families were under the strict control of the one-child policy.    
In order to ensure the implementation of the one-child policy, the Chinese 
government performed many practices. It began to deliver free contraception to families. 
Doctors of various specialties were trained to perform abortion and sterilization 
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procedures. Scientists and engineers were funded by the Chinese government to develop 
medicines and technologies of birth control. Hundreds of pills for emergency, short-term, 
and long-term contraception have become available in the market. Family planning 
institutions, which focused on developing family planning science and technology and 
educating specialists, became an indispensable part of almost every medical college in 
China.  
Moreover, the government punished families with multiple children in many ways. 
Chinese couples who worked in state-owned institutions such as governments, 
universities, factories, and companies would lose their jobs if they had more than one 
child. In many rural areas, the families that didn’t follow the one-child policy or the one-
and-half child policy had their valuables, such as cows, houses, and savings, confiscated. 
In addition, in some Chinese provinces that more strictly carried out the one-child policy, 
if a family had more than one child, the father or in some cases the mother was sentenced 
to jail time. Fong (2016) interviewed a former Sichuan County Official who told her “as 
long as we kept the quotas, we could do anything: destroy homes, property, jail people” 
(p. 72).  
Furthermore, the Chinese government tried to persuade Chinese couples to only 
having one child. For example, the Chinese families who only had one child could get a 
monthly stipend from the government. The Chinese government made the promise that 
“the government would take care of aged people if they only have one child” (Zhi Sheng 
Yi Ge Hao, Zhen Fu Lai Yang Lao/只生一个好，政府来养老), which later became one 
of the most popular slogans for the one-child policy. This slogan was used to fight against 
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the traditional Chinese belief that through raising children, especially sons, parents would 
have a secure future when they become old because they would be taken care of by their 
children (Yang Er Fang Lao/养儿防老). The discourse that having only one child is both 
good for the child who can live better off and good for the parents who can face less 
economic pressure, can better balance their careers and family lives, and have more spare 
time to enjoy their lives, was also prevalent.   
China’s one-child policy had successfully slowed down the rate of population 
growth.  In 1980 the rate of population growth was 1.254%; in contrast, in 2010, the rate 
of population growth was 0.483% [The World Bank (c), n.d.]. However, the one-child 
policy had resulted in two serious issues, which bothered the Chinese government 
significantly so that they later abolished the one-child policy and implemented the two-
child policy, which is the current family planning policy in China. First and foremost, 
“China’s one-child policy so tilted gender and age imbalances that in little under a decade 
there will be more Chinese bachelors than Saudi Arabians, more Chinese retirees than 
Europeans” (Fong, 2016, p. 7). In fact, as discussed earlier in this chapter, due to the 
gender imbalance in China, millions of Chinese men cannot find partners. Moreover, 
because the number of senior citizens is increasing rapidly, the Chinese government faces 
considerable pressure in terms of taking care of senior citizens. It was reported that by 
2017 the Heilongjiang Province had more than 20 billion Yuan deficit (approximately 2.9 
billion USD) in pensions, and 13 more provinces would face fiscal deficit in 2018 (Wu, 
2017). On Weibo, in April 2019, one of the highest trending hashtags was “The Chinese 
government will run out of pension by 2035.”  
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Noticing that the growing aged Chinese population poses a serious issue, the 
Chinese government, instead of keeping their promise to take care of citizens when they 
become aged if they only have one child, now argues that senior citizens should support 
themselves through selling their apartments and has raised the retirement age. The 
Chinese government wants to shift some of their support away from senior citizens 
toward requiring more people to participate in sharing these responsibilities.  
Moreover, another threatening situation that the Chinese government has 
encountered is that an increasing number of Chinese families refuse to have even a single 
child. The one-child policy has significantly influenced the views on reproduction in 
Chinese culture. Many Chinese families have had good experiences of having only one 
child, so the cultural belief that the more children (especially boys) you have, the more 
happiness you have has been challenged. Accordingly, many young Chinese people who 
grew up as the only children of their families have little interest in having more than one 
child or even one child. In Chinese society, an increasing number of Chinese families 
have become DINK (Double Income, No Kid) families. According to China.org.cn, “by 
2002, nearly 600,000 dink […]families have appeared in China's large and medium-sized 
cities, including one in every 10 households in the capital” (“More Dink Families Appear 
in China,” 2002).The DINK families, more importantly the Chinese people’s changed 
ideas concerning reproduction, create a serious issue for the Chinese government. As a 
country that depends heavily on cheap labor for its production industry and that faces a 
pension shortage, China needs to have more young working people.  
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To boost population growth, the Chinese government implemented the selective-
two-child policy in 2013. This policy allowed Chinese couples, when at least one of the 
parents was an only child, to have two children. However, “about 700,000 Chinese 
couples in which one of the partners is an only child applied to have a second child by the 
end of August. […] That’s far fewer than previous estimates by the authority, which put 
the annual births increase due to the policy change at more than 2 million” (Shan, 2014). 
Witnessing this unsatisfactory result, since January 1, 2016, the universal two-child 
policy that replaced the selective-two-child policy has been in effect. This policy 
currently allows every Chinese family to have two children. According to the Chinese 
government, there are four primary purposes of the two-child policy: to optimize the 
demographic structure, to increase labor supply, to alleviate the stress caused by the 
growing aging population, and to improve the health of the economy (“The Universal 
Two-Child Policy,” n.d.).As can be seen, all these purposes are strongly related to 
China’s economic development. In 2018, the Chinese government announced that the 
department of family planning was dismissed. This decision implies that the Chinese 
government has completely disregarded the idea of population control.  
However, even though all Chinese families are allowed to have two children, 
many of them still only want to have one child or none at all. Birtles (2018) reported: 
China's family planning commission has revealed the country's birth rate dropped 
by 3.5 per cent [in 2017], despite moves over the past couple of years to fully end 
the one-child policy. There were just over 17 million new babies born in mainland 
China in 2017.  
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Similarly, Zeng and Hesketh (2018) point out that based on the recent measures of 
population growth, the effect of the two-child policy in terms of increasing population is 
not satisfactory and will remain so for a long time (p.1930). Thus, instead of curbing the 
Chinese population growth, the Chinese government has begun to discipline couples to 
have two children in order to increase the population. On August 7, 2018, Renming Ri 
Bao, the official newspaper of the CCP, published the article “Giving Birth is a Familial 
Matter and a National Issue Too/ Sheng Wa Shi Jia Shi, Ye Shi Guo Shi/生娃既是家事
也是国事” (Zhang, 2018). Shortly thereafter, this way of framing population growth 
became the slogan of the current CCP’s population policy. This article argues that the 
local governments should employ new strategies to encourage Chinese couples to have 
two children.   
Based on China’s lunar calendar, 2016 was the year of the monkey and the year 
when the universal two-child policy began to take effect. As is their routine, the Chinese 
government released a commemorative stamp. (See the stamp below): 
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Figure 3. 3 Stamp Of The Year Monkey (2016). This photo was taken by the author. 
In this stamp, an adult female monkey happily holds two baby monkeys in her arms. The 
two baby monkeys are kissing the adult monkey. This commemorative stamp was 
interpreted as the Chinese government’s celebration of the two-child policy. In designing 
and releasing this stamp, the Chinese government implied that having two children would 
bring a mother tremendous happiness. In the year of 2019, the Chinese year of the pig, 
the Chinese government released a new commemorative stamp that seems to promote an 
even larger family. (See the photo below) 
 
Figure 3. 4 Stamp Of The Year Pig (2019). This photo was taken by the author. 
In this stamp, there is a smiling pig family that includes two adult pigs and three baby 
pigs. Although so far the Chinese people are not sure whether this stamp is a hint of the 
Chinese government’s plan to release a three-child policy, it is certain that the era of 
curbing the population has passed and that China is in the era of boosting birth rate.  
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In the beginning of the era of reforms, the one-child policy was implemented, 
then replaced by the selective two-child policy, and later by the universal two-child 
policy that is the current law. Despite the changes in the Chinese government’s focus, the 
Chinese government continues to emphasize that a family should have a child or several. 
To fulfill this purpose, the Chinese government establishes laws and uses media 
strategically. According to Article 62 of the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of  
China, “after childbirth, female workers shall be entitled to no less than ninety days of 
maternity leave with pay” (National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1994). 
Through providing about three months of paid maternity leave, the Chinese government 
hopes that women are more willing to give birth. Moreover, every year, the Chinese 
government organizes an event named “Beautiful Chinese Families.” In 2017, 991 
families were commemorated as “Beautiful Chinese Families.” According to Yuancha Li, 
the vice-chairman of China, a beautiful Chinese family emphasizes moral education for 
their children by teaching them to love China and Chinese people, to work hard, to 
respect and be interested in science, and to support and promote socialism (“Beautiful 
Chinese Family in 2017,” 2017). This means that the premise of being a beautiful 
Chinese family is—first and foremost— to have a child. In fact, in Chinese state media, 
one can easily find numerous articles and reports that depict the happiness that a child, 
now two children, brings to a family. This political propaganda makes a distinction 
between beautiful families with children from “undesirable” families that are without a 
child.  
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There is one more point that I need to clarify here. Although the Chinese 
government expects newborn babies, it does not welcome babies who come from non-
traditional families that do not include a husband and a wife. China has the hukou system, 
which significantly prevents the birth of illegitimate children by making their living 
situation difficult in the society. Hukou is a Chinese household legal registration based on 
a person’s birth place. The process includes four crucial steps: 
Step one: After 12 weeks of pregnancy, parents should bring their marriage certificate, 
their national ID cards, and their hukou books to the government to get birth permission.  
Step Two: Parents bring the birth permission to a hospital. Then the hospital will create a 
record of the pregnant woman and her baby. 
Step Three: After the birth of the baby, the hospital will give parents the birth certificate 
of the baby. 
Step Four: Parents can register their baby for a hukou after showing the government once 
more their marriage certificate, their national ID cards, their hukou books, along with the 
birth certificate of their baby. 
Accordingly, a baby whose parents do not have a marriage certificate won’t have 
a legitimate birth certificate. This means that the pregnant mother cannot receive 
treatment in public hospitals that provide more affordable service and even in most 
private hospitals in China. Moreover, even after the birth of a baby at home or abroad, the 
baby won’t have a Chinese hukou, which is the document that enables the baby to receive 
social benefits such as the free nine-year education. Moreover, without this document, 
when the baby grows up, they cannot register for the college entrance examination, which 
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makes costly foreign education their only option. This system reinforces the Chinese 
government’s disciplining of women to make them get married first before having babies.  
In summary, the Chinese government has a great concern for single women. 
Fincher (2014) points out: 
Single women threaten the moral fabric…, for being free agents, unnatural in 
failing to perform their duty to give birth to child and tame a restless man. From 
the government’s perspective, married couples are much less likely to cause 
trouble. (pp. 22-23).     
Thus, the Chinese government makes an effort to discipline single women first into 
marriages and then to become mothers through implementing a variety of policies and 
promoting discourses that disfavor and even stigmatize single women and childless 
married women. In summary, the articulation of Chinese myth, language, Confucianism 
and Daoism, and the Chinese governments’ practices makes being wives and mothers a 
largely nonnegotiable option for most Chinese women, as stated by To (2015), “the truth 
[is]—marriage [and family are] still a big deal [for women] in China—both in the past 
and the present” (p.xv). The link between Chinese women and as being a wife and 
mother is particularly tenacious, in spite of major shifts in expectations about women as 
professionals.  
Chinese Women’s Roles as Professionals 
The previous section focused on one of the Chinese women’s primary roles, being 
a wife and a mother. It argued that due to the articulation of Chinese myth, language, 
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Confucianism and Daoism, and the Chinese governments’ political practices, Chinese 
women have always been expected to get married and to have children. This section turns 
to the second role of Chinese women: being professionals.  
Professional women were very rare in ancient China. In China’s long history, 
women were, and largely still are, viewed as inherently not suited as breadwinners. This 
viewpoint is sometimes attributed to the long history of China as an agricultural nation, in 
which laborers were mostly men. In reviewing the anthropological research, Stockard 
(2002) concludes that: 
Some [anthropologists] put forward the strength theory, which attributes men’s 
monopoly of plowing to the on-average greater upper-body strength of adult men 
over women…. Other anthropologists favor the expendability theory, based on the 
growing need to physically defend agricultural land from outsiders. (p.41) 
Stockard’s statement clearly indicates that in ancient China, which heavily relied on 
agriculture, men were preferred as laborers because of their physical strength. Moreover, 
as discussed previously, Confucianism supports the argument that women should stay 
inside and merely focus on taking care of their husbands and sons, as indicated by the 
phrase “pin ji sichen/牝鸡司晨,” which was and is used to criticize female politicians 
who oppose male emperors as well as women who actively participate in their husbands’ 
or sons’ outside affairs, such as making decisions for them.35 These women are regarded 
as an evil power that will bring disasters to the world. In ancient China, few women 
                                                 
35The phase “牝鸡司晨” can be literally translated as: Hens replace roosters and begin to crow. The hens are 
understood as abnormal and unnatural.  
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received any education, and many received the surgery of foot binding to make their feet 
small, which aligned with the standard of beauty in ancient China. These practices 
restricted women’s ability to move around and to engage in labor. Although in ancient 
China, some women strived to make a living through producing cloth or being 
matchmakers, most Chinese women were housewives. 36  
This unfavorable situation in which women were discouraged from and not 
prepared for becoming professionals has changed since the 1900s, most significantly in 
the era of reforms. In order to understand women as professionals, the following analysis 
lays out two articulated forces, which are comparatively new when compared with myth, 
Confucianism and Daoism but have begun to exert increasingly important impacts on 
Chinese society. They have profoundly motivated and prepared Chinese women to join 
the workplace.  
The Discourse of The New Woman 
The first force is the discourse of The New Woman. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
since the Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, Western ideas have 
travelled to China en masse. Along with the idea that science and technology are 
important because they are thought to bring positive changes, the Western discourse that 
advocates for gender equality and for women to be independent also has impacted 
                                                 
36Francesca Bray in her book Technology and Gender: Fabric of Power in Late Imperial China discusses how women 
in the Song dynasty managed to work as cloth makers. Bray (1997) writes “Sericulture and silk weaving spread to new 
areas, so that a large number of women became involved in the production of high-value textiles….But tax demands 
were high and grew during the Song…women had to work increasingly hard just to pay their taxes” (p. 206). Thus, 
although it was a great improvement that women could work outside the home, they still struggled to support 
themselves independently.   
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Chinese society in significant ways. One of its primary impacts has been the emergence 
of the discourse of The New Woman. 
The key idea of the discourse of The New Woman is that with the development of 
the Chinese society, modern Chinese women should be different from traditional Chinese 
women who were generally categorized as submissive, illiterate, and dependent 
housewives and mothers. In contrast, new Chinese women should be literate, independent 
especially in terms of their finances, and have their own interests and careers. 
Back in the early 1900s, a prominent Chinese scholar, Cai Yuanpei—who later 
became the president of Peking University, the best Chinese university in the humanities, 
and whose given name “Yuanpei” was chosen by Peking University as the title of one of 
its divisions because of his profound influence on Chinese intellect and education—made 
a famous announcement concerning what kinds of wives he was willing to accept after 
being bothered by many matchmakers. Cai stated that his potential wife should: 
1) Not have bound feet, 
2) Be literate, 
3) Accept that he won’t take concubines, 
4) Be open to the option of remarrying after his death, and 
5) Agree to divorce if their relationship is filled with irreconcilable struggles. 
(Shen,  
Cai’s criteria resonated with the argument that Chinese women should make progress and 
become new women. The woman Cai wanted was fundamentally different from the 
women who were preferred in the traditional Chinese culture: illiterate women with small 
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feet who were happy to accept and take care of their husbands’ concubines, and to devote 
their whole lives to one partner only. Cai’s idea, although still centered on a woman’s role 
as wife and mother, promoted Chinese women to be more progressive. Because of his 
social influence, many Chinese men followed his idea and wanted to marry new women, 
which in turn motivated women to receive education and become more self-sufficient.  
Chen Duxie, the scholar whose quotes “for democracy” and “for science” were 
the two slogans of the New Culture Movement, also contributed to the discourse of The 
New Woman in significant ways. In 1916, Chen published an article “the Year of 1916” 
that criticized traditional Chinese culture for oppressing women and argued that women 
should fight against their status of being subordinated. Chen (1916) wrote: 
As young people of 1916, what should you do? 
First, you need to take the position “to conquer” not the position “be conquered”. 
Among all human beings, men conquer and women are conquered; white people 
conquer and non-white people are conquered….As proud people of 1916, you 
should wash away shame that is caused by this logic. 
Second, you should respect your subjectivity and not become subordinate to 
others. The Confucian thought of three obedience that requires people to be 
obedient to rulers; children to be obedient to fathers; and wives to be obedient to 
husbands…makes people subordinated slaves. Instead, people should center on 
themselves…both men and women should fight against the status of being 
subordinate and maintain their independent and autonomous subjectivities. 
Hu Shi, another influential thinker of the early 20th century, also promoted the discourse 
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of The New Woman. He made a significant speech, “American Women,” that advocated 
for Chinese women to learn from American women and to become new women at Beijing 
Normal University. Hu (1918) said: 
[When I encountered and observed an American woman at a dinner table that she 
shared with two Chinese couples, I found out that] these three women are 
differentiated by their outlooks on life. Chinese women’s outlook centers on being 
virtuous wives and caring mothers, in contrast, the American women’s outlook 
goes beyond being virtuous wives and caring mothers….This expansive outlook 
of American women is founded based on women’ perception of 
independence…American women all have the idea of being independent….and 
their life goals are probably about achieving independence….American women 
think that men and women are equal human beings, and that they should all work 
hard to be free and independent people.  
Later in the speech, Hu discussed how American women received higher education and 
became career women who actively participated in politics to fight for women’s rights. In 
short, Hu promoted Chinese women to learn from their American counterparts to receive 
education, to find jobs, and even to engage in politics.  
An increasing number of female scholars not only appeared but also began to gain 
prominence in the society since the late 1800s. Qiu Jin, who was born in 1875 and 
received education in Japan, a more Westernized country at that time, is regarded as the 
pioneer of new Chinese women. She devoted to participating in the rebellion against the 
Qing Dynasty and promoting gender equality regardless of her husband’s disagreement. 
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She founded Zhong Guo Nv Bao, an influential Chinese newspaper that centered on 
advancing women’s education and rights and opposing oppressive practices such as foot 
binding. Although Qiu was executed by the Qing government, she inspired many Chinese 
women to choose different lives from traditional Chinese women. For example, Lü 
Bicheng, Xiao Hong, Shi Pingmei, and Chang Eileen were four outstanding professional 
women from 1910s to 1940 s. These four women not only received good education and 
wrote influential pieces of literature to support themselves, but also openly criticized the 
oppression of women and advocated for women to receive education and become 
independent.  
In 1935, the release of the film New Women, in which one of the main characters 
played by Ruan Lingyu, a famous actress at that time, propelled another large scale 
discussion of The New Woman. The film depicts two images of new women: a female 
intellectual and a female worker (Cai & Sun, 1935). Through contrasting the female 
intellectual’s tragic death and the female worker’s promising future, this film not only 
criticizes the society for oppressing women but also states that new Chinese women 
should also engage in politics and bravely fight against sexism. These historical figures 
and events helped to articulate being literate and employed to the socio-cultural 
expectations for a Chinese woman.  
In the more recent years, the popularity of the discourse of The New Woman has 
lessened in Chinese society with the increasing number of women receiving education 
and having jobs. Thus, career women no longer seem a novel phenomenon. However, 
contemporary Chinese culture continues to promote the image of a woman who has a 
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successful career. For example, in contemporary Chinese society, there is a very popular 
genre of TV series labeled “Big Female Characters Show/大女主戏”. These TV series 
focus on depicting the process of how women develop themselves, overcome many 
difficulties, and have successful careers while at the same time having admirable families. 
Besides advocacy by intellectuals and promotion in Chinese popular culture, 
many Chinese women’s organizations also support this idea that career women are 
preferred in contemporary China. For example, in 1989, The All China Women’s 
Federation (ACWF) used the slogan of women’s four selves to represent a new Chinese 
woman who should have self-respect, self-reliance, self-confidence, and self-
improvement.  
The discourse of The New Woman has profoundly impacted women’s roles. This 
discourse has successfully contributed to encouraging many Chinese women to receive 
education and to join the workplace. However, unfortunately, the persuasiveness of this 
discourse is significantly based on its articulation with the traditional social expectation 
for women to be desirable in order to marry men with higher status. For example, TV 
series that belong to the genre “Big Female Characters Show” often depict how a well-
educated professional woman attracts a successful man. In fact, in contemporary Chinese 
culture, an increasing number of men prefer to get married to women with bachelor’s 
degrees and with respectable jobs such as university professors and civil servants, 
although some of them want their wives to quit their jobs after getting married. As a 
result, receiving college education and joining the workplace have become a 
nonnegotiable option and a crucial step for many women to marry up.  
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Additionally, the articulation of the discourse of The New Woman with the social-
cultural-historical-political expectation for women to become mothers and wives 
redefines the meaning of being a Chinese woman in the era of reforms. To be an ideal 
Chinese woman, the person not only needs to be a virtuous wife, a caring mother, but also 
a well-educated successful professional at the same time. This expectation creates an 
almost impossible position for women with its inevitable tensions in terms of the 
contradictory personality traits that they are expected to embody. For example, as argued 
previously, being virtuous wives and caring mothers requires women to be dependent and 
submissive, but being successful professionals requires women to be assertive and 
independent.  
In summary, the discourse of The New Woman has significantly impacted 
women’s roles in contemporary Chinese culture. Because of its promotion for women to 
receive education, to find jobs, and to be independent, especially economically, being 
working women has become a trend in contemporary Chinese society. However, to this 
day, this discourse still fails to undermine the articulation, which I discussed previously, 
that disciplines women to get married and to have children. 
The CCP’s Political Practices 
The second force that contributes to women’s new roles as professions is the 
CCP’s political practices. Because the CCP claims to follow Marxism, which pursues an 
egalitarian society in which both men and women equally work and are served, and more 
importantly because the CCP needs more working laborers to develop its economy, the 
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CCP has implemented many political practices to encourage and prepare women to join 
the workplace.  
Mao Zedong, an influential leader of the CCP and the first Chairman of the PRC, 
made the famous statement, “women can hold up half the sky.” In the West, Mao’s 
saying is often translated as “women hold up half of the sky.” However, based on Mao’s 
original phrase “妇女能顶半天天,” the modal verb “can” should be included in this 
sentence. The addition of the word “can” into this sentence changes the connotation that 
Chinese women are important to the connotation that Chinese women can be important if 
they work hard enough, which I believe is what Mao argues. However, the fact is that the 
cultural reality is more complex than the words convey. Under Mao’s administration, the 
two predominant options for women were positions of superficial status and those of 
intense manual labor. Women in rural areas were encouraged to compete with men and 
even to surpass men in expending manual labor in agricultural work. Women in urban 
areas were assigned jobs in state-owned organizations (Dan Wei/单位) by the Chinese 
government as long as they finished their education. Xian and Woodhams (2008) point 
out that in Mao’s era, many women were “allocated to supporting positions that fitted 
their perceived abilities regardless of their education background. These positions held 
little room for promotion and a greater risk of redundancy” (p.411). For example, they 
worked as salespersons and secretaries, which gave the appearance of including women 
in organizations, but did not give them actual positions of power. In contrast, the rest of 
the women were assigned to work in heavy industries such as mining, construction, and 
petroleum, which were regarded traditionally as men’s fields. Most of these women were 
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expected to conduct manual work. In fact, from the 1960s to the 1970s, the CCP 
promoted the image of “iron women” (Tie Gu Niang/铁姑娘). Also known as iron girls, 
this term referred to women who were strong physically, had visible muscles, were 
capable and enthusiastic about conducting heavy manual work, and did not have typical 
female features such as a comparatively smaller body size and long flowing hair. Below 
is a poster that was released by the Chinese government of an iron woman, a female 
construction worker.37 
 
Figure 3. 5 A Poster of An Iron Girl. Title: 我们为参加国家工业化建设而自豪 (We 
Are Proud Of Participating In The Founding of Our Country's Industrialization). 
Designer:丁浩(Ding Hao). Date: February, 1954. Publisher:华东人民美术出版社 
                                                 
37Appendix A is the fair use report to support my use of this image in my dissertation.  
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(Huadong Renmin MeishuChubanshe, Shanghai). Retrieved from: 
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e16-17.php. 
 
Although the image of iron women reflected the CCP’s endeavor to improve women’s 
status through showing that women are as strong as men, this image failed to empower 
Chinese women by either crediting their intelligence or advocating for their education. 
Thus, women were viewed as physically but not intellectually equal. In fact, the image of 
iron women pressured Chinese women into a situation where they had to conduct heavy 
manual work in order to fit into this positive image. After studying and interviewing 
actual iron women, Jin (2006) writes:  
A veteran of the Shengli Oil Field women’s brigade stressed that there were ways 
in which the establishment of women’s work brigades eroded ‘a certain kind of 
protection’ that women had once received in the past [when they worked in heavy 
industries]…. Whereas women’s brigades consistently received official 
recognition, they also performed their share of undesirable tasks and endured 
considerable discomfort. Gu Yingzhen (pseudonym), a former brigade leader in 
Nanjing’s Shuang Zha Township, pointedly noted that Iron Girls performed work 
that was at once shunned and arduous: “The women’s brigade specialised in 
things that other people did not want to do. In the spring we planted seedlings, 
watered the plants and worked on the water treadmills . . . during the harvest we 
worked day and night. Two strong young men collapsed from exhaustion. They 
fell asleep in the fields and refused to get up. We were stronger than them. (p. 
620-621) 
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This competition for women to be stronger than men in performing manual labor resulted 
in many women suffering from serious health issues from exhausting their bodies when 
they were young. Furthermore, due to the overemphasis on manual labor, other aspects of 
women, especially their intelligence, were ignored. As a consequence of this persuasive 
anti-intellectual image, many women were not enthusiastic about receiving education and 
thus were trapped in their situations as manual laborers rather than decision makers.   
It was not until 1986 that the CCP implemented the Compulsory Education Law, 
after which an increasing number of Chinese women have been able to support 
themselves by utilizing their intelligence. In general, this policy states that Chinese 
children who are around the age of 7 should attend schools and all Chinese citizens 
should receive at least 9 years of education. In order to fulfill this task, the Chinese 
government has initiated several strategies. For example, the government covers all 
children’s tuition from public elementary school (about 6 years) to middle school (about 
3 years), has built more schools (especially schools in rural areas), and recruits college 
students to teach several years in rural schools as a condition to waive their university 
educational and living costs. This policy fundamentally changed the situation in which 
many Chinese people, especially Chinese women from poor rural areas, were illiterate 
and denied educational opportunities due to their families’ inferior economic situation 
and their comparatively isolated geographical location.  In 1982, 51.137% of Chinese 
women aged 15 or above were literate; in 1990, 68.072% of Chinese women aged 15 or 
above were literate; and in 2010, 92.711% of Chinese women aged 15 or above were 
literate [ The World Bank (d), n.d ]. These 9 years of school enable women to be able to 
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read and write, which is a crucial prerequisite to joining the job market. Moreover, some 
girls who demonstrate their intelligence in elementary school and middle school also 
change their parents’ minds from the notion that girls are inherently not as smart as boys 
and will have difficulties finding satisfactory jobs to support themselves and their parents. 
These girls sometimes reverse the notion that girls do not need to receive much education 
but rather need to focus on finding breadwinners. Impressed by their daughters’ academic 
performance, which means that there exist great possibilities for their daughters to 
become prosperous in the future, many families, even including some rural poor families, 
decide to support their daughters to receive higher education even though this requires 
the parents to work harder. According to Martin (2018), “in 2012, female college students 
made up 51.4 percent of the total university student population.” College education not 
only potentially provides these women more job opportunities but also sometimes 
requires them to find jobs to repay their families’ educational investment. In this way, 
women are not only prepared but also motivated and pressured to become professionals.  
In addition to the implementation of the Compulsory Education Law, the Chinese 
government has formulated policies to protect women’s interests in the job market. For 
example, in 1992, the Chinese government announced the “Protection of Women’s 
Rights and Interests Law of People’s Republic of China.” This law guarantees that 
women should enjoy equal rights to men in the spheres of politics, education, work, 
ownership of property, personal rights, and rights of marriage and family. This law 
emphasizes that women and men should be paid equally for equal work. In 2007, the 
government issued  “Employment Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China,” in 
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which the government explicitly states its objective to prohibit discrimination based on a 
person’s gender, ethnicity, religious belief, or race in the workplace.  
In February 2019, the Chinese government announced that it is illegal to list the 
gender requirements or gender preferences in job advertisements, to reject job applicants 
merely based on their gender, or to ask about a woman’s marital and childbearing status 
in job interviews. Although this practice is partly motivated by the Chinese government’s 
purpose of propelling women to join the workplace and by the Chinese government’s 
current two-child policy that aims to encourage women to have babies, this political 
practice signifies great progress with regard to protecting women’s workplace rights.  
The CCP’s political practices are significant in China because they articulate to 
the Chinese societal hierarchy, in which the government occupies the highest level of the 
pyramid. Thus, the CCP’s policies not only profoundly influence Chinese politics, but 
also Chinese people’s perceptions and the culture. Since the CCP requires women to 
receive education, encourages women to join the job market, and educates women to be 
prepared as professionals, a growing number of Chinese women are eager to do so 
because it not only may fit their interests but also because they have been educated in 
Chinese culture, which emphasizes people’s obedience to the government. Hence, many 
women want to be “model” citizens and to support the government’s decision by joining 
the workplace. Additionally, many Chinese men have more open attitudes to working 
with female colleagues and marrying career women, and a growing number of 
workplaces decide to accept female workers at least in order to follow the government’s 
regulation in order to avoid trouble. Overall, the society has become increasingly tolerant 
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and supportive of female workers. All these positive changes provide women 
opportunities to make a living themselves, enjoy more freedom, and gain some 
sovereignty over their destinies.  
However, the CCP’s political practices that encourage and prepare Chinese 
women to join the workplace are also articulated with its political practices of 
disciplining women to get married and to have children, which creates many tensions and 
contradictions in women’s lives. Moreover, due to this articulation, it is hard for Chinese 
women to completely focus on their careers and become independent not only financially 
but also in the sense of following their wishes to not get married or become mothers.  
Chinese Women as Wives, Mothers, and Professionals in 
the Era of Reforms 
As argued previously, in the era of reforms, Chinese women are still expected to 
become wives and mothers due to the articulation of Chinese myth, Confucianism and 
Daoism, and the Chinese governments’ political practices that require and discipline them 
to get married and have children. However, at the same time, impacted by the discourse 
of The New Woman and the CCP’s political practices that encourage and prepare 
Chinese women to receive education and to join the workplace, they are also expected to 
become professionals. The traditional roles of mother and wife as well as the emerging 
new role of professional create tremendous tensions and contradictions that Chinese 
women have to navigate. For example, the famous line from the popular film Lost,  
Found, spoken by a successful female lawyer, captures the tensions that many Chinese 
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women have experienced due to the articulation of their traditional roles and new roles in 
the era of reforms:  
Today’s society has extremely high expectations for women. If you decide to 
focus on your career, people will criticize you for being bad and irresponsible; if 
you decide to focus on your familial life, people will criticize you for having no 
career and merely doing what you are supposed to do. (Lü & Qin, 2018).  
In fact, housewives, who still account for a large population of Chinese women, 
have become more vulnerable in contemporary Chinese society because they not only 
have to conduct all housework and rely on their husbands but they have also often been 
criticized in comparison with career women for being lazy, noncompetitive, and 
dependent, as argued by Liu and Ma (2009). But at the same time, as indicated by the 
discourse of the Leftover Woman, single professional women are not preferred by society 
or the government. They are also criticized for being irresponsible, extremely picky, and 
sometime even stigmatized as ugly and unattractive creatures, as analyzed previously. 
Cai and Feng (2013) focus on late marriage in Shanghai and find out that an increasing 
number of women who receive college and even graduate education, which leads to them 
to be able to find decent jobs to support themselves, decided to remain single and enjoy 
their singlehood. Obviously, these professional women become the “undesirable” leftover 
women from the perspectives of society and the government.   
Moreover, while the society and the government expect married women to 
maintain their families, many women, especially professionals, hold more open attitudes 
toward divorce. As Zhang (2006) has argued, due to an increasing number of Chinese 
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women becoming professionals, their improved material status changes their viewpoints 
towards divorce. Thus, the phrases that have been used to describe divorce have changed 
from “divorce wife,” to “make a divorce,” and “to negotiate divorce,” which signifies 
women’s growing agency concerning this practice. In part because of this cultural shift, 
as argued previously, the Chinese government introduced the experimental “calm-down” 
divorce period for the purpose of reducing the divorce rate in China, which consequently 
prevents some women from ending their unsatisfactory marriages.  
Additionally, traditional Chinese culture expects Chinese women to be virtuous 
wives, which require women to preserve their virginities before marriage. However, 
many women who leave their hometowns and support themselves independently as blue-
collar workers decide to have “temporary husbands.” These are short-term male partners 
from the same cities who work to support and take care of each other. Liu (2014) points 
out the action of having a temporary husband reflects Chinese women’s improved agency 
in terms of choosing their partners. However, this relation is temporary and often won’t 
last long; many women eventually have to marry the partners preferred by their families 
and become traditional wives and mothers to take good care of their husbands, their 
husbands’ families, and their children.  
Moreover, many Chinese women have shifted their energy and time to their careers 
instead of merely focusing on their families. In response to this, the discourse that the 
most important thing for a woman is to be a virtuous wife and a caring mother becomes 
increasingly salient in popular culture. Hershatter (2007) argues that in recent years the 
discourse that a woman’s essential role is to be a virtuous wife and a caring mother has 
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regained popularity even though this discourse had become less prominent in the mid 
twentieth century. Hershatter (2007) writes: 
The phrase ‘virtuous wife and good mother,’ which had circulated in the early 
twentieth century, enjoyed a resurgence [in recent years], as did the notion that 
women were primarily responsible for the healthy development and moral 
education of children.    (p. 48) 
Moreover, as pointed out by Zuo (2016), due to the hardship and discrimination many 
professional women experience in the workplace, many of them have to quit their careers 
and “retreat to the home [as] a refuge” (pp. 112-113). 
In the era of reforms, the expectation of being a wife and a mother are articulated 
with the expectation to become professionals, which complicates Chinese women’s lived 
experiences in significant ways. This articulation creates strong tensions and 
contradictions that require women to negotiate in order to fulfill their traditional roles as 
well as emerging ones. Thus, it is common in China that women prefer certain 
occupations, the two most predominant of which are teachers and civil servants, which 
usually do not require them to work extra time, are more permanent even when some 
women’s performance is infringed upon by their familial duties, and have regular, usually 
longer holidays. Because of these affordances, women can have time and energy to take 
care of their families while maintaining their jobs. Through choosing these specific 
occupations, Chinese women try to negotiate their two roles.    
Moreover, instead of understanding women’s struggles and helping women to 
deal with difficulties by providing them with concrete strategies such as promoting men’s 
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responsibilities to share household chores and extending women’s paid maternity leave, 
society promotes the image of the “super mother,” which basically argues that ideal 
Chinese women are able to be perfect both in their careers and their familial lives. Back 
in 2013, there was a popular Chinese TV series Hot Mom! that describes how a 
fashionable, professional woman has successfully balanced her career and familial life 
after giving birth to her unexpected child. At the end of the TV series, the female main 
character who used to not like babies is happily pregnant with her second child (Shen & 
Qin, 2013). Another example is the popularity of the reality show Super Mom. This 
reality show, which aired from 2016 to 2018, has focused on 12 pairs of mothers and 
their children. All the mothers are beautiful and highly successful professional women 
(Yuan, 2016-2018). In fact, Guo and Zhang (2017) point out that a super mother is 
fundamentally different from a traditional Chinese mother who doesn’t have a career and 
a working mother who seems to suffer from great pressures of balancing her career and 
familial life. Instead, a super mother is confident, knowledgeable, has an elite career, and 
not only raises her child, but also emphasizes her child’s education to make her child 
successful in the future. Despite these many demands, super mothers supposedly enjoy 
their lives and become prosperous while performing both of their roles.  
This chapter has explored Chinese women’s roles as wives and mothers as well as 
professionals in the era of reforms and maps the tensions caused by the conflicting 
aspects of these two roles, which complicate women’s lived experiences. As argued in 
the previous chapters, science and technology, which are promoted uncritically for 
bringing positive changes and solving all problems, have become integral in people’s 
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lives and integrated into the Chinese government’s political practices. Thus, in order to 
better understand women’s lived experiences as well as the status of science and 
technology in contemporary China, it is important to explore how the beliefs about, as 
well as the applications of, science and technology are articulated with women’s roles in 
the era of reforms. The next chapter will bring the previous three chapters together and 
map the implications of the science and technology for Chinese women from a Cultural 




Chapter Four: Putting It All Together: The 
Implications of Science and Technology for Women’s 
Roles in the Era of Reforms 
Chapter One introduced the many changes that happened in the era of reforms, 
explained the analytical perspectives of cultural studies and feminism, and laid out the 
methods of articulation and mapping, which are the two major analytical tools I use in 
this dissertation. Chapter Two explored the status of science and technology in the era of 
reforms. It argued that science and technology are venerated. People believe that science 
and technology have nearly omnipotent power that can bring positive changes, resulting 
in their rapid development sometimes without regard to the human costs. Chapter Three 
maps the two prominent roles that many Chinese women have in the era of reforms. It 
argued that Chinese women are always expected to be wives and mothers. However, in 
the era of reforms, they are also expected to become professionals. Chapter Three 
concluded with an analysis of the tensions and conflicts, with which many Chinese 
women have struggled, that are generated by the articulation of Chinese women’s 
traditional roles of being wives and mothers with their new roles as being professionals.  
This chapter brings all the previous chapters together and explores the 
implications of science and technology for women’s roles as wives and mothers as well 
as professionals in the era of reforms from a cultural studies perspective. As revealed in 
previous chapters, many elements are articulated to women’s lived experiences. Among 
them, four elements warrant particular attention. They are: 1) traditional Chinese culture 
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that includes myth, Chinese language, Confucianism, and Daoism, 2) the CCP’s political 
practices, 3) the discourse of The New Woman, and 4) science and technology. By 
focusing on these four, I demonstrate how they are articulated to influence Chinese 
women’s roles. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, traditional Chinese culture has 
significantly contributed to the expectation for Chinese women to be virtuous wives and 
caring mothers. Traditional Chinese women, since their birth, were expected to get 
married and to give birth to children, which should include at least a baby boy. Besides 
being subordinate daughters that marry partners arranged by their parents, submissive 
wives who take good care of their husbands and their parents-in-law, and caring mothers 
who would be willing to sacrifice themselves for their children, most traditional Chinese 
women had no other access to self-fulfillment. Even in the era of reforms, the influences 
of myth, language, Confucianism, and Daoism remain strong in terms of disciplining 
women to get married and to have children. Moreover, the CCP also expects women to 
“tame” bachelors who are viewed as potential disruptive forces and to produce babies 
who significantly influence the economic future of China. The cultural and the political 
forces are tenaciously articulated, which make it difficult for women to remain single and 
childless.  
However, at the same time, the discourse of The New Woman urges 
contemporary Chinese women to be different from their traditional counterparts through 
receiving education and having jobs. It argues that illiterate women who have no careers 
are not welcomed and not preferred by good Chinese men. Thus, not only in order to 
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keep up with the times, but also to marry up, women should no longer confine themselves 
exclusively in the domestic sphere. Instead, they should be literate and join the  
workplace. Furthermore, facing the economic-political environment of the era of reforms 
that needs female workers to demonstrate the party’s care for gender equality and to 
contribute to the Chinese economy that heavily depends on mass labor, the CCP also 
prepares and encourages women to join the workplace. Through implementing the free 
nine-year compulsory educational system, an increasing number of Chinese women have 
become literate. Through promoting the image of the Iron Girl and implementing policies 
that aim to protect women’s rights in the workplace, the CCP tries to persuade women to 
have careers. The discursive and the political forces have articulated with increasing 
insistence and impact in the era of reforms, which makes being a professional gradually 
become an important role shaping many Chinese women’s identities. 
While the previous two paragraphs illustrate how traditional Chinese culture, the 
CCP’s political practices, and the discourse of The New Woman have been articulated to 
impact women’s lived experiences in the era of reforms. However, one force is missing: 
science and technology. As discussed in Chapter Two, the era of reforms is strongly 
characterized by the veneration of science and technology. This means that the idea that 
science and technology are nearly omnipotent and are intrinsically positioned to bring 
positive changes is deeply rooted in contemporary Chinese culture, and that Chinese 
people and government have become increasingly dependent on science and technology, 
hoping they can solve all problems. Thus, science and technology have influenced 
Chinese politics, culture, society, and people in significant ways in the era of reforms. 
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Obviously, along with all Chinese people, Chinese women cannot resist this pervasive 
scientific and technological influence. 
In fact, some scholars have discussed the impacts of science and technology for 
Chinese women. For example, Zhou and Guo (1995) point out scientific and 
technological developments in China on the one hand create more industries, thus 
providing additional job opportunities for women; on the other hand, they reduce some 
job opportunities that previously depended on human labor and they make some jobs 
require advanced skills, which result in some women losing their jobs. When Pei and Ho 
(2008) discuss cybersex, they mention the case of the housewife “Xiao Feng” who had 
been empowered to discuss her “sexual coldness,” which was diagnosed by her husband, 
with her netfriends who not only give her advice, but also supported her in resisting her 
husband’s criticism. Hu et al. (2016) explore the use of neuraxial labor analgesia in  
China, which is a method of providing pain relief for labor. They highly evaluate the 
nongovernmental No Pain Labor & Delivery Program (NPLD) for bringing labor 
analgesia and better perinatal care to Chinese women. Li, Qu, and Lǚ (2017) claim that 
many women who get married late have difficulties conceiving naturally and have to use 
reproductive science and technology for assistance. This stressful process of conception 
leads to an increasing number of female patients with postpartum depression.  
In more recent years, more people have engaged in this discussion. Xie (2018) 
argues that the rise of internet matchmaking agencies in recent years contributes to 
changes in Chinese matchmaking and dating culture from 1988 to 2018. Fincher (2018) 
recognizes the important role of the internet and social media in feminist movements in 
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China, and writes “even as the Chinese government tightened ideological controls on 
university campuses across the country, more and more young women were starting 
feminist social-media accounts” (p.50). In March 2019, to celebrate International 
Women’s Day, many highly successful career women gathered together in Shanghai to 
discuss their working and familial experiences and some of them talked about the 
influences of science and technology for career women. For example, Zhai Fang pointed 
out that science and technology enable career women to better take of their families since 
they can work in offices at home, and Sun Jie used the case of handling tigers and argued 
that science and technology significantly benefit women because they increase women’s 
power and enable them to do many things that previously were only designated to men 
(“Sun Jie—CEO of Ctrip: Science and Technology Enable Women to Do What Men Can 
Do,” 2019).  
In general, the previous literature reveals that science and technology have 
impacted Chinese women’s lived experience in the era of reforms in three significant 
ways. First, science and technology empower women, as indicated by Pei and Ho (2008), 
Fincher (2018), and other scholars. This mainstream viewpoint has been argued 
extensively by many Chinese researchers. Second, science and technology are double-
edged swords, which means that they can benefit some women but at the same time can 
hurt other women, as indicated by Zhou and Guo (1995). Third, as argued by Li, Qu, and 
Lǚ, science and technology can also create problems for women. Although this previous 
literature is helpful, there still lacks sufficient and in-depth scholarship concerning the 
implications of science and technology for women.  
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To engage in and contribute to this scholarship, this chapter explores how science 
and technology are articulated with the elements of traditional Chinese culture, the CCP’s 
political practices, and the discourse of The New Woman to influence both Chinese 
women’s traditional roles of being wives and mothers and their emerging roles of being 
professionals in the era of reforms. To demonstrate the impacts of these articulations, this 
chapter focuses on the following four examples of the developments and uses of science 
and technology to promote marriage and family, for population control and family design, 
to promote the discourse of the super mother, and for women to gain independence and 
resist sexual violence.  
The Development and Use of Science and Technology to 
Promote Marriage and Family 
As discussed in Chapter Three, traditional Chinese culture argues that women 
should get married and the CCP also wants single women to marry, to “tame” single men, 
and to give birth to babies. However, compared with many single women who are 
professionals that receive good education, many single men do not have much money and 
do not fit many Chinese women’s expectation of marrying up, which is preferred in 
traditional Chinese culture. In order to increase these single men’s chances to find 
partners, the Chinese government has implemented several policies, such as providing 
subsidies for marriage. The government also has participated in promoting the discourse 
of the leftover women, which originated from contemporary Chinese popular internet 
culture. This section continues to explore the articulation of the government’s political 
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practices with the traditional Chinese culture through adding the element of science and 
technology.  In general, through analyzing the cases of the “Apply for Marriage 
Certificate” function on the App Alipay, the ways that dating websites promote 
themselves and women’s experiences of using dating websites, and the government’s 
prohibition for single women to receive the treatment of egg freezing, this section maps 
how science and technology are articulated with the political and cultural forces and how 
this articulation impacts Chinese women in significant ways.  
The “Apply for Marriage Certificate” Function on the App Alipay 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Chinese government emphasizes its control 
over science and technology as a means to surveil and discipline people. For example, 
through implementing the Great Firewall of China, the government tries to monitor 
information flows and filter information, so that the Chinese people can only access the 
information that the government prefers them to see. The “apply for marriage certificate” 
function on the App Alipay is another effort by the Chinese government to achieve its 
political purposes through manipulating people’s access to science and technology.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese government prefers single Chinese 
people to get married and to set up stable families. Thus, it introduced the experimental 
“calm-down” period for the purpose of reducing the divorce rate in China. However, 
apart from preventing people from getting divorced too easily, the government also 
endeavors to encourage people to get married. The government believes that the high-
expense and time-consuming procedures of getting married in China have profoundly 
contributed to China’s low marriage rate.   
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In fact, the expensive and time-consuming nature of getting married is due in part 
to the influence of traditional Chinese culture. The traditional Chinese process of getting 
married, which was strongly viewed as a ritualistic practice and is still practiced by some 
Chinese families to this day, includes three letters and six etiquettes.38 In the era of 
reforms, although this process has been simplified for some families, getting married still 
remains costly and time intensive. Thus, the government thinks that what they need to do 
is to reduce the cost. Accordingly, the government provides subsidies to newlywed 
couples regardless of their economic situations. Moreover, the Chinese government 
announced that since April 1, 2017, the service fee for getting a marriage certificate in 
mainland China has been eliminated. This means that basically Chinese people do not 
need to pay for anything to apply for marriage certificates.  
                                                 
38The three letters were: a) the betrothal letter that the bridegroom’s family gives to the girl’s family to signify the 
mutual agreements by the families permitting the marriage,b) the gift letter in which the bridegroom’s family lists the 
gifts that they are giving to the girl’s family, and c) the wedding letter.  
The six etiquettes were:  
a) Proposing: the boy’s family should hire a matchmaker to bring around thirty different things to the girl’s family, 
amongwhich a unique but necessary gift is a pair of life swan geese, which is symbolic because they maintain 
monogamous pairing throughout their entire lives. 
b) Matching birth dates: For this step, the boy’s and the girl’s birth dates and times are brought to a fortune-teller to 
calculate if they match, which basically verifies whether the god approves their marriage. 
c)  Setting up the date for the boy’s family to send the betrothal letter to the girl’s family. 
d)  Presenting the wedding gifts. 
e)  Arranging the marriage for an auspicious date. 
f) Holding the wedding ceremony.  
This elaborate process of getting married reveals how the ritualistic aspects of marriage were emphasized in traditional 
Chinese culture.  
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In this context, in 2018, the local governments of Jiangsu Province, Fujian 
Province, Anhui Province, Sichuan Province, Zhejiang Province, Jiangxi Province, 
Guangzhou City, Wuhan City, and Haikou City announced that people from these regions 
can apply for marriage certificates using their cellphones. This option became available 
after the government’s collaboration with the company Alibaba, which developed the 
popular app Alipay that had more than 700 million active Chinese users in 2018 
(“China’s Alipay,” 2018). Basically, the government added the function “Apply for 
Marriage Certificate” into this app. This enables the users of Alipay to finish almost all of 
the administrative process using their cellphones such as taking pictures, filling out  
forms, and booking the date and time to get their marriage certificates, although they still 
need to be present in the government’s civil affairs office to get their certificates. 39 It is 
believed that this technological innovation will save people time waiting in the line and 
dealing with administrative procedures and thus encourage marriages. In 2019, to 
celebrate the Chinese Valentine’s Day (August 7), the local governments of Zhejiang 
Province, Jiangsu Province, Jiangxi Province, Fujian Province, and Chongqing City 
announced again that residents of these places can apply for marriage certificates online. 
CCTV news, the most authoritative channel that is sponsored by the CCP, used the 
hashtag “This is How Love Looks” to celebrate this news on its Weibo platform.  It is 
                                                 
39Different from the marriage documentation in the U.S., the marriage certificate in China includes a photo of the 
husband and the wife. Thus, in order to get the marriage certificate in China, couples must first take a photo of 
themselves and submit the photo to the government. Previously, the photo could only be taken in certain government-
affiliated photo studios.  
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reported that more regions will follow this practice, and in the near future all Chinese 
people will be able to apply for marriage certificates through their cellphones. 
The function of “Apply for Marriage Certificate” online reflects the Chinese 
government’s tradition of turning to science and technology to reduce the cost, time, and 
energy required for a marriage, hoping they can solve the “problem” of China’s low rate 
of marriage. It is interesting that although both the traditional cultural force and the 
contemporary political force promote marriage, tensions still emerge due to their different 
viewpoints concerning marriage. For the traditional Chinese culture, marriage is 
significantly ritualistic, as evidenced by its long, highly-detailed codes of conduct. 
However, for the Chinese government, marriage is more about utilitarianism. It hopes 
people get married because they believe married couples have a lower chance of 
becoming social disruptors and they need children since the shortage of pension and 
future laborers pose increasingly serious threats to the economy.  
However, the government’s effort has not been particularly effective. According 
to the statistics released by the government in 2019, the marriage rate in 2018 in 
mainland China was the lowest in the past decade. In 2018, the average marriage rate in 
China was7.2‰, in Shanghai City was 4.35‰, and in Zhejiang Province was 5.9‰ 
(“Shanghai Has the Lowest Marriage Rate,” 2019).  
The blame for the low marriage rate is heavily placed on women, while many 
single men are seen as the victims of women’s desires for better lives. As analyzed 
previously, the crucial purpose of developing this science and technology is to help men, 
especially the men whose economic situations are not favorable. Through promoting the 
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idea that marriage should be simple and not associated with money, the government 
makes women who have material requirements for their partners, such as having 
apartments or cars, the target of attack for being unwelcome women who have too many 
desires. To be clear, I am not trying to judge these women. In fact, facing the situation 
that many Chinese women have to shoulder all the household chores alone, to take good 
care of their husbands and parents-in-law, are fired from their workplaces when they are 
pregnant, and often are questioned in terms of their abilities, time, and energy to handle 
jobs when they have children, it is understandable that some Chinese women have 
material requirements for their future husbands to lessen some of their financial burdens. 
Thus, probably in order to “recruit” more women to get married and reduce the impacts 
of traditional Chinese culture, besides introducing science and technology to make 
getting marriage certificates convenient, the government should better protect women’s 
rights in their marriages and their workplaces.  
Dating Websites 
As discussed in Chapter Three, great tension in contemporary China arises 
between the increasing number of Chinese women inclined to remain single until they 
really want and are well-prepared to get married and the traditional cultural forces and the 
CCP’s political practices that urge women to get married in their early or middle 20s. In 
fact, for the traditional Chinese culture and the CCP, for women, marriage is more 
important than being professionals. However, many single professional women have the 
polar opposite idea. In response to this tension, cultural-political forces have created the 
label “leftover women” to stigmatize single professional women who are over 27-years-
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old for the purpose of compelling them into marriages. To understand the roles of science 
and technology in this tension-filled context, I turn to dating websites and explore the 
impacts of dating websites for Chinese single women. 
Dating websites did not exist in China until the late 1990s. Despite its short 
history, the business of online dating websites has expanded rapidly. According to 
iResearch, which is a professional market research and consulting company in China, the 
profit of the online dating industry was 4,000,000,000 Yuan in 2017(approximately 
580,000, 000 USD). iResearch estimated that by 2020, the income of the online dating 
industry would be over 50,000,000,000 Yuan (approximately 730,000,000 USD) 
(iResearch, 2018, p. 12). Among the hundreds of different dating websites in China, I 
focus on the three most influential ones: Jiayuan Wang/世纪佳缘网, Baihe Wang/百合
网, and Zhenai Wang/珍爱网. They have comparatively good reputations and have the 
largest numbers of users.  
Jiayuan Wang, which is also often known as ShijiJiayuan Wang, was founded in 
2003 by Haiyan Gong who at the time was a second-year graduate student at Fudan 
University, which is one of the best universities in China. Jiayuan Wang claimed that it 
has gained the largest number of users among all dating websites. Baihe Wang was 
founded by Fanjiang Tian and Yan Mu in May 2005. Among the three websites, Baihe 
Wang works most closely with the Chinese government. Since March 2007, it has 
cooperated with the Ministry of State Security of the PRC to request all its users to 
provide their national ID numbers. Since April 2007, Baihe Wang has cooperated with 
the All-China Women’s Federation. In February 2008, Fanjiang Tian, a founder of Baihe 
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Wang, was appointed as a secretary in the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC. Zhenai 
Wang was founded by Song Li and Si Chen who used to work for Morgan Stanley and 
Dell respectively. Different from Jiayuan Wang and Baihe Wang that were initially 
designed to provide a free online platform for strangers to meet, Zhenai Wang has 
focused on providing a fee-based service from the beginning. Users have to work with 
matchmakers from the company, send messages to strangers through matchmakers, and 
pay at least 18,880 Yuan (around 3,000 USD) to have the chance meet a stranger in 
person, which is also arranged and accompanied by matchmakers. 
Although these three websites have their own unique features, all the them 
promote their products through exploiting the tensions between the cultural-political 
force that urges single women to get married in their early or middle twenties and many 
single women’s situations of being financially independent and the targets of the cultural-
political force. For example, in 2014, a commercial released by Baihe Wang explicitly 
reveals how Baihe Wang took advantage of this tension to make a profit from single 
women and their parents. The 30-second-long commercial “Because Love Won’t Wait/因
为爱不等待” begins with a single young woman’s monologue “This year I must get 
married. I should do so considering my grandma’s wishes and health condition. 
Whenever she meets me, she only asks me one question ‘Have you gotten married?’” 
(“Because Love Won’t Wait,” 2014). 40 Then the camera shows how this young woman’s 
grandma, who becomes increasingly old and sick, keeps on asking her the same question. 
                                                 
40 Appendix B is the fair use report that demonstrates my fair use of images from this commercial in my dissertation.  
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The grandma is not happy even though her grandchild got her degree (see screen capture 
1) and found a job (see screen capture 2). The only thing this grandma cares about is her 
granddaughter’s marriage (see screen capture 3 and screen capture 4). Screen captures are 
below: 
 
Figure 4. 1 Screen Capture 1 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This 
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html.This 
screen capture was taken by the author. 




Figure 4. 2 Screen Capture 2 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This 
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html. This 
screen capture was taken by the author. 
In this screen capture, the woman who has already become a professional is not happy 
since she is still not celebrated by her grandma.  
 
Figure 4. 3 Screen Capture 3 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This 
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html. This 
screen capture was taken by the author. 
In this screen capture, the grandma is getting older and appears visibly distressed and 
asks her granddaughter “Have you gotten married?(结婚了吧)” 
 
Figure 4. 4 Screen Capture 4 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This 
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html. This 
screen capture was taken by the author. 
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In this screen capture, the grandma is already in the hospital. She is on the verge of tears. 
She asks her granddaughter the same question “Have you gotten married? (结婚了吧)” 
The woman continues her monologue “I shouldn’t be picky and wait for my soul mate. I 
should visit an offline store of Baihe Wang quickly.” At the end of the commercial, the 
woman and her husband visit her grandma who stays at a hospital; she wears a wedding 
dress, and tells her grandma with happy tears “Grandma, I got married” proudly and 
affectionately. (see screen capture 5) 
 
Figure 4. 5 Screen Capture 5 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This 
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html. This 
screen capture was taken by the author. 
 
This commercial promotes the idea that Baihe Wang can help single women find 
partners. It resonates with the cultural-political expectation for women to get married, 
arguing it is both in women’s and their family members’ best interests to get married 
before they enter middle-age since for women, nothing is more important than marriage 
and that this technology can help them fulfill this purpose. After being played 
ubiquitously on screens of family TVs, subways, airports, and shopping malls during the 
Spring Festival in February 2014, a time when Chinese families usually reunite, cook and 
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eat together, sit in front of TVs, talk about their experiences in the past year, and set up 
their plans for the coming year, this commercial reinforced this expectation and the 
necessity to use its service, as indicated by women’s comments online. On Tianya  
Luntan, which is a popular Chinese open-access Reddit-style online forum, a user under 
the pseudonym “nekoaisiteru” (2014) wrote “I feel very uncomfortable whenever I see 
this commercial. As a single woman, I face lots of pressure. My mom has always wanted 
me to find a husband. After watching this commercial, her expectation became even 
stronger.” “俞艾维”/Yu Aiwei (2014) wrote “When I first saw this commercial I was 
watching TV with my mom. My skin crawled and I knew something bad might happen. 
Just as I thought: my mom turned to me and asked me to register for Baihe Wang.” “抹茶
红豆糯米糍”/Mocha Hongdou Nuomi Ci (2014) wrote: 
Because of this commercial, in the eight days of my Spring Festival holiday, I did 
not dare leave my room and watch TV with my family. The first moment I saw 
this commercial, I realized that I am screwed. I poured myself a cup of water and 
retreated into my room. In three minutes, my mom approached me and asked me 
to have a blind date. 
Similar to Baihe Wang, Zhenai Wang promotes its product through articulating 
with the cultural-political expectation for women to find a husband who can be the 
breadwinner of the family. In order to understand the process of using dating websites to 
find partners, I registered for several Chinese dating websites, which include Zhenai 
Wang. After submitting some of my information online such as my age, height, weight, 
educational level, and place of work (I used my hometown Wuhan City instead of 
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Houghton), matchmakers began to contact me. Below is a screen capture of a message 
that a matchmaker from Zhenai Wang sent to me on February 16, 2019: 
 
Figure 4. 6 Screen Capture Of The Message From Zhenai Wang. This screen capture was 
taken by the author. 
The message reads: Hello, I am the matchmaker Teacher Xiao from Zhenai Wang…I 
want to introduce you to a partner. He is a manager of a company in the foreign trade 
industry. His monthly salary is above 1,5000 Yuan (approximately 2181 USD), he has an 
apartment of his own in Wuhan, and he is interested in travelling abroad.... 41  
                                                 
41In 2018, the average annual salary for people who work in Wuhan City was 73,671 Yuan (approximately 10,760 
USD). This means that the average monthly salary was about 6139 Yuan (approximately 896 USD) (Statistics Bureau 
of Wuhan, 2019).  
160 
Aiming to allure me to pay for the service to meet the man, this concise message 
primarily focuses on the man’s economic situation, as indicated by his job, his salary, his 
property acquisition, and his luxurious interest, all of which reveal that he is a desirable 
breadwinner. Through attracting women by advertising that many of its male users are 
rich enough to support and lead a family, Zhenai Wang not only reinforces the necessity 
for women to get married but also contributes to the gendered pattern of power and 
authority.   
Many women reported being discriminated against and shamed when they used 
online dating services. In fact, many online dating websites intentionally choose to shame 
single women, hoping this anxiety will compel them to buy expensive fee-based services. 
On Zhihu, which is a Chinese version of Quora, in answering questions about using 
ShijiJiayuan Wang, Baihe Wang, and Zhenai Wang, many women talked about their 
negative experiences. For example, “维尼”/Wei Ni (2016) who described herself as a 29-
year-old single woman wrote “In an offline store of Zhenai Wang, a matchmaker told me 
that it is unbelievable that I haven’t had a boyfriend for so long, so I need more help, thus 
I should choose the service that costs 48,888Yuan (approximately 7,271 USD).” “英英” 
/Ying Ying (2017) wrote “I never encountered such an evil website as Baihe Wang. I 
paid more than 300 Yuan (approximately 45 USD), they called me again and asked me to 
pay 600 Yuan (approximately 90 USD) more to update my service. They asked me 
whether my family members had pressured me to get married recently since I am no 
longer young.” On Douban, another popular open-access Chinese online forum, some 
women also posted about their experiences using dating websites. “鹅组 lvlv说不得”/ 
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Erzu Lvlvshuobude(2019) wrote “I received a message from ShijiJiayuan Wang. It wrote 
‘if you don’t get married before you become aged, your womb becomes worthless’.” “郭
又欠”/ Guo Youqin (2019) wrote: 
When I visited the offline store of ShijiJiayuan Wang, the matchmaker there 
asked me whether I am a virgin…Then he told me that because I am no good at 
decorating myself and am not willing to spend money, men don’t like me…He 
told me that I lacked social responsibility….I talked back. He became angry and 
was about to beat me. I was so scared. 
My analysis reveals that although dating websites acknowledge professionalism— 
for example the commercial released by Baihe Wang includes the image of a professional 
woman and Zhenai Wang solicit its users’ information concerning their occupations and 
places of work—many dating websites’ approach to resolve the tension between single 
women and the cultural-political force that urges them to get married is to reinforce the 
necessity for women to get married and to claim that their products can help single 
women to get rid of their singlehood. In this way, many dating websites are articulated 
with the cultural-political force that disciplines and even shames single women to find 
partners before they become old like stale food that will expire soon. This approach 
significantly ignores many single women’s inclination for late marriage or remaining 
single for the rest of their lives.  
Consequently, for some single women, dating websites reduce the pressure on 
them to get married by offering them another option to meet new people; however, for 
others, the dating websites’ approach of seizing on that tension creates extra burdens for 
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them and their parents, contributing to these tensions. For example, triggered by the 
commercial released by Baihe Wang, many single women shared online their terrible past 
experiences of blind dates, their determination to avoid marrying merely because they are 
aging, and openly criticized Baihe Wang for exacerbating their sufferings as single 
women and the Chinese culture for being sexist. For instance, on Tianya Luntan, the user 
“树蛙躲雨”/Shuwa Duoyu (2014) wrote “Marriage is important. But what is more 
important is to be happy with our lives.” The user “小马甲 818”/ Xiao Majia818 (2014) 
wrote “We, women, Let us be strong!” The user “20120207” wrote “It seems the whole 
Chinese society begins to commercialize leftover women. It is disgusting. Single sisters, 
watch out. Instead of marrying a wrong husband, we should remain single. Don’t be 
manipulated by the propaganda…It is never too late to get married.” At the same time, 
some single women channeled this incident of online boycotting of Baihe Wang and even 
the discourse of the leftover women into a street campaign. On Valentine’s Day of 2014, 
they protested outside the company of Baihe Wang and in subways. They held signs such 
as “Don’t push me to get married,” and “Why Can’t I Remain Single? I Will Only Get 
Married When I Want To.” A few single men also joined the campaign and held posters 
like “Don’t Marry Me Because of Your Grandma.” (“Feminist Voice in Valentine’s Day 
to Against Baihe Wang,” 2014). Through this radical protest, these single women justify 
their decisions to remain single and request respect from the Chinese society and 
government, which have contributed to the already existing tensions.  
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The Treatment of Egg Freezing 
As argued previously, an increasing number of single professional women 
prioritize careers over marriages, resulting in the phenomenon of late marriage among 
professional women in China. However, cultural-political forces also disfavor late 
marriage and argue that if women get married late, there will be lower chances for them 
to get pregnant or to have healthy babies, a claim that is said to be proved by medical 
research. It is argued that this situation will detrimentally influence the relationship 
between couples. Moreover, with the improvement of their economic situations, 
professional women have more sovereignty over their lives, resulting in their confidence 
facing divorce or determination to reject marrying men in order to avoid bad experiences 
in marriages such as the conflict between daughters-in-law and parents-in-law.42 
However, some of the women who refuse to have husbands still want to become mothers 
and to have biological children who can accompany them and take care of them when 
they become old. 
In this context, the treatment of egg freezing has attracted the attention of many 
single professional Chinese women. On the website of UCLA Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, egg freezing (or oocyte cryopreservation) is explained as “a process in 
which a woman's eggs (oocytes) are extracted, frozen and stored as a method to preserve 
reproductive potential in women of reproductive age” (“Egg Freezing,” n.d.). According 
                                                 
42Due to the influence of the traditional Chinese culture, many daughters-in-law have to stay with their parents-in-law 
in order to take care of them in contemporary China. However, staying together can be hard due to the differences 
between their backgrounds.  
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to Dr. Bergman (2016), “once frozen, embryos can remain viable for many years, with 
cases of live birth resulting as long as 15 years after freezing”.  
In general, this treatment enables Chinese women to fulfill two purposes. The first 
one is that freezing eggs allows women to be less anxious about getting married early, 
since they still have plentiful opportunities to have children even if they get married in 
their 40s. Lake (2018) records the pressure concerning women’s fertility that Christy, a 
professional Chinese woman, experienced: “‘I don’t mean to stress you, but I simply 
cannot relax until you are married,’ Christy’s mom recently said to her. ‘You’re thirty-
four already. How can you be sure you’re still ovulating?’” (p. 21). This episode clearly 
reflects the anxieties that are generated for single Chinese women by the issue of 
women’s constrained biological clock when it comes to active fertility. With the help of 
egg freezing, women can better focus on their careers and remain single until they find 
people that they really want to marry. Second, this treatment enables women to have 
biological children without getting married or having permanent partners. Reproductive 
science and technology enable women’s frozen eggs to turn into fertilized eggs in test 
tubes. After transplanting the fertilized eggs into a woman’s womb, it is possible for the 
woman to have a child.  
Egg freezing was largely unknown to most Chinese women until the 2010s, when 
the internet enables celebrities to effectively exert one-to-many influence. In 2015, the 
famous Chinese actress and director Jinglei Xu revealed that in 2013 when she was 39, 
she flew to the U.S. to freeze nine of her eggs. Since then, Xu has promoted the treatment 
of egg freezing, arguing that through freezing eggs a woman saves herself a future option 
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of being a mother even if she becomes too old to ovulate. Xu’s argument has become 
widely circulated in society and been viewed as extremely persuasive. For example, 
searching the two key terms “Xu Jinglei” and “egg freezing” on Baidu, the largest search 
engine in China, generated 419,000 results. Xu is regarded as the first Chinese celebrity 
to receive the treatment of egg freezing, a pioneer for Chinese women to likewise seek 
this medical treatment. Since Jinglei Xu’s revelation, some other famous Chinese 
actresses such as Xuan Ye and Zhiling Ling also publically revealed that they had frozen 
their eggs. These famous actresses have helped an increasing number of Chinese women 
to become familiar with the treatment of egg freezing. 
While the treatment of egg freezing can enable many Chinese women to fulfill 
their dreams of better focusing on their jobs when they are young without being pressured 
into getting married and having children or having children of their own without being 
trapped into marriage, the Chinese government doesn’t favor either of these situations. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese government wants single women to get married 
in their early or mid-twenties. Moreover, the Chinese government doesn’t welcome 
“illegitimate” children—“out-of-state-family-plan” babies or babies whose parents are 
not legally couples. In 2013, facing the situation that in some big Chinese cities an 
increasing number of women have children without getting married, the document 
“Population and Family Planning Management in Wuhan,” which was proposed by the 
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local government of Wuhan city, argues that unmarried women who give birth to children 
should be charged twice the social compensation fee.43 
Facing the popularity of the egg freezing, the Chinese government continues its 
practice of challenging single women’s right to give birth through limiting access to egg 
freezing exclusively to married couples since 2015.  Accordingly, it became illegal for a 
single Chinese woman to freeze her eggs in any Chinese hospital. The Chinese 
government requires all the hospitals and medical institutions that provide the service of 
egg freezing to mandate their female patients to provide three documents: 1) national ID 
card, 2) marriage certificate, 3) and birth permission. If any of the three documents are 
missing, the woman cannot receive this treatment (“It is not easy to freeze eggs in   
China,” 2019 ).  
That the government bans single women from egg freezing while allowing single 
men access to sperm freezing has irritated many Chinese women. For example, on Tianya 
Luntan, many Chinese netizens criticized this gender-based difference. The netizen “捷纪
天鹰”/Jieji Tianying (2015) wrote “Unbelievable country always has unbelievable 
policies.” The netizen “冷月无声 1985”/Lengyue Wusheng1985 (2015) wrote: 
In China, women should get married before turning 25, or they will become 
leftover women; women should give birth to children before turning 30, or they 
will be categorized as aged pregnant women. If you want to have a biological 
                                                 
43Social compensation fee/she hui fu yang fei/社会抚养费: according to the Chinese government, parents of 
“illegitimate” children need to pay this fee to compensate their children’s “illegitimate” uses of social and natural 
resources.  
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child, sorry, you cannot freeze your eggs, instead, you have to show your 
marriage certificate, reproductive certificate, and many other certificates. For 
mothers, if you want your children enrolled in elementary schools, you have to 
show schools the proofs that you have an IUD inserted. For married women who 
only have baby girls, you have to work hard to become pregnant with baby boys 
regardless of your health condition.  
Obviously, the government’s political practice conflicts with many single women’s 
interests, resulting in a great tension.  
Despite many Chinese women’s strong reaction against the government’s ban in 
recent years, the ban is still in place. Facing this situation, some privileged Chinese single 
women respond this tension through traveling abroad to access egg freezing in foreign 
countries. According to Kyle Francis, the CEO of the Southern California Reproduction 
Center, due to the increasing number of Chinese women who want to utilize egg freezing, 
this industry has become an expanding, profitable market in the U.S.. When Francis was 
interviewed, he said, “fertility preservation is a growing factor, due in part to the fact that 
[Chinese] people are waiting longer to get married, particularly as women's career 
opportunities have expanded…. We are seeing patients in their early 30s to early 40s” 
(“More Chinese women seeking,” 2018). In 2017, Ctrip, one of the biggest travel 
websites in China, even began to provide a special travel plan, “The Trip for Egg 
Freezing to Los Angeles, the U.S.A.” This trip lasted for seven days, and cost 218,888 
Yuan (approximately 34,603 USD) (Tao, 2017). 
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While travel abroad addresses the tension between the government’s ban and the 
desires of many women to freeze their eggs, most Chinese women don’t have enough 
money and resources to receive this treatment abroad. 44 Thus, although egg freezing 
treatment provides single women important access to focusing on their careers without 
worrying too much about getting married early, it does not fundamentally resolve the 
tension produced between some single Chinese women’s prioritization of becoming 
professionals over getting married and the cultural-political force that disciplines them to 
get married early even at the cost of sacrificing their careers.  
The Development and Use of Science and Technology for 
Population Control and Family Design 
While the previous section explored how science and technology are developed 
and used to promote marriage and family in the era of reforms, this section maps the 
development and application of science and technology for population control and family 
design. As discussed in Chapter Two, many Chinese people believe in the nearly 
omnipotent power of science and technology, which can enable them to fulfill their 
wishes. For example, during the Westernization Movement, they wished to fend off the 
Western invasions in order to live peacefully, and in the era of reforms, they wish to 
become rich and prosperous, consequently turning to science and technology for help. 
                                                 
44 If a Chinese woman wants to receive the treatment of egg freezing abroad, she must first successfully obtain a visa 
from her destination country. For some countries, such as the U.S., it is very hard for single women to get visas because 
single women, given that they are available to marry, are suspected to have strong intentions of immigration.    
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Moreover, the Chinese government has heavily relied on science and technology to 
achieve its political purposes such as surveilling its citizens, as evidenced by its projects 
of the Great Firewall and the Tian Wang System. This section analyzes the issue of 
population control and family design, which have been emphasized both by Chinese 
people and the Chinese government. Through exploring the cases of government-
sponsored abortion, sterilization, IUD insertion, and use of IVF—which are the 
predominant means of population control and family design in contemporary China— 
this section considers how science and technology are articulated with politics and the 
traditional Chinese culture to exert significant impacts on Chinese women’s lives.  
Government-Sponsored Abortion, Sterilization, and IUD Insertion 
Chapter Two stated that the Chinese government has a long tradition of utilizing 
science and technology to achieve its various political purposes. Chapter Three pointed 
out that in order to control the Chinese population, the Chinese government has 
implemented several family planning policies, all of which regulate the number of babies 
that a Chinese family is allowed to have. Additionally, Chapter Three stated that the 
Chinese government has adopted several strategies to discipline people to follow the 
government’s family planning policies strictly. For example, it is normal for parents who 
have out-of-plan children to be fired if they work for the government-affiliated 
companies, universities, labs, or other entities.   
Besides these strategies discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese government has 
turned to science and technology, especially the procedures of abortion, sterilization, and 
IUD insertion. In order to achieve the desired effects of its family planning policies, the 
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Chinese government has disciplined and even forced millions of Chinese people to 
receive these procedures. In most cases, it is Chinese women that are subject to this 
discipline. In Chinese culture, men are viewed as breadwinners and their strength is 
closely associated with their reproductive organs, so their bodies, especially their 
reproductive organs, are expected to remain intact. Moreover, because of the long history 
of treating and viewing eunuchs as sub-human beings in ancient China, it is common that 
men with damaged reproductive organs are mocked, discriminated aganist, and 
stigmatized even in contemporary society. Thus, whether for abortion, inserting an IUD, 
or receiving sterilization, Chinese women become the designated subjects. Rabinovitch 
(2013) reported that due to the one-child policy: 
Since 1971, doctors have performed 336m [million] abortions and 196m 
sterilisations, the data reveal. They have also inserted 403m intrauterine devices, a 
normal birth control procedure in the west but one that local officials often force 
on women in China.   
The many cruelties that occur in this process have been widely discussed. The 
most representative work of Mo Yan, the only Chinese writer who has won the Nobel 
Prize in Literature, is Frog/蛙, which touches on this subject. The pronunciation of frog 
is “wa,” which is very similar to the word “baby/娃.” Yan’s book describes the range of 
lived experiences of an obstetrician in Shandong Province (China): from helping women 
with obstructed labor to deliver their babies, which saved many women’s lives, to 
aborting women’s out-of-plan children, which led to the death of many women (Mo, 
2016). The practice of forced abortion still exists in the years since China has 
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implemented the more “relaxed” two-child policy. Sudworth (2016), who works for the 
BBC News, interviewed a Chinese man who was hiding with his family because his wife 
was going to give birth to their third child. The man explained his reason for hiding: “A 
third baby is not allowed…so we are renting a home away from our village. The local 
government carries out pregnancy examinations every three months. If we weren't in 
hiding, they would have forced us to have an abortion.” Similarly, Mosher (2017), from 
the Population Research Institute, states that “forced abortions in China continue despite 
the two-child policy.”  
Besides forcing some Chinese women to abort their out-of-plan babies, the 
Chinese government also has disciplined and even compelled women to receive the 
procedures of IUD insertion and sterilization. Fong (2016) points out:  
China in particular favored sterilization because it was a virtually foolproof way 
of lowering fertility. Nonpermanent barrier methods like condoms, the Pill, IUDs, 
which gave individuals more choice and control, were not so trustworthy, even 
though the IUD used—a stainless steel ring with no string—was specially 
modified so women could not remove it themselves. In one year alone, 1983, 
China sterilized over 20 million people. (p. 68) 
To persuade and discipline women to have IUDs inserted, besides using force, the 
government promotes the discourse that claims scientific studies reveal that an IUD has 
no ill effects on a woman’s body; rather an IUD is beneficial for a woman’s health. Thus, 
many Chinese women have IUDs placed in their bodies after giving birth to their first 
children, and now after their second children. 
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To ensure that the procedures of abortion, IUD insertion, and sterilization are 
systematically carried out, there used to be a special governmental “Office Specialized at 
Dealing with Women” (Fu Nv Shi Wu Ban Gong Shi/妇女事务办公室), and in some 
regions this office still exists. An important purpose of this office was and, in some cases, 
still is, to discipline women to follow the government’s family planning policies and 
receive these “proper” treatments. Lili, a woman who I interviewed about her experience 
when she encountered government officials, conveyed:45 
At first, they (village government officials) talked to us (all the wives in the 
village). They told us we should sacrifice ourselves for the nation…They 
mentioned many medical terms, I could not understand what I supposed to 
do….They said “just do it, and stop asking questions. How could you understand 
all the information, some of you haven’t even finished your middle-school 
education”…I had to receive the surgery to have an IUD inserted. 
Furthermore, because not all doctors had received enough training in 
gynecological procedures and Chinese women were expected to receive the operation of 
abortion, IUD insertion, and sterilization locally as an additional mode of corporeal 
                                                 
45 This interview was approved by the IRB #614903-1, “A Study of Chinese ‘Shidu’ Mothers.” Appendix C contains 
the IRB approval of this project. Shidu mothers refer to Chinese women whose only child died. They followed the 
Chinese government’s one-child policy to only have one child. However, their only children died usually when the 
mothers were in their late 40s and 50s—an age at which they would struggle more to get pregnant again naturally. I 
interviewed six shidu mothers. Four of them were located through a Chinese organization of shidu people that include 
both shidu mothers and fathers “Hand in Hand,” and two of them were found through my personal connections. My 
interviews were organized based on three main questions: 1) How does shidu affect your life? 2) How does shidu 
impact you and your husband or ex-husband differently? 3) What are your future plans? All interviewees were assigned 
pseudonyms. This interview was conducted in Chinese. I translated it from Chinese into English. I will talk more about 
the issue of shidu mothers later in this chapter.     
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control, the procedures were sometimes carried out in an unsanitary environment by 
unqualified physicians. As a result, these procedures could result in serious side effects. 
The case of the government-sponsored abortion, sterilization, and IUD insertion 
reveals how the Chinese government uses technology to disciplines women to follow the 
family planning policies to have the right number of babies. Moreover, it also 
demonstrates the impacts of the articulation of politics, the traditional Chinese culture, 
and science and technology on women. Due to the traditional Chinese culture, Chinese 
women are expected to give birth to more than one child; however, the Chinese 
government only allowed them to have one child. Subsequently, tensions emerged and 
the government introduces policies and uses technology to both respond to and add to 
these tensions. As indicated in my analysis, although science and technology probably 
have successfully enabled the government to achieve its purpose of population control, 
they fail to resolve the tension between the political and the cultural forces, as evidenced 
by many Chinese people’s complaints and resistance. In this process, many women 
remain the subjects and objects of control: first expected to give birth to many babies by 
their husbands’ families, and then expected to give birth to only one child by the 
government. Moreover, the introduction of science and technology in this process has 
exacerbated many women’s suffering, sometimes endangering their health and even their 
lives. For these women, science and technology fail to fulfill the expected roles of 
bringing positive changes to their lives.  
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In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) Treatment 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese culture has a long tradition of family 
design through focusing on the necessity of a baby for a family and promoting gender 
selection of babies. For example, in ancient China, it was legitimate for a husband to 
divorce his wife merely based on the ground that she failed to produce an heir for his 
family.  
Even in contemporary China, having babies remains crucial for Chinese women. 
For example, after collecting the narratives of Chinese shidu mothers, the mothers whose 
only children died and thus leave them childless, I revealed that without a child, it can be 
very hard for a Chinese woman to maintain her family and thrive in her community in 
contemporary Chinese society. For example, Yan, a 57-year-old worker told me her 
experience after the death of her only child: 
My son left me when I was 48 years old…At that time, I had finished menopause. 
I could not reproduce a child. My husband was 50 years old. Soon, we divorced. 
He married a younger woman from a rural area. She produced a baby for him…I 
don’t blame my husband; he also faced a lot of stress at that time. (as cited in Liu 
& Slack, 2014, p. 41) 
Yan is not the only shidu mother who was deserted by her husband. “Fang, a shidu 
mother and leader of the shidu family organization ‘Hand in Hand,’ explained that of the 
more than 500 people in the organization, 2/3 are females and more than half of them are 
divorced” (Liu & Slack, 2014, p. 41). 
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Another shidu mother, Feng, reveals that in contemporary society, having a child 
is still important for women if they want to be accepted by their communities. She 
mentioned her experience after the death of her child: 
In 2000, my best friend’s daughter made plans to get married. She called me and 
told me this piece of news. I felt so excited because I finally found someone who 
was still willing to share blissful events with me. I asked her for the location of 
the wedding. She just smiled. At that time, I was so stupid. I asked someone else 
and found the location ultimately. I knew her daughter, and I liked her daughter 
very much. I wanted to go to her wedding to give her my sincere wishes. On the 
wedding day, when I showed up, I saw anger and fear in my friend’s and 
daughter’s faces. My friend took me away from the wedding and begged me to 
leave. Her words hurt me a lot. Since then, I never go to any weddings or birthday 
parties. (as cited in Liu & Slack, 2014, p. 44) 
In fact, as discussed in Chapter Three, the tenacious connection between women and 
childbirth can be traced back into Chinese myth. Due to this mythical influence, many 
Chinese people believe that childless women are unlucky or even evil because God 
refuses to send them a child. Moreover, as Chapter Three makes clear, the mythical 
person who is responsible for spreading bad luck is the goddess Sao Ba Xing. Childless 
women, the women who can be viewed as the potential manifestations of Sao Ba Xing, 
are often discriminated against in the communities. 
While the expectation to have children has remained constant, the number and 
genders of the children that women are expected to bear have shifted over time. In the 
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beginning of the era of reforms when China’s one-child policy was implemented, due to 
the strong influence of traditional Chinese culture that argues that the more children, 
especially baby boys that you have, the more blessed you are, many Chinese families 
wanted to have more than one child, preferably baby boys. This meant that many Chinese 
families had to break the government’s law or tried to circumvent the law. Thus, some 
families decided to pay the government the fines for their out-of-plan babies, other 
families wanted to be pregnant with twins since according to China’s one-child policy a 
family was allowed to keep both children if they were twins. For some families who do 
not want to break the law and do not want to have twins conceived with the help of 
reproductive science and technology, which was still a risky practice that could 
potentially endanger the parents’ careers if they worked for the government, they wanted 
to guarantee their only children were boys. In order to meet many Chinese people’s 
demanding expectations of family design, such as having twins and having a boy with 
their only chance, they had to turn to reproductive technology for help because, as argued 
in Chapter Two, many people rely on science and technology to solve their problems.  
However, Chinese people’s notion of an ideal family has changed significantly in 
recent years. After the implementation of China’s most recent two-child policy, Chinese 
families are allowed to have two children, and many of them want their babies to include 
one boy and one girl. The need for a baby boy follows the long Chinese cultural tradition 
of preferring boys over girls, as discussed in Chapter Three. However, for the other child, 
an increasing number of Chinese families hope that it will be a girl. This preference has 
resulted in part from two reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter Three, due to the lack of 
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single Chinese women, many Chinese men’s families have to pay large sums of money to 
their sons’ girlfriends’ families to get permission for marriage from the girls’ parents. 
Moreover, it is Chinese tradition that it is a bridegroom’s family’s responsibility to buy at 
least one living unit for the newlywed couple. Fong (2016) points out that due to the 
expense for a boy to get married in contemporary China, marriage has gradually become 
“a matter of money, valuation, and investment” (p. 117). Thus, many Chinese families 
now do not want to have two boys because they would have to face severe economic 
pressure when their boys become adults. Instead, they want to have a boy and a girl: the 
girl can obtain money for the family, which can be used to pay her brother’s girlfriend’s 
family. This makes prenatal gender selection to have baby girls an investment for their 
families, especially for their sons.  
Additionally, the discourse that having a boy and a girl makes a happy family 
began to gain popularity in Chinese society recently. For example, on January 15, 2016, 
Sohu—one of the most popular websites in China—published the article “Having a Boy 
and a Girl, That’s a Perfect Life.” In the article, the mother Yaling Li presented her happy 
life by showing photos of her son and daughter. She concluded that her most meaningful 
and proud job was to take care of her children and witness their growth (Chen, 2016). On 
April 24, 2017, when the famous Chinese diver Jingjing Guo gave birth to a baby girl as 
her second child, Jingjing Guo was widely recognized as a super lucky woman who have 
a baby boy as her first child and a baby girl as her second child. She is regarded as a 
female role model because she had a successful career that enabled her to attract and 
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marry a rich man, and after her retirement she secured her position in a well-endowed 
family by having two babies of different sexes.  
In fact, nowadays in China, it is widely argued that since the Chinese character 
“好” (good) is made of two parts “女” (girl) and “子” (boy), having a boy and a girl will 
bring a family great wellbeing. This discourse tries to promote a new image of an ideal 
contemporary Chinese family to replace the prior image that a happy Chinese family has 
only one child that is ideally a son. On the one hand, this discourse reflects the 
improvement of a girl’s status in Chinese culture because she is no longer viewed as a 
money-losing property (Pei Qian Huo) as in ancient China or a half person as in the time 
of China’s one-and-half child policy. On the other hand, it reinforces the necessity of 
using reproductive science and technologies in order to have the right number of babies 
of the right genders. In this context of emphasizing family design, IVF has become 
prevalently used in Chinese society. In fact, China has the largest population of test-tube 
babies in the world (“China Has World’s,” 2018).46  
The science and technology of IVF first appeared and were used in Western 
countries since the late 1970s. The first test-tube baby was born on July 25, 1978 in the 
U.K. Just one year after, the first test-tube baby in China was born on March 10, 1988. 
According to Nordqvist (2018), IVF includes five crucial steps: 
                                                 
46 Test-tube babies: this term refer to babies conceived by in vitro fertilization.  
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[The first step is to] suppress the natural menstrual cycle: The woman receives a 
drug, usually in the form of a daily injection for about 2 weeks, to suppress their 
natural menstrual cycle. 
[The second step is called] super ovulation. [In this step,] fertility drugs 
containing the fertility hormone follicle stimulating hormone (FSH) are given to 
the woman. FSH makes the ovaries produce more eggs than usual. Vaginal 
ultrasound scans can monitor the process in the ovaries. 
[The third step involves] retrieving the eggs. The eggs are collected through a 
minor surgical procedure known as “follicular aspiration.” A very thin needle is 
inserted through the vagina and into an ovary. The needle is which is connected to 
a suction device. This sucks the eggs out. This process is repeated for each ovary. 
In 2011, researchers suggested that collecting 15 eggs from the ovaries in one 
cycle gives the highest chance of a successful pregnancy. Frozen or donated eggs 
may also be used. 
[The fourth step involves] insemination and fertilization. The eggs that have been 
collected are placed together with male sperm and kept in an environmentally 
controlled chamber. After a few hours, the sperm should enter the egg. Sometimes 
the sperm is directly injected into the egg. This is known as an intracytoplasmic 
sperm injection (ICSI). Frozen sperm, retrieved through testicular biopsy, may be 
used. This is believed to be as effective as fresh sperm in achieving a successful 
pregnancy. The fertilized egg divides and becomes an embryo. At this point, some 
centers offer pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) which can screen an 
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embryo for genetic disorders. This is somewhat controversial and is not always 
used. One or two of the best embryos are selected for transfer. The woman is then 
given progesterone or human chorionic gonadotrophin (hCG) to help the lining of 
the womb receive the embryo.  
[The final step is to transfer the] embryo. Sometimes, more than one embryo is 
placed in the womb. It is important that the doctor and the couple wishing to have 
a child discuss how many embryos should be transferred. Normally, a doctor will 
only transfer more than one embryo if no ideal embryos are available. The 
transfer of the embryo is done using a thin tube, or catheter. It enters the womb 
through the vagina. When the embryo sticks to the lining of the womb, healthy 
embryo growth can begin.  
IVF treatment mainly can enable its recipients to achieve two purposes. First, as a 
significant medical breakthrough, it provides an efficient way to overcome infertility. 
Second, IVF is also used for the purpose of embryo gender selection as well as 
conceiving twins. In the fourth step “insemination and fertilization” of IVF treatment, 
doctors can identify the gender of the fertilized eggs, allowing them to filter out female 
embryos so that only male embryos remain. Fetal sex selection is prohibited in mainland 
China since the Chinese government is afraid that if it is legal, many Chinese couples 
would not want to have baby girls. However, it is a common practice that bribed Chinese 
doctors will perform the embryo gender selection secretly even in Chinese public 
hospitals. Moreover, in many other countries such as the U.S. and Thailand, it is legal for 
doctors to reveal the gender of an embryo and the parents can then decide whether they 
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want to discard the female embryo. Additionally, IVF treatment increases the chance for 
women to have twins since usually several fertilized eggs will be transplanted into 
women’s wombs. 
Although IVF treatment can be very efficient, it is costly in China due to the 
complex procedure involved. On Zhihu, the Chinese Quora, many people used their 
experiences answer the question “How much does it cost to receive IVF treatment?”47 
For example, “随遇而安”/ Suiyu Eran (2018) wrote, “In 2014, I received IVF treatment 
twice. The first time, I paid for 72,000 Yuan (10,700 USD), and the second time I paid 
96,000 Yuan (approximately 14,300 USD). However, both treatments failed.” Samson 
(2019), a doctor in reproductive science, pointed out that to receive the IVF treatment in 
China will cost in average140,000Yuan (approximately 19,737 USD).   
Moreover, besides its cost, IVF treatment can result in female patients suffering 
from serious pains. As described in the detailed process of IVF, the only step in which a 
man is involved is providing his sperm. However, the woman’s work is much more 
complicated. First, she has to take pills to suppress her natural menstrual cycle, then to 
have FSH to produce more than one egg at a time, after that to receive surgeries to 
retrieve her eggs and to have the embryo transferred to her womb, and finally to carry 
the[se] embryo[s]to term. While men’s participation does not require much effort, the 
treatment for women is painful and lasts for several months. In this process, unlike the 
man who follows his natural proclivities, the woman is fighting against her own 
                                                 
47The question and its answers were written in Chinese. They can be openly accessed from 
https://www.zhihu.com/question/26900811. I translated them from Chinese into English.  
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biological cycle. A report from sohu. com recorded many female patients’ miserable 
experiences of receiving IVF treatment. It wrote “in this process, a mother received 236 
injection. She definitely chooses to sacrifice herself in order to have a baby…A woman 
even cannot leave the hospital after she received the treatment of fertilized egg 
transplantation because she felt so much pain” (“The complete process of receiving IVF 
treatment,” 2017). A woman “安素筱”/An Suxiao (2016) posted a long article “Test-
Tube Baby: How Brave Can a Woman Be?” on Tianya Luntan, which recorded her 
friends’ and her experiences. In her post, she quotes her friend Z’s comment to 
summarize women’s experience when they receive IVF treatment: “I am treatedas a 
lifeless machine.” 
However, for the purpose of overcoming infertility, to have twins, and to have 
babies in preferred genders, many Chinese women are willing to or have to endure all the 
pains caused and cost incurred by the procedure of IVF. For instance, Lili, one of my 
interviewees, talked about her experience of using IVF and trying to become a mother 
again after the death of her son. Lili said: 
I want to have a baby again. I don’t care about how much I need to pay for it. I 
would sell everything I have; I just want to have a baby….[Lili told me that] I beg 
God and the doctors to please give me a child. You asked me what my wish is 
now? I have no wish but to get pregnant soon…. [I asked her: if you get pregnant 
successfully, what are your plans for yourself and the baby? Lili thought for a 
while and said] I have no plan. I just want to have a baby. (as cited in Liu & Slack, 
2014, pp. 40-41) 
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In contemporary China, not only do infertile women receive IVF treatment, those 
who are healthy also receive this treatment. Chinese people’s obsession with receiving 
IVF treatment to have babies and to peform fetal sex selection even has resulted in the 
flourishing of the international market of reproductive science and technology. It was 
reported that “more Chinese women are visiting fertility centers in countries like 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, and even as far as the United States, as they look to 
start, or expand, their families”(“More Chinese Women,” 2018).  
The case of IVF treatment reveals how science and technology are articulated 
with the CCP’s family-planning policies and Chinese cultural beliefs concerning ideal 
Chinese families to discipline Chinese women. In this context, IVF significantly affects 
Chinese women even though some of them do not use it. Based on Wajcman’s (1991) 
argument that “the very existence of [the reproductive science and technologies] changes 
the situation…[A woman’s] ‘infertility’ is now treatable, and she must in a sense actively 
decide not to be treated,” I argue the due to its articulation with the Chinese policies and 
culture, the very existence of IVF treatment not only makes a woman’s infertility 
treatable but also enables women to have babies in the “right” genders that are often 
determined by the Chinese socio-cultural expectations, thus women must in a sense 
actively decide not to receive this treatment (p. 62). It is ironic that IVF, which is often 
viewed as an emancipatory reproductive science and technology that free women from 
the situation of being infertile and provide women opportunities to choose their babies in 
their preferred sexes, in reality traps Chinese women. On the surface, Chinese women can 
decide whether they want to receive IVF treatment or not; in reality, many of them are 
184 
pressured to receive this treatment. Additionally, the process of compelling is often 
disguised as women’s choice. After being articulated with the socio-cultural expectation 
for women to become mothers, IVF treatment has gained popularity in the Chinese 
society, turning into a non-negotiable option for many Chinese women and reinforcing 
the socio-cultural-political expectation for women to be mothers of the right number of 
babies in the preferred genders. 
The Development and Use of Science and Technology to 
Promote the Discourse of the Super Mother 
As discussed at the end of Chapter Three, in the era of reforms women are 
expected to be caring mothers and at the same time professionals, which are roles that 
often conflict. In response, though not necessarily intentionally, the media as well as the 
government began to promote the ideal image of a woman as a super mother, which 
essentially argues that women can balance these two roles and if a woman fails to do so, 
it is her fault because she does not work hard enough or lacks ability.  
It is not easy to become a super mother, a fact that is even recognized by the 
government, which holds events to find and celebrate them. Thus how to become a super 
mother is a crucial question, one that relates to science and technology. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, in the era of reforms, many people believe that science and technology can 
solve all problems, including the task of being super mothers that has emerged in this 
context. This section explores the role of science and technology developed and used to 
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this end by focusing on the examples of breast pumps and children’s medicine made by 
Johnson & Johnson.  
Breast Pumps 
Breast pumps are significant in terms of helping professional women balance their 
careers and their responsibility to breastfeed their children. The main function of the 
breast pump is to enable lactating women to extract milk from their breasts and 
refrigerate it for their babies to drink when the mothers are at work. This technological 
device can be powered by hand, batteries, or electrical outlet.  
Breast pumps are very popular in China. Taobao, the biggest online market in 
China, sold more than 30, 000 electric breast pumps from the company Rusch and more 
than 20,000 from Xenbea monthly in 2019. Many customers who described themselves 
as working women left comments expressing how breast pumps are their must-have 
devices. In fact, in contemporary Chinese society, due to the increasing number of 
women who carry breast pumps in their working bags, a specific term “bei nai ma ma/背
奶妈妈,” which can literally be translated as “mothers who are carrying milk in their 
briefcases” was created to refer to lactating women in the workplace. By putting breast 
pumps in their briefcases, these bei nai ma mas try to shoulder their mothering 
responsibilities when they work outside their homes. 
There is a significant difference between the promising advertisements for breast 
pumps, which claim that they solve all the difficulties that bei nai ma mas’ have 
experienced and the actual lived experience of many women who use breast pumps. They 
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argue that their difficulties cannot be easily solved merely through using these 
technological devices. Commercials for breast pumps often convey the message that they 
significantly improve bei nai ma mas’ experiences, making their lives enjoyable and 
enabling them to take good care of their babies by providing fresh nutritious milk in their 
mothers’ absence. For example, the commercial for Rusch’s breast pump emphasizes that 
this product is easy to use, won’t cause any pain, and even can massage breasts sore from 
breastfeeding. Moreover, by giving its customers free storage bags for milk, it claims that 
it provides a complete high-quality service that meets all of its customers’ needs and 
saves bei nai ma mas from worrying about their babies’ food when they are away.    
However, many women reported uncomfortable experiences using breast pumps 
and argued that breast pumps, although necessary, do not fundamentally better their 
experiences of being bei nai ma mas. On Zhihu, the Chinese Quora, when women 
discussed their lived experiences of using breast pumps in the workplace, they often 
mentioned that besides the physical pains caused by breast pumps, they suffered from the 
psychological stress of being embarrassed in front of others, a situation that cannot be 
simply solved by using advanced breast pumps.48 For example, “三姐”/ San Jie (2019) 
wrote: “being a bei nai ma ma, you must have to face many difficulties….Moreover, 
whenever you go to any online forums, you can see people criticize career women who 
do not want to be bei nai ma mas.” “晴天”/Qing Tian (2016) posted her record of 
extracting 16, 510 ml of breast milk during the first two months following her return to 
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the workplace and summarized, “I am so tired. I have tried many different environments 
to extract my milk.”49 In fact, most workplaces in China do not have a lactation room. 
Moreover, many toilets in China do not have electric outlets. Thus, some mothers have to 
use conference rooms, a comparatively more private space, when they need to use 
electric pumps. 
As discussed previously, super mothers are characterized as caring mothers who 
take very good care of their children confidently and happily. Breast pumps have helped 
many career women fulfill the purpose of continuing to breastfeed their babies after they 
have finished their maternity leave, which is a prerequisite of being a super mother. In 
fact, the idea that a responsible mother should breastfeed her baby for at least six months 
to make her baby smarter and healthier is very popular in Chinese society. Mothers who 
don’t meet this expectation are often criticized as being irresponsible and selfish. Chinese 
society, which strongly discriminates against large framed women, accepts and even 
respects lactating women with a larger body shape since they are culturally viewed as 
mothers who have plentiful milk. In this case, their large bodies serve as the evidence of 
their sacrifice for their children.  
Although breastfeeding for young babies is strongly promoted, an increasing 
number of women cannot be around their babies at all the times. According to Chinese 
law, paid maternity leave for women is 98 days. Moreover, it is common that in order to 
maintain their positions, many professional women who work for private companies 
                                                 
49These comments can be openly accessed from https://www.zhihu.com/question/21325360/answer/59183635. I 
translated this comment from Chinese to English.  
188 
return even before they finish their maternal leave. This means that most professional 
women, have to use breast pumps and become bei nai ma mas if they want to have 
careers and at the same time be caring mothers. In this way, breast pumps provide these 
women an important tool to becoming super mothers, and therefore highly respected 
figures in society. But, at the same time, breast pumps lead to the simplification of bei nai 
ma mas’ difficulties, framing their struggles as ones that can be easily solved by using 
science and technology. Moreover, because of the possibility afforded by breast pumps, 
many women are trapped. Many bei nai ma mas indicated that after returning to their 
workplaces, they suffered from stress and anxiety, which resulted in reduced milk flow. 
Thus, no matter how diligently they used breast pumps, they could not produce sufficient 
milk. This circumstance leads to even more physical pain and anxieties for them (“An 
investigation of lived experiences of bei nai ma mas,” 2015).  
While mothers with careers have to use breast pumps and to endure physical 
discomfort and psychological stress in order to raise their children in accordance with the 
society’s expectations, fathers are largely absent from those responsibilities. In fact, while 
the image of a super mother, which sets up an “exemplary” model for contemporary 
Chinese women, emphasizes that women should prioritize their mothering 
responsibilities over their careers, the image of the super father is negative and mocks 
men who waste their time and life taking care of their babies. It is ironic that compared 
with the society’s strong emphasis on women shouldering all kinds of obligations for 
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child care such as breastfeeding, the paternal role is significantly ignored.50 As a result, 
some breast pump companies such as Xenbea even go so far to excuse paternal 
responsibility by promoting their products as being quiet and therefore not impacting 
other family members’ sleep in the middle of the night when the mother uses it. As 
revealed in my analysis, although breast pumps provide important resources for women 
to become super mothers, they do not resolve the fundamental tensions that many bei nai 
ma mas face.     
Children’s Medicines Produced by Johnson & Johnson 
As discussed previously, super mothers are different from traditional mothers who 
usually do not have jobs as well as working mothers who are often overburdened by their 
responsibilities. Instead, super mothers are supposedly to be confident and professional 
both in their careers and in raising their children. Science and technology, especially 
science and technology focused on children’s medicines, strongly promote the quality of 
professionalism super mothers should have. 
Johnson & Johnson, in order to promote its fever reducer for children named “Mei 
Lin/美林,” released a series of short commercials over the past few years. These 
commercials depict mothers who “fly” quickly from their offices to homes to take care 
their children when they are needed and show how these mothers turn to Mei Lin to 
provide care for their children while maintaining their professionalism. Mothers in these 
                                                 
50 In contemporary Chinese society, it is normal that mothers and grandmothers are responsible for taking care of the 
babies exclusively.  
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commercials are depicted as beautiful, knowledgeable, and confident professional women 
who can singlehandedly take good care of their children. These commercials always 
conclude with the statement that “Every mother is a firefighter/Mei Ge Ma Ma Dou Shi 
Xiao Fang Yuan/每个妈妈都是消防员.” In fact, the most typical image of mothers in 
Mei Lin’s commercials is a mother who wears a firefighter’s suit, happily holding her son 
and facing the camera with confidence. Below is the image of the mother in Mei Lin’s 
advertisements:51 
 
Figure 4. 7 An Advertisement To Promote The Children's Fever Reducer Mei Lin. 
This image can be publicly accessed from http://sucai.redocn.com/psd/553017.html. 
In 2018, Johnson & Johnson released a long commercial to promote its product 
Mei Lin, which was well received. This commercial depicts three generations of women 
who live together: a grandma who is responsible for all housework; a mother who is a 
highly successful, professional who often finishes her work at 2 am and at the same time 
takes good care of and teaches her baby girl; and the young girl. The commercial begins 
with the conflicts between these three generations of women: the professional woman 
complained about her mother for not listening to her and the baby girl cried because her 
                                                 
51Appendix D contains the fair use report to demonstrate my fair use of this image.  
191 
mother refused to wear clothes for her. With the sickness of the baby girl, who later was 
cured using Mei Lin, these three women reconciled and expressed their love for each 
other: the grandmother understands her daughter’s requests and the professional woman 
explicitly shows her deep love for her daughter after staying awake the whole night to 
take care of her (“Let love be right,” 2018). 
Besides the father’s voice calling his family and asking the routine daily question 
“How is everything today?” , the image of a father is absent in this commercial. While 
promoting the effectiveness of its medicine and celebrating maternal love, the 
commercial clearly sends out the message that women are responsible for taking care of 
children, doing all housework, and if they need help, turning to science and technology 
and their female family members. Additionally, this commercial promotes the way of a 
high level of professionalism a woman should have to take care of her baby, which adds 
extra demands for many women. As revealed in my analysis, children’s medicine, such as 
Mei Lin manufactured by Johnson & Johnson, reinforces the image of the super mothers, 
which reframe mothers to accommodate to the current culture, economic, and political 
climate but still maintains the traditional Chinese family dynamics.   
Besides breast pumps and children’s medicine, an increasing number of 
technological products, such as smart home devices and mobile apps have been designed 
to help mothers who are also professionals. These technologies are meant to help mothers 
manage their time and take good care of their children, resolving the tension produced by 
women’s roles of being mothers and at the same time professionals. However, with the 
popularity of these products, extra burdens are added for women and the image of the 
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super mother becomes more demanding. As revealed in my analysis, the image of a super 
mother does not resolve the tension produced by women’s simultaneous roles as 
professionals and mothers. Moreover, although science and technology can be helpful in 
terms of enabling women to balance their careers and familial lives, the ways they are 
promoted in China significantly reinforce the absence of the role of the father and 
complicate the demands for women, which can even exacerbate women’s already 
stressful lives.  
The Development and Use of Science and Technology By 
Women to Gain Independence and Resist Sexual Violence 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the discourse of The New Woman advocates for 
Chinese women to resist their subordinated status, to receive education, and to join the 
workplace. It points out that since the late 18th century, feminist movements that 
primarily promote gender equality and request for eliminating gender-based violence 
such as foot binding have occurred in China. Chapter Three also pointed out that the CCP 
encouraged and prepared women to join the workplace, as evidenced in its various 
political practices. Accordingly, an increasing number of Chinese women have received 
education and become professionals, which in turn have enabled them to better resist 
sexism. However, as discussed previously, some sexist practices are still prevalent in 
Chinese culture and are even supported by the Chinese government. Thus, tensions have 
emerged between women’s independence and demands for gender equality and the sexist 
attitudes associated with the tenacious cultural-political force. This section explores the 
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roles of science and technology in this tension-filled context through focusing on 
women’s job opportunities in the era of reforms and online feminist activism against 
sexual violence in China. 
Job Opportunities 
 
As argued in Chapter Two, science and technology have developed rapidly in the 
era of reforms and have influenced Chinese people significantly. One of their important 
influences is the job opportunities they create. In fact, the development of science and 
technology has offered Chinese women from various backgrounds valuable job 
opportunities that increase their chances to gain independence.  
Chapter Three argued that with the implementation of the nine-year compulsory 
educational system, an increasing number of Chinese women have been able to receive 
education. Additionally, according to Chapter Two, due to the Chinese government’s 
emphasis on developing science and technology, STEM education is also prioritized 
compared with education in the humanities and the arts, which results in many Chinese 
women becoming scientists and engineers. In 2015, the Nobel Prize in Medicine was 
awarded to Tu Youyou, a Chinese female scientist. Tu is the first and the only scientist in 
China who has ever won the Nobel Prize in STEM. Tu and her team discovered the key 
chemical element “artemisinin” in the plant of Artemisia Annua, which was commonly 
used in traditional Chinese medicine to cure malaria. Her team successfully extracted 
artemisinin from the plant. Tu’s discovery is recognized as significant worldwide. On the 
website of the Nobel Prize, Tu’s work is explained as follows: 
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A number of serious infectious diseases are caused by parasites spread by insects. 
Malaria is caused by a single-cell parasite that causes severe fever. Traditional 
Chinese medicine uses sweet wormwood to treat fever. In the 1970s, after studies 
of traditional herbal medicines, Youyou Tu managed to extract a substance, 
artemisinin, which inhibits the malaria parasite. Drugs based on artemisinin have 
led to the survival and improved health of millions of people. (“Tu Youyou Facts,” 
n.d.)  
Chinese people are proud of Tu, since unlike many other scientists who have experiences 
studying or working in Western countries, Tu finished all her education in China and her 
achievement was significantly influenced by traditional Chinese medicine. Thus, Tu’s 
success signifies that China has the ability to cultivate its own scholars in STEM and that 
there is valuable scientific and technological knowledge in traditional Chinese culture, 
resisting the stereotype that it is a backward culture reliant on superstitions.  
Tu’s case also directed people’s attention to female Chinese scientists and 
engineers. On 10 January, 2017, CCTV.com, a website sponsored by the Chinese 
government published the article“1+15+50%: ‘Hua Mulan’ in STEM.” The article 
celebrates Tu as the most representative female scientist along with 15 other female 
scientists and engineers who were PIs on projects that won top Chinese prizes in STEM 
and the 50% of female scientists and engineers who have also worked on most of the 
renowned projects in STEM. The article likens them to Hua Mulanin contemporary 
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China. 52  The article states, “these female scientists and engineers who are active in 
different disciplines are blooming, working hard, and creating [legends]” (Liu, 2017). In 
fact, female scientists and engineers have important roles that will become increasingly 
indispensable in China, as indicated by Ma et al. (2018). They write: 
China is focused explicitly on building its own research and development (R&D) 
and innovation. Its R&D staff swelled from 3.2 million in 2009 to 5.8 million in 
2016, and the increased demand for talent has highlighted the need for more 
female scientists….after age limits for female grant applicants [for Young 
Scientist Fund] were extended [from 35 to 40 by the Chinese government as a 
strategy to attracting many women to work in STEM and to improve gender 
equality in 2011], The percentage of female award recipients jumped from 33% to 
43% in 2011….Women’s representation on review panels [in STEM] went up by 
45% between 2010 and 2017, to 13.3%. That is still low, but consistently higher 
than rates seen from 1986 to 2009, which fluctuated around 6%. 
Although the development of science and technology has afforded women who 
receive advanced education in STEM chances to become scientists and engineers, female 
scientists and engineers are still strongly discriminated against in their workplace. For 
example, in 2018, 177 male scientists were elected as Outstanding Young Scholars in 
                                                 
52Hua Mulan: Hua Mulan (花木兰) is famous female hero in Chinese culture. Although it is believed that she lived as a 
woman warrior in the Northern and the Southern Dynasties (420-589), she was treated as a legendary figure instead of 
a real person in Chinese culture. The legend of Mulan describes how she camouflaged as a man to replace her father 
who was old and sick and her younger brother to serve in the army because in that period of time every family with 
more than one male was required by the government to send a man to serve in the army. Mulan was very brave and her 
performances were outstanding during the wars. Mulan is not only known by Chinese people. In 1998, Disney released 
the film Mulan based on the story of Hua Mulan in Chinese culture. In 2004, Disney released the film Mulan II which 
continues Hua Mulan’s story in the 1998 film.    
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China; in contrast, only 23 female scientists were elected. Until 2017, female scientists 
only constituted 6% of the members of the Chinese Academy of Science (“The First 
Female Chief Editor of Nature,” 2018). Moreover, outstanding female scientists are often 
derogatorily labeled as “Abbess Mie Jie /灭绝师太.”53 Thus, although female scientists 
and researchers are valuable, they are not as valued as they deserve to be due to the 
cultural-political forces that prioritize men over women in the workplace.  
Besides offering women who receive good educations job opportunities in STEM, 
the development of science and technology also has provided migrant job opportunities to 
Chinese women who only receive middle school, high school, and vocational education. 
These women are known as rural migrant workers/Nong Min Gong/农民工. They leave 
their hometowns, usually villages and small towns, and come to big cities to conduct 
manual and low-skilled work. In 2018, there were 115.7 million migrant workers in 
China and more than one third of them were employed in the manufacturing industry 
(National Bureau of Statistics, April 2019). Moreover, among these workers, 34.8% were 
women (National Bureau of Statistics, May 2019). Foxconn, a manufacturing company 
that is famous for its role in producing electronics, including mobile phones, laptops, and 
tablets, is one of China’s largest private companies that has employed considerable 
number of migrant workers. According to Foxconn’s 2017 Suicidal and Environmental 
                                                 
53Abbess Mie Jie is a female figure from an influential swordsman novel The Heaven Sword and Dragon Saber/倚天屠
龙记. “Mie jie” means “destroy and eliminate.” Abbess Mie Jie is depicted as a stubborn and high-skilled female leader 
who has an extreme idea of success. In order to fulfill her dream of leading her team to be the best, she is willing to 
sacrifice her students’ love and happiness and even to kill her closest student (Jin, 2013).  
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Responsibility Report, an official document released by the company, it had 988,000 
workers in China as of December 31, 2017; among them, 35% were women (pp. 11-23).  
The phenomenon of large numbers of Chinese women from rural areas becoming 
migrant workers is quite recent and began to emerge during the mid-1980s when China 
began to cooperate with Western countries to build modern factories equipped with 
assembly lines. These modern factories attracted companies to move their factories from 
Western countries to China where labor is cheap, the exchange rate favors U.S. and 
European currencies, and many poor Chinese people are desperate to take any kind of job. 
Due to the expanding population of migrant workers, in 1991, a TV series Wai Lai Mei/
外来妹 showcased this group through depicting the experience of six female migrant 
workers in the manufacturing industry (Chen, 1991). This TV series was highly 
successful and is still regarded as one of the best Chinese TV series. It applauded female 
migrant workers’ bravery in leaving their hometowns and making irreplaceable 
contributions to the development of the city, even though they were suffering from 
discrimination and homesickness.  
The discussions concerning the issue of female migrant workers always center on 
two words: “opportunity” and “hardship.” The opportunities for these women from poor 
rural areas to find jobs as factory workers as well as waitresses, cleaners, and other 
menial laborers in cities are crucial for them to achieve economic independence. After 
interviewing and surveying migrant women in Beijing, Jacka (2005) points out that many 
female migrant workers suffer from poverty and sexism before their migrations to Beijing. 
They intentionally decide to work in cities for the following reasons: to leave their 
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backward, poor hometowns and/or families; to develop themselves; to broaden their 
horizons; to exercise independence; and to receive education. Jacka concluded that these 
urban job opportunities enable women to explore the world, to gain independence, and to 
redefine their identity as someone more than a daughter and a wife (pp. 55-62). Similarly, 
Goodburn (2015) also believes that urban job opportunities improve rural women’s living 
situations significantly: 
While [migrant] women’s burden of work in cities may not be much less 
[compared with their burden of agricultural work in their hometowns], their 
subordinate status is subtly changed, at least societally if not necessarily within 
each household, with the increase in participation in paid labour and the distance 
from husbands’ parents. (p. 336) 
While many female migrant workers develop a sense of autonomy, they are struggling at 
the same time. For example, Pun and Chan (2012) explore the hardships of migrant 
workers after discussing the case of Tian Yu, a female migrant worker in Foxconn, who 
survived after attempting to commit suicide. To and Tam (2014) write, “the fact is that 
they [migrant workers] still receive poorer welfare benefits… [and] they are also blamed 
as the causes of social problems.” (p. 1329)  
Whether or not women from rural China choose to become migrant workers, the 
development of science and technology, which results in the rapid expansion of the 
manufacturing industry in China, provides women— especially rural women who only 
receive minimal education— an extra option besides conducting agricultural work in 
their hometowns. Besides female scientists, engineers, and migrant workers, the 
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development of science and technology also contributes to the increasing number of 
businesswomen. Dong Mingzhu (董明珠) and Hu Weiwei (胡玮炜) are the two most 
representative figures whose success significantly resulted from the development of 
science and technology. Dong began her career as a salesperson in 1990 at Gree 
Company, which is famous for producing air conditioners. In 2012, she became the 
chairperson of this company. As a highly successful company, in 2017 the revenue from 
Gree air conditioners in China was 123.41 billion Yuan (approximately 18.3 billion USD) 
(“Gree,” 2018). Moreover, air conditioners produced by Gree have been exported to other 
Asian, African, Latin American, and European countries. Gree’s success is widely 
attributed to Dong’s efforts and intelligence. At the same time, Dong is also widely 
recognized as a highly successful Chinese professional woman.  
Compared with Dong Mingzhu, Hu Weiwei’s path to success has been different, 
even though both of them took advantage of scientific and technological developments. 
Hu began her career by building an online platform while Dong began her career as a 
traditional salesperson. Inspired by the rapid development of information and 
communication science and technologies, Hu set up the company Mobike. This company 
centers on a bike-sharing scheme. People download the Mobike App into their 
smartphones in order to use it to unlock bikes. When they finish using the bikes, they can 
leave the bikes almost anywhere and finish the rental process by using the app again. By 
December, 31, 2017 there were 200 million registered users, and Mobike was active in 16 
countries by May 2018 (Smith, 2019). Because of the success of Mobike, Hu, who was 
born in 1982, became one of the youngest and most prosperous businesswomen in China.  
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Although not many businesswomen are as successful as Dong Mingzhu and Hu 
Weiwei, many Chinese women set up small businesses, especially online shops, to 
become self-employed workers. Previously, it was expensive and complex to own a shop, 
because the person needed to pay rent for a store and get a set of licenses from the 
government. However, the development of the Internet makes the path to opening a shop 
much cheaper and easier. Alibaba, a world renowned company in e-commerce, was 
founded in 1999 in Hang Zhou China. Alibaba enables businesspeople to sell products 
without renting a physical place and without needing to obtain the many required licenses 
from the government. In this way, Alibaba provides many people, including women, job 
opportunities. As Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba has said, Alibaba contributes 
significantly to female entrepreneurship. Ma (2017) claimed that 
More than one-third of its founders were women, with a similar percentage taking 
senior management roles. Women are well-represented within Alibaba, with the 
ratio of female employees once nearing 50 percent, and is only slightly watered 
down after a wave of mergers and acquisitions of overseas assets. 
Also, half of the sellers on its gigantic Tmall and Taobao marketplaces are women, 
and a greater proportion of storefronts with higher positive user ratings have 
female owners. 
These are clear manifestations that the internet has helped equalize the playing 
field and enabled women to create and pursue opportunities to flourish in their 
own right. (as cited in He, 2017) 
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By running online shops, some women have become rich and successful. For 
example, in 2018, the Wall Street China reported on the successful career of Zhang Dayi, 
who began her business as an owner of an online clothing shop. Using pictures of herself 
wearing the clothing she sold in her shop as a guide for how to be fashionable, Zhang’s 
online shop has become famous and has gained many loyal followers. On 11, November 
2017, the sales of Zhang’s online shop exceeded 170,000,000 Yuan (about 25,000,000 
USD) daily (“Will Zhang Dayi’s Company,” 2018). In fact, it has become a trend for 
many Chinese women to become self-employed as owners of online shops. They focus 
on their interests such as clothing, cosmetics, and specialized talents (e.g. painting and 
language skills), to achieve economic independence and gain self-fulfillment. 
However, we should notice that despite their successes, many female online shop 
owners are being strongly denounced. They are labeled as “Internet Red/ Wang Hong/网
红” , which has a derogatory connotation. They are accused of using their influence to 
make Chinese women obsessed with superficial concerns such as buying excessive 
clothes to chase fashion trends and of commercializing their bodies to make profit.  
Moreover, since their businesses are primarily women-related, they are not viewed as 
seriously as other businesses. In addition, in order to attract customers, many of these 
women try to build personal connections with their customers, which results in them 
being vulnerable to overwork and abuse. For example, in 2012, a 24-year-old female 
online shop owner “艾珺 Aj,” whose shop won recognition as a diamond shop since it 
was deemed high-quality and trustworthy, died from overwork. It was reported that in 
order to run her shop, she took only five hours of sleep and put all the rest of her time 
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into her shop (“A 24-years-old online shop owner,” 2012). However, because she was 
self-employed as an online shop owner, her death from overwork did not receive any 
material compensation. Furthermore, in 2015, “Xiao Mei,” an owner of an online 
homeware shop, was raped by five men who lured her out to discuss her products 
(“Beautiful Online Shop Owner Was Raped,” 2015). These two cases reveal that the 
working conditions for owners of online shops are not necessarily stable or safe.  
Although the development of e-commerce has not avoided or eliminated sexism 
or provided sufficient protections for women who are self-employed, it offers Chinese 
women another opportunity to make a living independently. With the development of 
science and technology, an increasing number of Chinese women have more 
opportunities to become career women whether they are in cities or in rural areas and 
whether they receive college education or not, although sexism continues to be a problem. 
Consequently, despite discrimination against women in the workplace, Chinese women 
are more likely to become independent working women who take control of their lives. 
Online Feminist Activism Against Sexual Violence 
As argued in Chapter Three, traditional Chinese women were expected to be 
submissive in their marital and familial lives. However, with an increasing number of 
women receiving education and becoming professionals accompanied by the popularity 
of the discourse of The New Woman that criticizes traditional submissive women in 
contemporary China, many women began to question the legitimacy of the requirement 
for women to be submissive and to realize that, like men, they should be equally 
respected. This change is explicitly reflected in Chinese women’s increasingly strong 
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attitudes against sexual violence. For example, on March, 2015, five young feminist 
women protested against sexual harassment on public transportation in Beijing, the 
capital city of China. However, on March 6, they were arrested, which happened two 
days ahead of International Women’s Day. This case reveals the serious tension that is 
created by the increasing number of Chinese women who engage in feminist movements 
and the Chinese government’s political goal of building a society that is stable and free 
from conflicts, activism, and complaints.  
In this context, many women shift their locations of resistance against sexual 
violence from offline to online spaces, utilizing the internet and social media. For 
example, a group of feminist activists imitated the play Chicago to make a video “China 
Scumbag Illustration” that lists and criticizes the six most typical forms of sexual 
violence in China and posted it online (Tu & Hu, 2018). In the video, Tu and Hu replay 
the life experiences of six women who killed their boyfriends and husbands due to the 
unendurable sexual violence they suffered. The first women was betrayed by her husband 
who not only slept with many women but also categorized these women based on their 
sexual behaviors and labeled his wife as dead hutong.54 The second woman was suffering 
from domestic violence. She was beaten frequently and violently by her husband using 
his favorite instrument: a saxophone. The third woman was driven to kill her husband 
because he killed her adopted children since she wanted to have a child but her husband 
lacked the ability to reproduce. The fourth woman was used by her boyfriend as the 
                                                 
54Hutong/胡同 means alley. Through comparing the woman to a dead alley, her husband criticized the woman for his 
betrayal of their marriage, arguing that it is the woman’s fault because she lacked sexual attraction for him.  
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scapegoat for his crime of transporting and hiding heroin in her apartment. Moreover, in 
order to escape from the punishment, her boyfriend called the police to report her  
address. The fifth woman was suffering from her ex-boyfriend who stalked, harassed, and 
threatened her every day since their first encounter following their breakup. The next 
woman killed her husband because he killed their baby girl since someone was willing to 
pay for their baby girl for a ghost marriage.55 This video was widely discussed online. 
For example, due to its high search frequency, in November 2018, the hashtag “China 
Scumbag Illustration” was the highest trending topic on Weibo, the Chinese Twitter. 
Despite many Chinese netizens’ disagreements with the radical approach that the six 
women took to end their suffering by killing these men, most viewers commented that 
this video truthfully depicts the predominant forms of sexual violence that are prevalent 
in Chinese society and that Chinese women have the right to fight against sexual  
violence. This video reveals how Chinese women utilize the internet and social media to 
resist sexism, to criticize sexual violence, and to exert feminist influence over the society.  
In fact, in recent years, many social activist movements that target sexual violence 
have happened online. One of the most successful movements is online anti-domestic 
violence activism, which significantly contributed to the implementation of China’s first 
anti-domestic violence law on March 1, 2016. Legette (2017) focuses on the discussion 
of domestic violence on Chinese online platforms, especially the Weibo account Feminist 
                                                 
55Ghost marriage is a traditional Chinese cultural practice of sending a wife to accompany the dead male members of 
their families, which is still performed in some Chinese areas. To perform ghost marriage, people usually hold wedding 
ceremonies for dead men and women to announce that they are couples. Some people also kill women and baby girls 
and bury them with men to perform ghost marriage.  
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Voices, and argues that the online platforms have contributed to China’s politics and 
society in the ways as “raising awareness and fostering normativity of an anti-domestic 
violence stance; [forming] anti-domestic violence CSO [Chinese Civil Society 
Organization] network; [and]linking the online discourse to offline action” (pp. 2270-
2272). Similarly, Tan (2017) highly evaluates the impacts of the online anti-domestic 
violence activism, stating: 
During the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence campaign and 
the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women in 
November 2012, feminist activists in China launched a petition for legislation 
against domestic violence which was eventually enacted in December 2015. (p. 
178). 
In this activism, many women use their bodies as the battleground. For example, 
many of them post their nude photos online with words written on their bodies with their 
faces covered or absent, which can hardly be done offline in the conservative Chinese 
society. Tan (2017) analyzes this action and describes one of the pictures as “inscribed on 
her [Xiao Meili who is a Chinese feminist] torso were two columns of Chinese  
characters: ‘Shame on domestic violence / Proud to have [a] flat chest’” (p. 178). Tan 
argues that in this way, Xiao Meili asserts that women should never be held responsible 
in any way for being victims of domestic violence for any reason. In arguing that social 
media has become the core political resource for young Chinese feminists, Li and Li 
(2017) also invoke the example of the online activity of women uncovering breasts to 
fight against domestic violence. They point out that Chinese women use this activity, as 
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well as other similar strategies to attract the most public attention in order to efficiently 
send out their messages regarding their intolerance of domestic violence, and to create 
strong public pressure for the Chinese government to respond and to make legal changes.   
In short, the online anti-domestic violence activism has helped Chinese women to 
identify the manifestations of domestic violence, thus they realize that violence includes 
both physical and mental abuse. Additionally, this online activism enables many Chinese 
women to express their requests for being legally protected and respected in their 
marriages and families, provides victims of domestic violence with resources to seek help 
such as China’s Anti-Domestic Violence Network, and creates strong social pressure for 
the Chinese government to address the issue of domestic violence. These efforts have 
later resulted in the enactment of the anti-domestic violence law that has the potential to 
save millions of women and children from being abused.   
Although the internet and social media are helpful in terms of providing a safer, 
relatively anonymous space for women to bravely and openly criticize sexual violence 
and advocate for social changes, these technologies do not resolve the tensions between 
women’s demands for equality and independence and the government’s conservative 
attitude towards social activism. For example, although the video “China Scumbag 
Illustration” was popular and recognized by most of its viewers as Chinese women’s 
determination to demand for social justice that they deserve, one day after it became 
trending on Weibo, it was banned all over the Chinese internet by the government. 
Although the government hasn’t provided an explanation for this action, it is likely that 
the part of the video that depicts the way the women end intolerable sexual violence 
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irritated the government. It is possible that the six women who killed the men that 
suppressed them can be interpreted more as social disruptors rather than feminist fighters. 
Consequently, this video was banned likely because the government prioritizes stability 
of the society over ending sexism. Besides banning this video, the government also 
banned the Weibo account Feminist Voices, which had significantly contributed to the 
online activism against domestic violence in March 2018. Fincher (2018) interviewed a 
Chinese feminist and borrowed her words to explain the ban, writing: 
[The feminist Lü Pin] says the fact that the Chinese government felt the need to 
crack down so harshly on feminist social-media accounts was a sign of just how 
successful the feminists had been in tapping into the urgent needs of women 
across China and striking a nerve with the mainstream public. (p. 51) 
Despite the government’s increasingly strict censorship concerning online 
comments that indicate and demand for social change, Chinese women are resilient and 
try to speak out against sexism. For example, many Chinese women still engage in the 
#MeToo movement, a topic that is strongly censored by the government through deleting 
comments and even banning some participants’ social media accounts. In order to avoid 
being caught, instead of using the hashtag “#MeToo,” many Chinese women used two 
emojis  and  when they talked about their past experiences of being sexually 
harassed and even damaged on campuses, in their workplaces, and in public spaces.  
refers to rice, which in Chinese sounds like “me.”  refers to rabbit, which in Chinese 
sounds like “too.” So when put these two emojis together, it refer to “Me Too.” Through 
this code, they demand for social change.  
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The online activism against sexual violence reveals how the internet and social 
media have empowered Chinese women through providing them an important space to 
build solidarity and more importantly to resist sexism and make political demands. In  
fact, as indicated by Kuah-Pearce (2008), “by embracing the Internet and the cyberspace, 
[many] women have accumulated significant socio-cultural capital and are creating a 
feminized virtual space for their use” (p. 43). However, while serving Chinese women, 
the internet and social media are under the strict control of the Chinese government. 
Consequently, although the internet and social media mediate the tension to some degree 
between women’s engagement with feminist activism and the government’s conservative 
attitude towards any social activist movements, they have not resolved the tension in a 
fundamental way. 
This chapter has explored the implications of science and technology for Chinese 
women’s lived experiences as wives, mothers, and professionals. Through focusing on 
the developments and uses of science and technology to promote marriage and family, for 
population control and family design, to promote the discourse of the super mother, and 
for women to gain independence and resist sexual violence, this chapter has demonstrated 
that science and technology are closely articulated with traditional Chinese culture, the 
Chinese politics, and the discourse of The New Women to exert gendered influences.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
This final chapter includes three sections. The first summarizes the main 
arguments in this dissertation. The second explores the theoretical and practical 
implications of my findings. The third addresses a limitation of this dissertation and my 
future directions of research.  
Summary: Cultural Stories of Science and Technology and 
Chinese Women  
This dissertation has brought together scholarship from cultural studies, gender 
studies, contemporary Chinese studies, and science and technology studies to explore the 
implications of science and technology for Chinese women. More specifically, this 
dissertation answers the following questions: what’s going on with regard to science and 
technology in the era of reforms? What are Chinese women’s lived experiences in the era 
of reforms, and how do science and technology impact them? I tell two stories—one 
about science and technology and the other about women in contemporary China—to 
summarize the main arguments in the previous chapters.  
The first story is about science and technology. They have existed in Chinese 
culture for thousands of years. The ancestors of the Chinese people deeply respected 
science and technology, which for them were mysterious powers that were difficult to 
control, figuring the people who mastered scientific and technological skills as gods and 
goddesses. Over time, Confucianism gradually replaced myth as the ideological 
foundation of Chinese culture. As a philosophy that strongly emphasizes people’s 
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subordination to the government and education but humanities education exclusively, 
critical thinking as well as STEM education were profoundly underscored. However, this 
doesn’t mean that Confucianism had only negative impacts on science and technology. In 
fact, due to its two emphases, Confucianism contributes significantly to the STEM fields 
in contemporary China, as the Chinese government promotes STEM. Besides 
Confucianism, Daoism, as the most traditional Chinese religion, also impacts science and 
technology in Chinese culture. In order to survive in the society to attract followers, 
Daoism shifted from a philosophy that promotes the idea that people should not pursue 
scientific and technological knowledge, which would not be beneficial, to a religion that 
focuses on exploring scientific and technological world to find out ways to live healthily 
and remain immortal. Due to this shift, Daoism has made significant contributions to 
STEM, especially medical science.  
In the 18th century, with invasions from Western countries equipped with 
advanced weapons, two socio-cultural and political movements, the Westernization 
Movement and the New Culture Movement, emerged, arguing that science and 
technology should be highly prioritized. Since then, Chinese society has increasingly 
emphasized science and technology. In the era of reforms, with the Chinese government’s 
promotion of science and technology and strong support of STEM projects and  
education, science and technology are venerated as being nearly omnipotent, able to solve 
almost all social, economic, cultural, and political problems. An increasing number of 
Chinese people believe that through using advanced scientific and technological artifacts, 
they can better their living situations, and the Chinese government believes that science 
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and technology are crucial to achieve almost any political purpose. At the risk of 
oversimplification, contemporary Chinese culture strongly celebrates science and 
technology. 
My first story is about science and technology, and my second one is about 
Chinese women. Chinese myth promotes the image of a good woman: she should have 
babies and be willing to sacrifice herself for her babies. Moreover, she should be a caring 
beauty who is subordinate to her parents and her husband. The Chinese language 
reinforces the idea that as a woman, your reproductive function is most crucial. 
Confucianism states that women are restricted to the domestic sphere and should not 
receive much education or find jobs since their destinies are pre-arranged as marrying 
men chosen by their parents and sacrificing themselves for their husbands, their babies 
(especially baby boys), and their parents-in-law. Daoism, at the same time, argues that 
unmarried women unbalance society and nature. Besides these social and cultural 
pressures, the Chinese government also supports the idea that women should get married 
and have babies, expecting that women will “tame” unmarried men, who are viewed as 
potential social disruptors, and will give birth to future laborers who are important for 
Chinese economic development. Accordingly, the Chinese government has conducted 
many political practices to persuade, compel, and discipline women to become wives and 
mothers. The social, cultural, and political expectation for women to get married and 
have babies is strong to this day. As a result, similarly to Chinese people’s emphasis on 
food, which results in them greeting each other with “Have you eaten?” it is common that 
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Chinese women will be asked about their marital and reproductive status when they meet 
new people. 
While Chinese women are expected to become wives and mothers, they are also 
expected to become professionals in the era of reforms. The discourse of The New 
Woman promotes the image of an independent and well-educated Chinese woman. 
Facing the political and economic needs to include women into the workplace, the 
Chinese government has implemented several policies to promote women’s education 
and encourage them to find jobs. The traditional roles and the new role often conflict, 
requiring women to navigate tensions. For example, many Chinese women prefer to 
become teachers because these positions are more stable and usually have longer  
holidays, so they can have more time to take care of their families. The discourse of the 
super mother, which argues that women have the ability to have good careers and at the 
same time to become good mothers single-handedly, has become popular. This discourse 
basically argues that if women fail to balance their families and careers without 
complaint, they are not capable enough.  
My third story puts my first story about science and technology and my second 
story about Chinese women’s roles together. In the context of the veneration of science 
and technology in contemporary Chinese culture and women’s expected roles as wives, 
mothers, and professionals, science and technology have significantly impacted women’s 
lived experiences, especially by promoting marriages and families, population control 
and family design, and the discourse of the super mother; while also helping some gain 
independence and fight against sexual violence.  
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Through focusing on several technological artifacts, these implications were 
revealed. For example, through inserting the function “Apply for Marriage Certificate” 
into the popular app Alipay, the Chinese government aims to encourage more Chinese 
people to get married. The government also prohibits single women to receive the 
treatment of egg freezing, hoping through limiting single women’s access to have 
biological babies they will get married and have “normal” families. Moreover, many 
dating websites in China promote their products by reinforcing the social, cultural, and 
political pressure for single women to get married.  
For the aspect of population control and family design, the Chinese government 
has disciplined and even compelled women to undergo abortion, sterilization, and IUD 
insertion to ensure the implementation of China’s family-planning policies, which restrict 
the number of babies a family is allowed to have. Additionally, due to the Chinese long 
tradition of emphasizing women being mothers and gender selection, many Chinese 
women have been trapped by IVF, which makes their infertility “treatable” and gender 
selection “easy and accurate.”  
Breast pumps, as well as children’s medicines, are promoted by taking advantage 
of the discourse of the super mother, which reinforces the traditional gender roles in a 
family as only mothers should be children’s caretakers. For instance, breast pumps, often 
advertised as making professional women in the period of lactation worry-free, represent 
these women’s struggles as something that can be easily solved by science and 
technology, but it is not this simple. Companies that manufacture children’s medicine 
often promote their products by emphasizing how their products can enable women to 
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provide professional care for their children efficiently. Thus women can not only be 
professional in their careers but also in their families. However, there lacks an emphasis 
on fathers’ roles in child rearing, which reinforces the tensions that many women have 
experienced between their careers and familial responsibilities.   
The development of science and technology also enables some women to gain 
independence through offering them job opportunities, even though sexism in the 
workplace has seriously impacted their professional development. For example, an 
increasing number of Chinese women become scientists and engineers, and with the 
industrialization of China many rural women who receive little education are able to 
leave their hometowns and to work as migrant workers in cities. Moreover, internet and 
social media, though they are under the strict censorship of the Chinese government, still 
provide Chinese women a crucial site to engage in social activism to fight against sexual 
violence in their families and workplaces.  
This dissertation narrates cultural stories of science and technology and Chinese 
women in the era of reforms. It reveals that in this era, some traditional forces continue to 
have profound impacts, but new forces have emerged; some old articulations are being 
dis-articulated while new articulations are beginning to take effect. As a result of this 
process of maintenance and change, science and technology are elevated to supreme 
status and influence contemporary Chinese culture in significant ways. Various forces 
and articulations, which have created alignments, tensions, and conflicts, have also 
affected Chinese women’s lived experiences, resulting in the perpetuation of some of 
their traditional roles and responsibilities as well as the introduction of new ones. My 
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cultural stories explore the impacts of science and technology for Chinese women’s lived 
experiences in the era of reforms: not only their powerless positions, reinforced by 
science and technology and resistant to change, but also their resilience against sexism 
and their efforts to better their living situations through strategic use of science and 
technology.  
Theoretical and Practical Significance  
This dissertation contributes to the field of cultural studies mainly through 
discussing the gendered implications of science and technology, which have been 
explored by many Western cultural theorists but rarely by Chinese scholars. This 
discussion is important since as discussed in Chapter Two in the recent decades science 
and technology have developed rapidly in China. Moreover, unlike the Western context 
in which there are many voices arguing that the impacts of science and technology are 
not good overall, the main discourse in China applauds the general goodness of science 
and technology. This one-sided discussion can be harmful. As a cultural researcher, I 
hope this dissertation, which maps some implications of science and technology for 
contemporary Chinese women, will invite other Chinese cultural theorists to engage not 
by asking whether science and technology are beneficial or harmful, but exploring how 
science and technology affect people’s lived experiences and rethinking the roles and 
impacts of science and technology in contemporary Chinese culture.  
My analysis reveals that in contemporary Chinese society, science and technology 
articulate with many elements, especially the Chinese government’s policies and 
traditional Chinese culture. These two articulations have exerted significant impacts on 
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Chinese women’s lives, such as disciplining them to conform to sexist cultural and 
political expectations. Thus, researchers who aim to understand the gendered influences 
of science and technology in China should pay special attention to the elements of 
Chinese politics and Confucianism, realizing that science and technology are most 
tenaciously articulated with these two elements. In summary, instead of asking whether 
science and technology influence Chinese women positively or negatively; researchers 
should first attend to the Chinese government’s political practices, since in Chinese 
society, the government’s attitude fundamentally shapes women’s access to and use of 
science and technology. Then, researchers should turn to traditional Chinese culture to 
explore how traditional cultural ideas, which play crucial roles in Chinese society, have 
become articulated with science and technology in ways that impact women. After that, 
researchers can examine other elements, such as class and economic background, to study 
the various impacts of science and technology for different women.  
Besides the theoretical significance of this dissertation to the field of cultural 
studies, this dissertation also contributes to the field of women’s studies in China. 
Women’s studies, which is often known as fu nv yan jiu/妇女研究, emerged in the era of 
reforms. Du (2005) records the history of the development of women’s studies:  
[The field of women’s studies] arose out of the “Open & Reform Policy” in China 
in 1980s…. In 1982, Social Science Abroad…first mentioned women’s studies…. 
At present, women’s studies in mainland China is still in the early stage of 
development.  (p. 40) 
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As described by Du, this field is still young, thus it needs researchers to bring different 
perspectives to facilitate its continued development. This dissertation is my effort to 
engage in the scholarship in women’s studies through addressing several primary 
commitments of this field. Based on Chow, Zhang, and Wang (2004), the field of 
women’s studies in China has the following commitments: 
(1) a commitment to make feminism and gender the theoretical and the principal 
analytical concepts of women's studies; (2) an engagement [with] scholarship 
from outside China through a series of reading/discussion[s] [to] evaluate the 
relevance of this scholarship to the Chinese context; (3) [education] and faculty 
development by combining scholarship with teaching inside and outside China for 
theory building, curriculum development, [and] pedagogy; and (4) 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches targeting [the following] 
disciplines: history, sociology, and education. (p.167) 
My dissertation brings in the method of “articulation” from the field of cultural studies; a 
field that was born and has been mainly developed in the West, to explore how gender 
matters in the era of reforms. My dissertation shows that this field provides a useful 
analytical framework that can be used to analyze culture in other contexts. Thus, cultural 
studies can be fruitfully incorporated into the field of women’s studies. Moreover, by 
focusing on the issue of science and technology, this dissertation enriches women’s 
studies by adding an important analytical perspective, which is crucial in contemporary 
China, which elevates science and technology above many else. However, in China there 
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is a lack of researchers in women’s studies to investigate the gendered impacts of science 
and technology. I hope to encourage more to join the field.  
In the global context, an increasing number of scholars (e.g. Lykke 2002; 
Haraway 2003; McNeil 2007) have noticed that the intersection of feminist studies, 
science and technology studies, and cultural studies is worthy of research and have 
proceeded to explore it. Thus, this dissertation, which forms the early scholarship in the 
Chinese context, contributes to women’s studies by laying groundwork that scholars from 
women’s studies can further develop.   
Besides this theoretical significance, this dissertation makes two major practical 
advancements. First, through exploring women’s lived experiences in contemporary 
China, this dissertation sheds light on the trajectory of Chinese women’s empowerment 
and specifically their fight against sexism. This dissertation reveals that in contemporary 
Chinese society, gender is articulated with other issues such as the Chinese government’s 
political practices and traditional Chinese culture to influence gender asymmetrically. 
Thus, in order to better women’s living situations, the Chinese government should 
carefully consider the gendered influences of its policies before implementing them. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Two, due to the deeply-rooted idea that Chinese 
people should be subordinate to the government, the Chinese government’s role in 
counteracting sexism is crucial. Thus, the Chinese government should recruit more 
feminist politicians, not in decorative positions, but in positions that can enable women to 
voice their requests.   
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Apart from the government, Chinese people, especially people who work for the 
mass media industry, should promote ideas that support gender equality to supplant old, 
sexist ideas. For example, TV series that depict real independent women who are 
successful without relying on their fathers or partners should replace the current popular 
TV series that often depict how women become successful only after attracting rich,  
loyal, and sophisticated men to help them. Moreover, some successful TV series from 
foreign countries that focus on career women who solve problems independently should 
be imported into China to replace the current popular Korean TV series that often 
celebrate love between poor young women and successful middle-age men. Promoting 
the image of independent women in popular culture is important for changing the 
traditional Chinese idea of women as being subordinate.  
This dissertation also reveals that some Chinese women have used effective 
strategies to fight against sexism. For instance, they have used feminist theories to argue 
that sexism is not legitimate; and used science and technologies to form solidarities, 
engage in activism, and open options for themselves. Thus, Chinese women should 
remain receptive to feminist ideas. Moreover, the women who can have closer 
interactions with feminist ideas and theories, such as scholars in women’s studies, should 
work on interpreting these ideas to make them more accessible and should promote these 
ideas to other women. If more Chinese women can participate in social movements to 
voice their requests for gender equality, this collective power would not be easily ignored 
and could promote change over time.  
220 
Second, through analyzing the status of science and technology and mapping the 
living situations of Chinese women in the era of reforms, this dissertation presents my 
understanding of contemporary Chinese culture, the reform and opening-up policy, and 
Chinese women, which can help other Chinese people as well as foreigners to understand 
contemporary China from a cultural studies perspective. With the rapid rise of China as 
an influential global power, many people have become curious about the reasons for 
China’s accelerated development and the trajectory of China’s future. This dissertation 
suggests that science and technology play important roles in terms of propelling China to 
become prosperous. Because of this, it is very likely that the Chinese government will 
continue to promote science and technology, hoping that they can further facilitate 
China’s development. Accordingly, the Chinese government will most likely further 
strengthen its practices of encouraging Chinese people to receive higher education in 
STEM, investing a large sum of money in Chinese people’s education and STEM fields, 
bringing in foreign experts in STEM, and cooperating with other countries on STEM 
projects.  
This dissertation also reveals that despite China’s rapid developments in the past 
decades, sexist ideas still remain tenacious in Chinese society and even more so in the era 
of reforms. In Mao’s era, promoting gender equality was a key focus of the Chinese 
government, resulting in the political propaganda of iron women and the abolishment of 
arranged marriage. However, in the era of reforms, since the Chinese government 
primarily concentrates on developing the economy and evaluates the country’s 
performance and Chinese people’s living situations mainly through numbers, many 
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humanistic aspects are trivialized. Accordingly, although the government still claims that 
men and women are equal, they have not implemented as many significant political 
practices as Mao’s government did to empower Chinese women. The lack of government 
attention to the issue of sexism will affect Chinese women in increasingly detrimental 
ways, resulting in more unfair treatment of women in their workplaces and in their 
marital and familial lives. I believe that besides developing the economy, the Chinese 
government needs to put more effort into the humanistic aspects of the Chinese society, 
such as fighting against sexism. Although economic performance is crucial for a country, 
what enables people to live happily also includes the government’s efforts to make the 
country a fairer and more just place where people, regardless of their gender, can gain 
more access to self-fulfillment and live their best lives.  
Limitations and Further Directions 
This dissertation can be expanded by incorporating a more detailed discussion 
concerning the differences between the lived experiences of rural women and urban 
women. Although Chapter Four, which argues in one section that science and technology 
have provided working opportunities for women, points out that an increasing number of 
rural Chinese women have left their hometowns to do menial labor in cities, Chapter 
Three, which focuses on women’s lived experiences, as well as other sections in Chapter 
Four, could benefit from more discussion concerning the unique experiences of urban and 
rural women.  
This discussion is crucial when researchers want to study Chinese culture because 
the differences between rural and urban women’s living situations are striking. For 
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example, according to the International Labour Organization, Chinese women are “more 
likely to be in agriculture than men,” which “signals a greater sticky floor for women 
impeding their mobility” (Dasgupta, Matsumoto, & Xia, 2015, p.10). This means that 
compared with urban women who have more freedom and access to earn livings through 
their intelligence, many rural women are still limited to their households and to 
agricultural work. Moreover, unlike many urban women who are able to receive college 
and even graduate education, a large number of rural women can only receive middle-
school or at most high-school educations after which they are expected to work as low-
skilled migrant workers or to get married and have babies. Accordingly, the impacts of 
science and technology can vary profoundly for rural and urban women. I should pay 
more attention to the aspect of geographical difference, which would make my analysis 
of women’s lived experiences in the era of reforms more careful, detailed, and persuasive.   
Because of this limitation of my dissertation, I plan to conduct more work to 
explore rural women’s lived experiences in my future research. More specifically, I want 
to focus on the group of left-behind women, who are also known as Niu Shou Fu Nv/留
守妇女, to explore how science and technology have impacted them.  
Left-behind women are rural Chinese women whose husbands are away from 
their hometowns as migrant workers. These women are left behind to take care of their 
aged parents and parents-in-law, raise their young children, and do agricultural work. 
Even before the era of reforms, some women were left behind by their husbands who 
worked away from their hometowns. But in the era of reforms, left-behind wives have 
become a pronounced social phenomenon as the government’s relaxed control over 
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population mobility, the building of many foreign factories in China, and the 
development of transportation science and technology have made it easier for working 
men to travel. According to Zhang and Zhang (2006), the number of left-behind women 
had reached 47 million in 2006 (p.15). Moreover, many researchers (e.g. Chen, Qin, and 
Zhu 2005) have reported that these women often suffer from heavy workloads, 
psychological stress, and no safety. To understand the implications of science and 
technology for rural women, it is important to explore how science and technology 
influence left-behind women by mapping the ways that these women are using them and 
the differences they have created in their lives. I believe a comparison and contrast study 
of the implications of science and technology for leftover women, who as I discussed in 
Chapter Three, are single, professional, urban women and for left-behind women who are 
married, poorly-educated, rural women will not only help to map a more comprehensive 
landscape of the living situations of Chinese women in the era of reforms, but will also 
generate some inspiring new understandings of how science and technology are 
articulated with genders, classes, educational backgrounds, and economic situations to 
impact these women in diverse ways.  
Moreover, I believe my dissertation could be strongly enhanced by including 
additional first-hand data collected through further fieldwork, such as observing some 
Chinese women’s daily lives as well as conducting interviews and surveys with them, 
which is also my future research direction. I plan to interview 30 Chinese women who 
have used the internet, dating websites, IVF, egg freezing, and/or breast pumps. My 
interviews will be organized based on the following five questions: what motivates you to 
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use these technologies? What is your experience of using them? Based on your 
experience, how do you think science and technology are influencing women? What is 
your understanding of women’s constraints in contemporary Chinese society? Do you 
think science and technology help you to overcome these constraints? I want to combine 
Chinese women’s narratives of using science and technology with the interpretations of 
the implications of science and technology for them that I have made in this dissertation, 
which were developed mainly based on my analysis cultural artifacts such as songs,  
films, and TV series. 
Last but not least, I am also considering studying the implications of science and 
technology for men as my follow-up project of  this dissertation, in which I map the 
gendered the implications of science and technology for women exclusively. As with 
women, Chinese men are also strongly influenced by science and technology. For 
example, the increasing number of Chinese male homebodies/Zhai Nan/宅男—the group 
of men formed in part by the availability of the internet who usually have jobs or are 
supported financially by their parents, prefer to spend their money and time on 
videogames, and are fascinated with fictional women in these games and in comic books, 
but have no interest in marrying real women or having children—reveals that science and 
technology have also influenced Chinese men’s lived experiences in significant ways. 
Thus, it will be interesting to explore how science and technology impact Chinese men 
and women differently. I believe this exploration will enable me to better understand the 
gendered influences of science and technology.  
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In general, this dissertation explores the implications of science and technology 
for Chinese women. In doing so, this dissertation sheds light on contemporary Chinese 
culture. Through laying out a groundwork, this dissertation invites more research that can 
contribute to gender studies, cultural studies, and science and technology studies in the 
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Appendix E Copyright documentation 
Figure 2.1 Bagua In A Coin. This photo was taken by the author. The author owns the 
copyright of this image. 
Figure 2.2 A Collarbone Holds Coins. This photo was taken by the author. The author 
owns the copyright of this image. 
Figure 2.3. Rice Stamp.This photo was taken by the author. The author owns the 
copyright of this image. 
Figure 2.4 Pork Stamp. This photo was taken by the author. The author owns the 
copyright of this image. 
Figure 3.1 The Image Of Taiji. This image was drawn by the author. The author owns the 
copyright of this image. 
Figure 3.2 Screen Capture Of Online Articles On Leftover Women On Xin Hua Net. 
These articles are from a publiclyavailable online source. The author took the screen 
capture. Citation and attribution information is available in its caption. 
Figure 3.3 Stamp Of The Year Monkey (2016). This photo was taken by the author. The 
author owns the copyright of this image. 
Figure 3.4 Stamp Of The Year Pig (2019). This photo was taken by the author. The 
author owns the copyright of this image. 
Figure 3.5 A Poster Of An Iron Girl. This poster is from a publiclyavailable online source. 
Appendix I contains the fair use evaluation document to demonstrate the author’s fair use 
of this image. Citation and attribution information is available in its caption. 
Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5 Screen Captures Of The 
Commercial “Because Love Won’t Wait.” This commercial is from a publiclyavailable 
online source. Appendix II containsthe fair use evaluation document to demonstrate the 
author’s fair use of this image. Citation and attribution information is available in its 
caption. 
Figure 4.6 A Screen Capture Of The Message From Zhenai Wang. This message was 
retrieved from the author’s personal communication and the screen capture was taken by 
the author. Citation and attribution information is available in its caption. 
Figure 4.7 An Advertisement To Promote The Children’s Fever Reducer Mei Lin. This 
image is from a publiclyavailable online source. Appendix IV containsthe fair use 
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evaluation document to demonstrate the author’s fair use of this image. Citation and 
attribution information is available in its caption. 
 
 
 
